# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
## East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-94-148* *2 August 1994*

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## Paper Views Socialist Rally in Support of Nano

*AU0108144594 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 30 Jul 94 p 3*

[Report by Martin Leka on Socialist Party rally held in Tirana on 29 July: "If Hie himself Were There, Besides His Shadow..."]

[Text]

### Before the Rally

It seems that the state, whether under yesterday's dictatorship or today under... (what can we call it today?) always has its own scripts and stagecraft to protect its power. For instance, when E. Hoxha travelled somewhere, not only the highway but the hedgerows and bushes were scoured for fear that somebody might be hiding there who might dispose of Hoxha and with him his regime. Today's regime too is at pains to preserve its "throne." With this in mind, it did two strange things a year ago: It imprisoned the chairman of the largest opposition party, and "gave a drubbing" with rubber truncheons and even imprisoned some of the organizers and participants in a semi-legal, semi-illegal rally that was held. Fear or the experience of the rally of a year (minus one day) ago, has "taught" the government a lesson. Socialist Party [PS] leaders say that 400 people were arrested yesterday, although there was no rally. The PS headquarters was put under a "state of siege." By 1900 [1700 GMT] yesterday, the police had still not issued permission for the rally. There was a strong police presence on motorcycles on all the streets of Tirana today, especially downtown. Today, for instance, the opposition Socialists could not have held their rally where it was held last year, perhaps because it is very close to the presidency.

These were just some of the measures taken to preserve the power of a regime that the people themselves elected on 22 March [1992], and to keep public order in happy, democratic Albania...

### At the Rally

Perhaps the overcast sky and the showers, the long road to the Ali Demi sports field, which was reserved for the meeting, or perhaps fear inspired by yesterday's arrests meant that the attendance was not the same as last year. Nevertheless, thousands of people gathered at the Ali Demi sports field. Hundreds of others sat around the edge. The roofs of the apartment blocks were full. The residents of the apartment blocks perhaps had the privilege of seeing so many people for the first time, a privilege that they owe to the state, not the PS.

The emergence of the PS leaders on the terrace of the sports field that served as a rostrum was greeted with loud and prolonged cheers. However, the hero of all these thousands of people was not on the rostrum. He was down among the people on the field, on the dozens of pictures held aloft: Fatos Nano! The rally was accompanied to the end by cries of "Freedom, democracy"; "We love Fatos Nano"; "We want a constitution"; "We want work"; "Down with the dictatorship"; and "Whether we live or die, we will free Fatos Nano." Musa Ulqini, PS chairman for Tirana, opened the rally, and said at the start of his speech, "we have gathered here today to raise our voices of protest in defense of the human rights and freedoms violated on every side by the Berisha regime." He went on to say that the participants had come to the outskirts of Tirana to tell the regime that anyone who trifles with the opposition trifles with democracy and its destiny. "For we Socialists, the ideals of the students of December [1990] and real democracy are sacred, and we are therefore protesting today against those who have betrayed these ideals." He went on to say that nobody would have believed that the symbolic cry of "Freedom, democracy" three years ago would still be shouted today. The most flagrant case, the speaker continued, is the arrest, imprisonment, and sentencing to 12 years imprisonment of Fatos Nano. We are determined to defend Nano, because we are convinced that he is a true patriot of this country, who has a sense of responsibility for Albania's destiny. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians and democratic Europe share this conviction, Mr. Ulqini continued. He went on to say that we today know better than ever how valuable Nano is to Albania. Even though the regime hastened to shut him up in Ali Pasha Tepelene's fortress, nobody can forbid us from shouting, "We love Fatos Nano!" Mr. Ulgini went on to speak on the lack of a constitution, theft and vandalism, a roundtable of parties, early elections, and so on.

Prof. S. Pellumbi, PS deputy chairman, then took the rostrum. He said that they were gathered on the anniversary of the imprisonment of PS Chairman and Parliamentary Deputy Fatos Nano in order to say "no" to political revenge and "stop" to the police state, and not to have any political prisoners. The three-stage judicial farce that concluded yesterday with the sentencing of Fatos Nano was a disgrace to Albanian justice and another step toward the consolidation of a regime with a strong hand that tramples on the independence of the judiciary. We have gathered to show that the time of dictatorship and dictators has left Albania once and for all. He then spoke about the problems currently preoccupying the country, and said that they had gathered to tell Berisha that his demagoguery about human and rights and freedoms was now exhausted.

Monika Kryemadhi, deputy chairwoman of the Eurosocialist Youth Federation, spoke about the dangers threatening Albanian democracy. Our country, she said, is suffering from the fever of an extreme intolerance that is attempting to divide the Albanians from one another, whose clearest symptom is the sentencing of PS Chairman Fatos Nano. She later said that the action of the judiciary under political instruction shows that dictatorship is deep-rooted in Albania. The Eurosocialists have clearly stated their view of the Nano case, which

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will cast a shadow over Albanian politics until it is solved. It affects the destiny of Albanian democracy, and not just of a transient political regime. It is the legitimate right of the opposition, faced with police terror and Berisha's rule, to shout "Freedom, democracy," Monika Kryemadhi said in conclusion.

The veteran Nexhmi Dibra and one of the leaders of the Socialist Women's Forum then addressed the rally.

**After the Rally**

The participants dispersed peacefully. At the exit, a plain-clothes individual attempted to seize from a child who was shouting "Free Fatos Nano" the picture he was holding in his hand. However, the child ran off, shoving the portrait under his sweater and hugging it to his chest.... Meanwhile, the main road was blocked by large police forces. On the route downtown, all the bridges over the Lana were blocked by police vehicles, which did not allow even ordinary passers-by to proceed in the direction of the center. Hundreds of policemen and vehicles guarded state buildings and institutions. Meanwhile, private traders continued their work in peace. There were many IFA vehicles used by the rapid deployment forces which were in constant movement. What a lot of policemen Albania has...?! What a lot of people...!

Today, Fatos Nano has again cast his shadow over the capital city! It is only his shadow. If he himself were here, besides his shadow...?

## KOHA JONE Wins Court Case Against Printer

*AU0208062994 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 30 Jul 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "KOHA JONE Emerges Victorious From Duel Sought by Director of Printing Works"]

[Text] The case brought by the First Tirana Printing Works, represented by its director Angjelin Luka, against the newspaper KOHA JONE, represented by its director, Nikolle Lesi, opened at 1300 (1100 GMT) yesterday. The matter under consideration was the sum of $50,000, which the plaintiff claimed KOHA JONE owed the printing works. Mr. Andi Celiku, deputy president of the Tirana District Court, was the presiding judge. He called for explanations from both sides. The printing works' case was destroyed by documents and paying-in slips used by KOHA JONE and in the possession of Nikolle Lesi. KOHA JONE's counsel, Mr. Maksim Haxhia, put forward his arguments and refuted the entire case. After half an hour in court, KOHA JONE's director produced some more documents that exposed the absurdity of the case, and the printing works were even ordered by the court to return to the newspaper the sum of 414,480 leks that had been paid twice to the printing works' account. After this, the printing works' director, Angjelin Luka, lost heart and was obliged to accept the facts presented, although in a subdued voice. It must be admitted that Mr. Celiku, the presiding judge, was punctilious in his judgment, in contrast to his error three days ago when he ordered the blockade and sequestering of KOHA JONE's assets.

The court session also exposed the many delays of the Albanian banks in their transactions.

Director Angjelin Luka failed in his suit, a case he apparently raised together with some member of the government (let us remember that the printing works is state-owned) in order to achieve the privatization of the printing works without its workers, who have worked as compositors for decades on end. We emphasize that the court proceedings raised doubts over the destination of the leks shown with the help of documents to have been paid in by the newspaper's director.

KOHA JONE has changed from a defendant into a plaintiff and is demanding that the printing works return the sum of 414,480 leks unjustly paid into its account.

## Opposition Papers Protest 'Economic Censorship'

*AU0208062894 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 30 Jul 94 p 2*

["Memorandum" to Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, signed by Shpetim Nazarko of DITA INFORMACION; Nikolle Lesi of KOHA JONE; Ilirian Zhupa of POPULLI PO; Aleksander Cipa of JAVA; Thoma Ceilci of ZERI I POPULLIT, and Prec Zoysi of ALEANCA, in Tirana on 29 July: "Memorandum Before a Strike"]

[Text] Before we decide to suspend publication as an act of protest against savage economic censorship, we, the representatives of the newspapers KOHA JONE, DITA INFORMACION, POPULLI PO, JAVA, ZERI I POPULLIT, and ALEANCA, feel obliged to remind Mr. Aleksander Meksi, prime minister of Albania, of the need to take urgent measures to free the press from absurd taxes and tariffs. All the raw materials for producing newspapers are at European prices, to which are added the taxes and multiple customs duties imposed by our state. In the meantime, Albania, although a small and poor country without a press distribution agency, surpasses Europe and the United States in the level of taxation imposed on the press. Moreover, the average salary in Albania is $50 per month, so that we cannot sell newspapers at European prices.

The government has been instructed by Mr. Sali Berisha, president of the Republic, to act in favor of the claims of the press. The government has had time to obtain the necessary information about the state of the press and to be convinced that a free press in a democratic country cannot be treated as a form of economic activity, but is an expression and defender of democracy. Without a free press, the universal right of expression and information is degraded into an empty phrase.

We are not only endangered, but deeply insulted by the government's policy of differentiation toward the press. We cannot accept the discrimination with which we have

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been treated by the National Privatization Agency and the National Housing Agency, which assist only the government press, regardless of the fact that they administer national assets. We cannot accept the taxes, tariffs, and the destruction of the distribution network, which, taken as a whole, exhibit the outlines of a strategy to bankrupt the independent and opposition press. We ask the government to act without losing time, suspending customs duties on raw materials for the press, lifting the 15 percent turnover tax, and subsidizing certain expenses of the printing works, with the aim of reducing newspaper production costs.

If the government fails to respond to our entirely justified claims and demands, we will first go on strike and will then seek other ways in which to free ourselves from the claws of economic censorship. We cannot leave the country without an independent and opposition press, and we therefore welcome the solidarity of other newspapers and of intellectuals with our demands.

All those who feel obliged to do something for the existence of a free press are welcome to sign this memorandum, a copy of which can be found in the editorial offices of each of the newspapers concerned.

### Commentary on Relations With U.S., Britain

*AU0108112694 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 24 Jul 94 p 2*

[Unattributed commentary: "The Anglo-American Salvation of Albania: Washington the Armed Wing, London the Diplomatic Matchmaker for the Albanian Question"]

[Text] W. Perry, U.S. defense secretary, and D. Hogg, British secretary of foreign affairs [title as published], are the two highest-ranking politicians to have visited Albania this year. Their arrival one after the other, with just a day in between, has its own significance. It once more confirms that our politicians today, in stark contrast with what E. Hoxha used to say, see British-U.S. cooperation with our country as the salvation of Albania and not as an Anglo-American threat to it.

Earlier, at the beginning of political pluralism, asked if there were any possibilities of interference of the National Front's policy into that of the PDSH [Democratic Party of Albania], one of its founders, the well-known writer and journalist P. Zogaj said that, with rusty weapons and the musty old slogans of the Ballists [nationalists], one could never compete on the historic stage of a parliamentary society. It seems that, in addition to weapons and slogans, he ought to have mentioned old alliances too. Our friendship with the United States and Great Britain is accompanied by an almost haughty disregard on our part toward other countries, mainly European ones, which from time to time have repeatedly manifested an interest in Albania, even though taking a critical view of its current political developments. Let us see what the political moment was like on the foreign policy front when these two visits took place. Italy, after Tirana's rejection of friendship without any obvious reason, recently called off Deputy Prime Minister Roberto Maroni's political trip to Albania. It may have been a fair thing to do, because alienation in foreign policy relations is always reciprocated. Greece finally reversed its veto that had been blocking the European Union aid of 5 million ECU, but [Foreign Minister] Papoulias refused to cross the Albanian border at the Kakavija crossing. It is only there that a meeting can take place, not in Tirana. German Foreign Minister Kinkel, who had appointed himself Albania's defense lawyer, turned out to be Greece's. As is known, Germany in its capacity of holding the EC presidency, will conduct a special mission to investigate and monitor the situation of the Greek minority in Albania, and only after this will the decision be made on whether or not to give the second half of the aid to Albania. France, as they say, by domestic internal orders prohibits Albanians from entering its territory. A few months ago, a sports team, supposed to take part in the Mediterranean Games in Montpellier, was allowed to cross the French border with Italy only after a clamor had been raised in the press, even though all the team members had the proper documents. Meanwhile, the European Inter-Parliamentary Union, its commission of deputies, is shortly expected to state that the trial against the opposition leader, Fatos Nano, is a political trial and the protagonist himself is a prisoner of conscience. Under such circumstances when the critical attitude of democratic Europe is becoming ever more emphasized, it becomes clear that the visits of Perry and Hogg can, not only in the figurative but also in the literal sense, be characterized as Albania's Anglo-American salvation.

With Perry, the actual ruling elite in Tirana put in order the armed wing. "We are on Albania's side; we are not leaving Albania alone," the U.S. defense secretary said. From Britain's Hogg it obtained diplomatic mediation, matched ever since Dr. Berisha's and later on Mr. Selami's visits to London. [sentence as published]

Judging from what was publicly stated about the visit of both America's Perry and Britain's Hogg, it seems that both of them just came to see Albania to extol its democratic victories, to prove that things had changed dramatically, to congratulate the current government, and that is all. However, it would be ridiculous naivete to think that the people can believe that Perry came to Albania just to recite Noli's verses, and Hogg to find out what had happened on the Rinas-Tirana road.

It is known that Hogg's mission started last May at least, when he was in Belgrade and Prishtina to persuade, at Albania's request, the conflicting sides to sit at the negotiating table. It is known how that stage of his mission ended. There happened to be some journalists in Prishtina who asked him in what capacity he had undertaken the trip, and he, without the least equivocation, answered: "I speak also on behalf of the EC."

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He set out as a British minister but then arrived as an undeclared emissary of the EC, having one overt and another covert mission, which he was compelled to declare only when asked to respond to the media. Here in Tirana, fortunately enough, there was no one to ask him about it. However, even without asking him, it is clear that the visit by the British secretary of foreign affairs had to do neither with Albania alone nor with the Albanian question in general, whose resolution seems to have been entrusted to him by both the Albanian leaders and the great decisionmakers.

The mission of the U.S. defense secretary needs no comment: It had to do with U.S. regional policy, not only at the Balkan level but also on a larger scale. His visit was part of several days of visits to seven or eight countries of central and southeastern Europe. It is quite natural, therefore, for the United States to build up a different policy of cooperation in Europe, when in two or three months' time Russia could adopt the Partnership for Peace initiative with NATO and even enjoy a special status. It looks like a failed attempt to intrigue Europe and its political institutions in the British-U.S. friendship. The loss of weight of this policy in the eyes of the public can be easily discerned by recalling only one thing: How was U.S. Secretary of State James Baker received nearly three years ago and how was his colleague received last Thursday, three days ago. In 1991, the citizens of Tirana were ready to carry the U.S. minister on their shoulders, together with his car, from Lapraka [on Tirana's outskirts] to the city center, as if he were coming down from heaven. But last week, Tirana's sky was being monitored from very early in the morning by dilapidated Army helicopters, not so much for security for Mr. Perry's visit as to show him the desire and will to put everything at his disposal for the success of his tour. On this occasion, we could see that Minister Zhulali is a closer friend to the guest from the United States than President Berisha.

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## Parliamentary Group Declaration on SDS Council

*AU0108163594 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 28 Jul 94 pp 1, 2*

["Declaration" issued by the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces in Sofia on 27 July]

[Text] The greatest achievement that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] secured in the democratic changes in Bulgaria was to eliminate the one-party totalitarian system and to elevate the freely elected parliament as the state's supreme body.

The SDS parliamentary group represents the millions of Bulgarians who voted with blue [SDS] ballot papers. Its deputies are the selfsame persons who toured the country before the elections, assumed commitments and responsibilities to the electors, and formed the basis of the success in 1991. The SDS parliamentary group is the group that drafted and ensured the passing of exceptionally important laws that implemented real changes in the people's lives and led to our acceptance into the Council of Europe. We formed and supported the first democratic government in Bulgaria.

In the name of preserving unity and maintaining the SDS's authority, we postponed raising a number of pressing issues concerning the leadership of the SDS coalition. The SDS parliamentary group is still waiting to receive an answer as to why the so-called Konstantin Mishev case [Mishev was an adviser to Filip Dimitrov involved in dealings with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], which led to a series of unilateral acts that culminated in the premature fall of the government, was allowed to enter the debating chamber of parliament without the group's knowledge or participation.

The SDS parliamentary group was not even informed of Edvin Sugarev's one-man hunger strike that led to a wastage of social energy and exertions on the parliamentary group's part, with the sole result of causing the resignation of Vice President Blaga Dimitrova.

The SDS parliamentary group was obliged to react after events had occurred due to the absence of a clear strategy and tactics. The SDS lost the mayoral elections in Nesebur—one of the most important municipalities in the country. The group's political opponent—the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]—was replaced by the leadership of the National Coordinating Council, with its endless search for the enemy carrying a party membership card within our own ranks.

The SDS parliamentary group complied with the resolutions of the Sixth SDS National Conference. However, the form of boycott that the National Coordinating Council leadership selected and imposed turned out to be insufficiently considered, unsuitable, and not supported by extraparliamentary actions as the conference recommended. The only result of this form of boycott is to facilitate the work of the BSP-dominated parliamentary majority. It also nullified some of the successes that the parliamentary group achieved during the past year and a half when in the plenary debating chamber, "although in the minority," it managed to stop changes to laws that we had adopted and to obstruct the voting through of laws blocking the democratic processes.

The truth is painful, but unless we carefully reassess it we cannot make progress.

We do not want to have anything to do with the apparatchik-type and careerist squabbles provoked by the present SDS leadership. This leadership has proved that it is incapable of handling the present political situation.

For the SDS parliamentary group, no other struggle exists apart from winning the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which is the way to rescue the country from the crisis, defend our citizens' tranquillity and security, and build a free and democratic Bulgaria. With this aim in view, the SDS parliamentary group will not cease opposing the BSP by all parliamentary and extraparliamentary means. Our voice will be heard both in parliament and everywhere outside. We will do what is necessary to unite all the noncommunist organizations and individuals who are ready to work for a convincing victory of the democratic forces.

[DEMOKRATSIYA editorial note] The declaration that the SDS parliamentary group adopted yesterday was approved by the votes of 54 deputies; two voted against, six abstained, and 20 deputies were absent from the meeting.

## Savov Remarks on Democratic Party Suspension

*AU0208064494 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 27 Jul 94 p 6*

[Interview with Democratic Party Chairman Stefan Savov by unidentified TRUD correspondent; place and date not given: "Filip Dimitrov Is To Blame for the Suspension"]

[Text] [TRUD] Mr. Savov, last Monday [25 July] you were sure that it would not be easy to remove the Democratic Party. Yesterday, however, the National Coordinating Council almost succeeded in doing this, by freezing your membership.

[Savov] I still believe even now that it will be very difficult to remove us. I told the National Coordinating Council this, despite the resolution passed by the parties that usually support Filip Dimitrov's proposals. We do not accept any form of suspension. Since only the names of the Democratic Party and the RDP [Radical Democratic Party] appear under the political agreement, and since we were the only ones of the parties now represented in the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] to adopt the blue ballot paper and the SDS lion, they can only remove us with great difficulty. Furthermore, today all these ladies and gentlemen have acknowledged that we are the largest party.

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[TRUD] Why then did they vote for your suspension?

[Savov] This struggle started a long time ago. It is in no way a struggle between personalities, at least on my side. This must be stressed, because very frequently people ask whether this can be anything else than a contest between personalities. I cannot answer on Filip Dimitrov's behalf, but I myself have proved on many occasions that I fight for principles, not for posts. Parliamentarianism is our party's fundamental principle, and in my view it should a fundamental one for the SDS as well.

[TRUD] Does this mean you will not leave the SDS?

[Savov] No, of course not. We will not attend the National Coordinating Council meetings, because we do not want to force ourselves upon them. However, I think that events will take a dramatic turn from now on.

[TRUD] What do you foresee?

[Savov] I cannot tell you precisely. It was interesting that today Dimitrov once again repeated in the National Coordinating Council that the parliamentary boycott is senseless if no elections take place after 15 September. What will happen then? This means that we are forbidden to disobey the SDS conference decisions on 15 July, yet suddenly we on 15 September we can do so. There are many contradictions, and I cannot tell how things will develop.

[TRUD] Does the SDS parliamentary group stand behind you?

[Savov] I hope so.

[TRUD] Do you consider any specific individual to blame for your party's "temperature change"?

[Savov] Naturally, the person most to blame is Filip Dimitrov. He is the chairman, so he should assume the responsibility. However, many activists are also to blame, like Edvin Sugarev, Vasil Mikhaylov, and so on.

[TRUD] What was the aim of suspending your membership?

[Savov] You have better ask them. I think that some people have a false understanding of the concept of parliamentarianism. I have said that parliament is not like a game of backgammon in which, if the dice do not fall as you like, you close the board and say you do not want to play any more. We simply have to learn about parliamentarianism, because elections will take place sooner or later. However, very few people are motivated by idealistic principles. A large proportion of them are people who have no place in life and who—I am almost sure—could not have any better fate than what they imagine in their own daydreams, namely of being a parliamentary deputy or a minister. This is the point, and what worries me is that if we genuinely want to be realists, we should realize that the SDS lost disastrously in making this choice. I mean this as a serious warning. It is ridiculous, at this precise juncture, when we should be considering serious issues, for us to be asking ourselves how such and such a person could want to become a deputy.

[TRUD] Do you admit the possibility of this being a deliberately instigated process. I ask you this, because lately it appears as if people in the SDS are acting to the benefit of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]?

[Savov] Oh, I find this a very difficult question. I am not a person who is very prone to suspicions, but sometimes I begin to wonder why and how certain things are being done, and whether anyone is pulling the strings.

You know that in the last elections Asen Agov ran for parliament in Sofia's Nadezhda constituency against SDS candidate Stefan Radoslavov. Today Mr. Agov allowed himself to claim that he had registered as an independent candidate on SDS instructions. I asked him who gave him this instructions, and in front of the entire National Coordinating Council he said that Yordan Vasilev gave them to him. I do not believe that Vasilev could have given any instructions at that time, because he was only the editor of DEMOKRATSIYA. The people able to issue orders were Zhelyu Zhelev, Petko Simeonov, Petur Beron, and so on.... This was a very interesting disclosure.

[TRUD] Do you envision any difficulties in the SDS parliamentary group?

[Savov] At the moment, the group is functioning perfectly, because even with a reduced number of members present it succeeded in delaying the armed forces bill. Regarding the foreign debt ratification bill, it will be passed soon, although we will oppose it. Personally, I will not support it, but will continue to attend the plenary sessions of parliament.

## Party Leader on Ability To 'Coexist' in SDS

*AU0108190794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29 Jul 94 p 3*

[Interview with Georgi Petrov, chairman of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, BZNS, in the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, by Galya Nikolova; place and date not given: "I would Advise Filip Dimitrov and Ivan Kurtev To Read Some History"]

[Text] [Nikolova] Mr. Petrov, following the events of last Tuesday [26 July], how do you, the members of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Parliamentary Group, intend to coexist with the SDS leaders?

[Petrov] How should we coexist with them as long as they do not come to parliament?

[Nikolova] Do you know their whereabouts?

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[Petrov] I could not know, but they are presumably staying at the SDS headquarters in No. 34, Rakovski Street.

[Nikolova] Nevertheless, what are the relations between the SDS Parliamentary Group and the National Coordinating Council expected to be?

[Petrov] I could not decide this by myself. To a certain extent the mutual relations are settled by the SDS Statute. However, we have holiday time now, and we should all have a good rest. Perhaps, the passions will cool down in the meantime. Things are rather nebulous for the time being and nothing is certain. No one knows about the future tactics of the Union. I would like Filip Dimitrov and Ivan Kurtev to speak more clearly, and tell us whether the SDS is likely to win the elections or not. Unfortunately, such statements are becoming increasingly rare.

[Nikolova] Are you not afraid that your party might also be suspended?

[Petrov] I am not afraid, because we are a large organization. No coalition whatsoever could afford to deprive itself of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS], because this would mean losing the elections, or only winning a few parliamentary seats. No other party whatsoever has as many structures in the rural areas. There is even more: An organization, such as ours, which has a 94-years-old history, cannot be suspended. I would like to ask the esteemed gentlemen whom you just cited whether we should not learn from our mutual relations of the past? Since they claim to be good politicians, let them remember the People's Bloc of the 1931-34 period, when Democrats, Radical Democrats, and Agrarians formed a coalition. Unlike today, that coalition was not presided over by a chairman, nor did it ever happen that Aleksandur Malinov [head of the Democratic Party in those days] would have been telling Dimitur Gichev or Konstantin Muraviev [Agrarian leaders] which member of the Agrarian Party was entitled to run for parliament. Or should the present SDS coalition not profess the democratic principles of the past?

I cite the People's Bloc as an example because it ruled the country for three years, rather than 10 months as did the SDS coalition. This shows that the old coalition was guided by more correct principles of mutual relations between individual leaders and member-parties. I would advise Ivan Kurtev and Filip Dimitrov to read something about our recent history.

[Nikolova] Do you expect the Radical Democratic Party to be suspended?

[Petrov] I cannot say so, although the Radical Democrats are threatened by this danger. To suspend political parties with democratic traditions by no means adds to the SDS's good reputation. I think that those who are suspending such organizations are suspending freedom. I do not think the SDS leaders should be remembered in history by such actions. They are bound to become historical figures anyway, but it is infinitely more important how and by what actions they will be remembered in our country's history.

[Nikolova] Why, as a member of the National Coordinating Council, did you refuse to cast a vote of confidence in Deputy Stoyan Raychevski who was expelled from the Democratic Party?

[Petrov] It was not my personal decision, but the view of our party's Executive Council.

You should understand that the SDS cannot be a party, although it currently acts as such. The SDS cannot possibly meddle with the personal status of a given party member. The SDS is entitled to expel, to reprimand, or even to punish each of its own representatives. However, the interference of the National Coordinating Council with the internal affairs of member-parties is likely to affect its coalition character and to intervene with the affairs of sovereign coalition members.

Even people in the West would tell you that a party is entitled to join certain coalitions, when it is in its own interest, when its representatives have the chance of being elected as mayors, local government leaders, of winning parliament seats, or of achieving any other such positions on the basis of a given coalition. Whenever the party in question does not see any further advantage in a coalition, it may leave it. This is what the German Free Democrats did by first forming a coalition with the Social Democrats [SPD] under Helmut Schmidt, and later joining the Christian Democrats [CDU] led by Helmut Kohl.

When I was in Germany, people explained to me that this is not considered an act of treason in their country. The same happened with Churchill who was first prime minister of a Conservative government, while he later joined the Labor Party.

It is normal for a party to be independent. The SDS Coordinating Council is not entitled to decide which BZNS member should be elected to parliament. This would mean that the SDS will become a party. If this should actually happen, the BZNS will think twice whether it should join such a party. We do not like the word party as such. In the early days of the Agrarian Union, its founders, Yanko Zabunov and Yordan Pekarev, tried to avoid the term party, because of the peasants' intense dislike for it.

## Commentary Views Democratic Party Suspension

*AU0208065694 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 27 Jul 94 p 3*

[Commentary by Mikaela Vuzharova: "Beyond the Issue of Discipline, There Is a Sense of Pain"]

[Text] The National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], in conformance with the

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rules of the statute that all the SDS parties have accepted, voted by a two-thirds majority to freeze the Democratic Party's [DP] membership in the coalition. As ethics required, the DP took no part in the voting, and one other organization abstained. The suspension was approved by a mathematically precise two-thirds majority, no more and no less. The national council that coordinates the actions of the coalition took this measure as a result of a declaration issued by the DP that in the majority's view was in opposition to the decision of the last SDS national conference to declare a boycott of the present counterfeit parliament with the aim of forcing elections. The DP considers that this interpretation constitutes taking the decision out of the overall context of the resolutions passed by the national conference. Accordingly, it instructed its deputies to discontinue what it regards as the fruitless boycott and change over to an "effective" boycott. The deputies are to take part in the plenary sessions of parliament, defend the formulated positions of the SDS (not the DP), contest anything that is unacceptable to the SDS, and cast their votes accordingly. The chances of winning in a minority—to which the SDS deputies have been reduced following the split of the parliamentary group resulting from a series of betrayals of their electors by others who ended parliament thanks to the SDS voters—are not difficult to foresee, but here a different question arises.

A party refuses to submit to a decision of the majority. The majority establishes that a breach of discipline has occurred and deprives the party of its right to vote, thus facilitating its own further actions. So far, these are the natural consequences of coalition discipline, logic, and mathematics.

However, painful issues arise over and above these matters. By smoothing its path in a style very reminiscent of 1991, the SDS coalition has now severed part of its own body. Today, no substantial differences exist between the allies. None of them wants the reds [socialists] to win. This means that, by cutting off part of its own body, the SDS also cut itself off from its voters. Yesterday's disciplinary decision was not approved unanimously. Members of all SDS parties gathered outside 134 Rakovski Street [SDS headquarters], but they were divided into two groups, which stood on the sidewalks opposite one another. They did believe each other. Those supporting the suspension, who believe that the only way to get rid of this parliament is to walk out of it, do not believe the supporters of the suspended party, who consider that they will overthrow parliament only if they continue to take part in its debates. Distrust leads to squabbling in the coalition, which partly explains the fall in the SDS's popularity rating. However, the arguments are not the cause, but the consequence. To claim the opposite is to bury one's head in the sand. Correct behavior toward the SDS coalition itself, honesty toward the electors, to whom the SDS is a question of belief, not mathematics, requires one to make a correct self-analysis, to take a look back into the past, without removing events from their historical context. It requires a review of the structure and internal rules for relations and, last but not least, a reassessment of the personal responsibility of the leaders who allowed two opposing groups of SDS supporters to appear on the sidewalk, and who permitted the demonstrative nonparticipation of SDS electors in by-elections for more than a year now.

### Berov Issues Schedule for Privatization 1st Stage

*AU0108143194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] The issuing of a decree on the organizational arrangements for the first round of mass privatization this year marks the administrative start of the mass privatization process, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov stated at the end of today's government meeting.

The decree defines the stages and main parameters of the first round of mass privatization. It prescribes that signatures for participation in the mass privatization are to be gathered from 1 September to the middle of October. During this period, privatization vouchers will be distributed and registered through local post offices. From the middle of October to the start of December, the vouchers will have to be exchanged for shares in enterprises chosen by the citizens concerned from the list, which in its present version contains 340 enterprises.

The prime minister announced that the list contains no hopelessly ailing enterprises, and he expressed the hope that, as a result of changes in management and work organization, the losses will be surmounted and the enterprises revitalized.

### GOR Leader Tomov Attacks Two-Party Model

*AU3107184594 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 25 Jul 94 p 4*

[Interview with Aleksandur Tomov, leader of the Civic Alliance for the Republic, GOR, by unidentified TRUD journalists in Bankya, near Sofia, on 20 July; published under the rubric "Figures in Present-Day Bulgaria:" "If Bipolar Model Is Retained, Bulgaria Will Disappear From Europe in Next 10-15 Years"]

[Excerpts] [TRUD] Mr. Tomov, let us go back a bit to when you left the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. What was the last straw that made you take this step?

[Tomov] In my view, it was not the result of a last straw, but a rather long period of taking stock of the situation. I had considered this question for at least a year. My zodiac sign is Taurus, and they are noted for their patience. For me to take such a step means that something very serious was happening around me and with me. I have stated my motives on numerous occasions, but one of them was decisive. During the last three years there have been certain serious developments in the country's economy. I can see that the country faces great and, I would say, historical dangers. These dangers

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frighten me as a human being and a citizen, and think that if I remain in politics I have to do something.

At the moment we are suffering something that the politician finds most grievous, namely political disintegration, and it is widespread. This creates a vacuum and causes a large proportion of the active population to avoid politics. With the economy in its present state, this in practice also means a loss of a sense of statehood. We can become a country with a shattered industrial structure and with an economy like that of an average developing state in Africa. We are moving in this direction.

This is also the reason for our loss of cultural identity and the depopulation that is usually associated with economic crises of this type. In the conditions of a new global society and total internationalization, we may gradually fade away from the map of the new Europe and the new world. That is the situation. I would not like such a thing to happen to Bulgaria, and this was my main motive for leaving the BSP, because I do not believe the BSP has any appreciation or understanding of these problems. [passage omitted]

[TRUD] How can the GOR [Civic Alliance for the Republic], the party that you lead, do something that neither the SDS [Union of Democraic Forces] nor the BSP is capable of doing?

[Tomov] I have a scenario in mind that I would like to publicize now, and it is not solely connected with the GOR. The GOR has to act as a litmus paper, a uniting link between political forces undergoing reorganization that must in the final event give stability to the country and its economy. There is no doubt that we will have to ride some heavy punches, but I think that the GOR will try to impose different moral standards and propose a different model for debate in Bulgarian political life.

[TRUD] Does the GOR want to be in the center of our political life?

[Tomov] I do not agree with President Zhelev's thesis that it is difficult to talk about a political center in Bulgaria. This is so because our main parties are eclectic. The SDS contains Social Democrats, Radical Democrats, Christian Democrats, people of the extreme left and the extreme right—all in all, it is some kind of mishmash.... The BSP is the same. They have absolute communists, pure social democrats, and even liberal socialists. How, then, can the Bulgarian people orientate themselves? The actual center is destroyed, it has no image. We adopted a political document that states that the GOR should not form a center, is not a center, and is not trying to be one. We are seeking an alternative. We must make the two main political parties clarify their images and say what they are fighting for, because at the moment we have chaos. No one is prepared to say what kind of Bulgaria he is fighting for.

[TRUD] We all saw what happened in the mayoral elections in Veliko Turnovo and Sandanski....

[Tomov] In my view, there was nothing surprising in these elections, in which 66 percent of the electorate said no to the bipolar model. What kind of victory is this for the SDS or the BSP? In Sandanski the SDS lost 83 percent of the votes it received in 1991, while the BSP lost 45 percent. This marks the end of the bipolar model. What may happen from now on? Some sound formation will appear as an alternative, but it should not appear earlier than necessary. It must appear at the decisive moment, like Berlusconi did in Italy. If he had appeared four or five months earlier, he would not now be prime minister.

On the other hand, if the bipolar model is preserved, I believe that Bulgaria will disappear historically and strategically from Europe within the next 10 to 15 years and will be captured by other geopolitical fields of attraction. Sometimes, Bulgaria appears to me to be a patient left in the care of a third-year medical student. At a time when we have to decide issues of immense importance for the nation, it is simply unforgivable for those who have to make these decisions to be unprepared.

[TRUD] In the scenario that you described, do you give any place to the extraparliamentary forces, such as the trade unions?

[Tomov] The GOR has tolerable relations with the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and good relations with the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria]. We have supported certain actions undertaken by the KNSB and refrained from supporting others. We took no part in the KNSB's campaign this spring because we did not agree with their arguments, which were politically unrealistic, such as their aim to overthrow the government. Did this mean that we have to remain without a government for six months?

This spring we held broad consultations with centrist elements in the SDS and BSP to seek an alternative to the present cabinet. I can firmly declare that the attempt failed. I do not approve the policies of the Berov government, especially during the period from March to May this year, when they committed major errors. I think it is very important for the KNSB, instead of becoming a transmitting medium for any political force, to identify itself with a specific program. This is very important, and it is a reciprocal process. [passage omitted]

[TRUD] You said that the government committed serious errors in the first half of the year. It is clear that one of them was its late reaction to the rise in the dollar exchange rates. What were the other mistakes?

[Tomov] It made the mistake of implementing three highly unpopular measures at the same moment. Any sensible government does one thing in the first quarter, another thing in the second quarter, and so on. In our country they allowed the foreign debt deal to be blocked at the same time as they imposed the value-added tax

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[VAT]. There is no doubt that the introduction of the VAT was a very progressive act, as a result of which the budget revenues are now in order. Thanks to the VAT, for the first time in three years we have collected 52 percent of the planned revenue within the first six months of the year. The third mistake was the shock rise in the dollar exchange rate. These three shocks occurred within a time span of 20 days. It is very bad to impose negative economic factors at one and the same time, because then inflation increases in geometric proportions. [passage omitted]

[TRUD] Mr. Tomov, can you describe the activities of the 21st Century Foundation that you are in charge of?

[Tomov] I can tell you that the foundation has not effected a single commercial deal, though the time was very suitable for such activities. The foundation is a typical brain trust. It is mainly engaged on international programs and, to a lesser extent, on domestic ones. For example, it is no secret that one of the national security concepts that the Presidency has instructed seven or eight working groups to develop came from us. I would even venture to say it is one of the better ones. We have six projects under way with the European Community and with Bulgarian banks. The money comes mainly from them. Recently we received 24,000 ECU in payment for our creative efforts, which is equivalent to about 1.7 million leva. By completing seven or eight jobs of this kind, we solve our financial problems. The foundation publishes details of its income and expenditure every year.

[TRUD] Will the GOR use this money for its election campaign?

[Tomov] No, the GOR does not collect money in this way, but in the manner that the law prescribes for all the parties. We keep a special book with details of donations.

[TRUD] Have you received donations from the G-13 [group of prominent private Bulgarian industrial and financial organizations]?

[Tomov] Regarding this issue, I can tell you this: The name of every donor is recorded in the book of donations if he gives his permission. If not, we record the donation with a number, so that we know who it is. Accordingly, it is not ethical for me to tell you who stands behind each number. The GOR does not accept any donations under conditions, whatever they may be, nor does it accept donations from abroad. I would like to stress that we owe no one anything, in contrast to the SDS and BSP, who have not paid the rents for their headquarters on Rakovski and Pozitano Streets and now owe 6 million-7 million leva. However, the government has approved a moratorium on the payment of rents by political parties. This is a burden imposed behind the backs of the people. Even more shocking is the proposal that Margarit Mitsev and Ivan Kostov made, that the parties should be financed by the state. This is absolute and total insolence.

[TRUD] What will happen in Bulgaria after 1 September, the start of the new political season?

[Tomov] In my opinion, an interesting situation will develop in the autumn. All in all, there will be a trial of strength between the more centrist circles in the SDS and BSP, which oppose elections because of their internal interests, on the one hand, and the extreme groups that are strongly in favor of elections because they want to ensure that their own party power lasts forever, on the other. If elections are held under the existing electoral law, the two party headquarters, led respectively by Filip Dimitrov and Zhan Videnov, will win a total victory, because they will be leading their own friends. [passage omitted]

[TRUD] When the idea of forming a new government was mooted this spring, your name was mentioned as one of the potential candidates for prime minister, and later you were suggested as one of the deputy prime ministers. Do you want to be prime minister?

[Tomov] I have views on how the economy should be organized. Why should I take the job on now, without any guarantees of change? I told Prof. Berov and Dr. Zhelev that I cannot take on any job that is not in conformity with my understanding of economics. However, the problems of the economy must be addressed without delay. I have my own program, and will publish it when the right time comes. I would serve in a cabinet with anyone who commits himself to this program. At the moment the GOR has at least six or seven invitations from parties to form a coalition with them. However, if we form a coalition only to consider how we can force our way into parliament, this does not resolve anything. [passage omitted]

## Party Official Outlines Proposed Statute Changes

*94BA0311A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian 26 May 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by Stefan Radoslavov, chief secretary of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party: "Toward the 40th Congress of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, 17-19 June 1995: From a Party for Itself to a Party for Others"]

[Text]

### Necessary Changes in the Statute of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]

The statute is the fundamental law of our party. It describes the institutions and standards that, together, govern life within the party and its participation in the life of society.

After 1989, the fast and complex development of social processes in our country and within the BSDP itself made the adoption of new statutes at its 38th and 39th congresses necessary. Changes have become necessary now as well, at the 40th BSDP Congress, which will take

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place on 17-19 June 1994, at which the congress will discuss and adopt essential amendments and supplements to the statute.

The draft of such changes has been published for discussion within the party. Unquestionably, every social democrat will express his views and submit proposals aimed at improving the organization of our party. This is a major prerequisite for its further successes.

*What are the most important changes in the BSDP statute that are being proposed?*

**Social Humanism Is the Foundation of Our Policy**

As the foundation of BSDP policy, in addition to the "needs of society," the preamble of the statute adds "its views on social humanism." This seemingly minor addition is of major importance. It fills a logical vacuum—that any policy rests on the views about the means through which the needs of society must be satisfied but not directly on them. This addition enhances the role of the BSDP as an active factor in social life. The party not only expresses certain needs of society, but also is the bearer of its views on societal development.

Naming social humanism as a basic concept of the BSDP eliminates from social democracy the political philosophy of the pseudo-democratic policy of the BKP/BSP [Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party] regarding democratic socialism. The concept of social humanism, the foundations of which were laid by Dr. Atanas Moskov, the honorary chairman of the BSDP, marks a new stage in the development of the political philosophy of global social democracy. This concept is now developed through the efforts of the entire party.

When conditions become ripe, the BSDP will present its new views to us. It is necessary, however, at this time, for the party to proclaim that it bases its policy on the principles of social humanism. This distinction will be of great significance in the future in the struggle for dominating the left.

**Equality in Obligations—Equality in Rights**

It is proposed to reduce to two years or to eliminate altogether the trial period of BSDP membership before former members of other parties may assume a leading position, as Article 5, Paragraph 3, of the present statute now reads.

This proposal is based on the following:

Such a restriction is undemocratic. It is a type of political discrimination which violates the Constitution of our country, which has unreservedly adopted all the rights and liberties of man and of the citizen as the foundation of democracy in Bulgaria. Every citizen of the Republic has the right to define his own convictions and political affiliations freely and by himself. Every citizen of the Republic has the right to elect freely and to be elected to all leading positions in the state;

This restriction has become obsolete. It does not protect the party from "being taken from within" by members of other parties. No prohibitions in the statute could protect a party from foreign agents if the party were not sufficiently mature to protect itself from aggression. The BSDP has acquired adequate experience in political struggles. It has been subjected to hits from "the left" and "the right." It has adequate means to wage a struggle. This makes it unnecessary for it to protect its integrity via simple prohibitions. The party organizations have a full opportunity to assess the activities of every one of their members and to define his place within the party structure;

Such a restriction conflicts with the BSDP policy of "softening up" the BCP/BSP and limiting its influence in leftist circles. It intensifies the confrontation within society and serves the policy of the extreme right within the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] which is to "harden" the BCP/BSP, thus extending the bipolar political model in our country;

The restriction isolates the BSDP from the dynamics of changes in society and weakens it. It presents the party as a closed sectarian organization and rejects from it many people who have realized the error of their political orientation and who would like once again to be part of life. They, along with many nonparty people, are leaning toward other "broad" movements such as TsNP [Center for National Policy], the GOR [Civil Alliance for the Republic], and others;

The restriction enhances the fear of competing to assume leading positions within the BSDP, thus blocking the path of natural development of its leading cadres. Such a trend is much more dangerous than that of the penetration of foreign agents within the party. Anyone who works against the BSDP is sooner or later exposed and rendered harmless. Should mediocrity take over the party, it could "corrode" the party from within. Nothing other than competition can put an end to this.

The future of any party depends upon the organization's means of creating conditions in which a conscientious attitude develops among the members. The true social democratic not only does not fear competition, but creates it whenever it has been eliminated.

**Everyone Is Responsible for His Assignment**

A more precise draft of Article 6 is proposed to establish concretely the obligations of BSDP members. Particular attention is paid to the obligation to participate actively in the work of the party and to strengthen its reputation within society. The BSDP is a democratic party, but it is a party and not a cultural-educational organization. The party is a political organization which struggles for power. This is why it assigns other responsibilities to its members.

Democracy within the BSDP is determined by the way it makes decisions, and its authority in society by the

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means through which such decisions are implemented. Increasing exigency in implementing party decisions, combined with tolerant rivalry among its members, is a prerequisite for further development.

**Self-Defense Mechanism Through the Choice of Leading Organs**

Three proposals for changes are directly related to improving the mechanism for self-protection and for ensuring the high quality of activities of the leading party authorities.

Article 9 of the statute is expanded with a new text which makes it possible to propose penalties, including expulsion, not only by members but also by the leading party organs, ranging from the local committee to the Superior Party Council.

A new text in Article 34 of the statute allows the local organizations, as well as the Executive Bureau, to submit nominations for a future National Committee. This possibility will improve the mechanism for the choice of members of the supreme party authority, not only "from below" but also "from above."

A new Paragraph "F" of Article 35 guarantees democratic methods and empowers the National Committee, acting under certain circumstances, to remove from its membership members who work against the BSDP. The party's experience gained after the 1991 split makes it necessary for the BSDP to develop a protective mechanism. The leading BSDP authorities should not stand by helplessly watching destructive antiparty activities. A misunderstood democracy is the equivalent of political naivete, which is paid for dearly by the entire party. The proposed mechanism for self-protection through active control in the choice of leading party authorities is much more reliable compared to the prohibitions stipulated in Paragraph 3 of Article 5.

**Increasing Activity of All Structural Party Units**

Substantial changes are suggested in terms of the competences (rights and obligations) of all structural party units as well as in the interaction between them on all levels.

It is proposed to improve the structures and mechanisms of democratic unity in several areas.

**Correlation Between 'Local Organization and Superior National Organs of the BSDP'**

—The Congress, Superior Party Council, National Committee, and Executive Bureau.

The basic principle of autonomy of the local social democratic party organization, as stipulated in Article 15 of the statute, is redrafted as follows: The local party organization is autonomous in implementing the resolutions of the Congress and the Superior Party Council and must take into consideration the resolutions of the National Committee and its Executive Bureau. This way the principle of autonomy of the local organization is given a specific content.

We know that the correlation between "the local organization and the superior national party organs" is manifested mostly in decision making, which is the most essential aspect of the political process. The combination of the rights of the organizations and their authority in decision making through the entire party chain expresses the degree of its democracy and effectiveness. A combination of democracy and effectiveness in the activities of the Social Democratic Party is the main requirement of its organization, and this is the principle of democratic unity. Democracy in decision making should not hinder effectiveness. Conversely, the requirement of efficacy in making decisions and, above all, timeliness, should not violate democracy in the decisionmaking process.

The new draft of Article 15 provides an original solution: The higher the national party organ that has passed a resolution, the more autonomous becomes the local organization in its implementation, and vice versa. The local organization is autonomous in implementing the resolutions of the Congress and the Superior Party Council. However, it must take into consideration the resolutions of the National Committee.

In this way, the rights of the structural units within the party, including the autonomy of local organizations, are related to the very technology of decision making: The superior authority by necessity makes more general resolutions with a long-term effect, while the lower passes resolutions that are more specific and shorter. The more general a resolution is, the greater is the freedom granted in its implementation. Conversely, the specific nature of a resolution demands its strictest execution.

The experience of the BSDP indicates that a differentiated approach in determining the autonomy of the local organizations depends on the nature of the resolutions and the authority which has issued them. This is the best possible guarantee for preserving its democratic nature and upgrading its efficiency.

Politics is a lively and purposeful activity. It would be much more threatening to the BSDP if local organizations ignore the resolutions of the National Committee, which is the permanent superior party authority responsible for current policy, than nonimplementation of resolutions of a general nature. Furthermore, the possibility of boycotting the specific party policy for the sake of its "superior" objectives is also excluded; this is the most common aspect of various kinds of separatism.

By preserving the autonomy of the local organizations, the new mechanism to implement their autonomy protects the party from concealed or open counteraction and, in the final account, from divisiveness. It is thus that the democratic nature of the BSDP strengthens its unity. The BSDP is not a federation of regional parties: It is a single national party consisting of autonomous local organizations.

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So far, this basic principle in the organization of the BSDP had been merely the subject of a declaration. The new proposal on its application gives it flesh and blood.

The proposed mechanism for combining party democracy with unity has been experienced concretely by all of its members. It is necessary and useful.

**Correlation Among 'Central Organs-Intermediary Units-Local Organizations'**

The new draft amendment to the statute suggests the following:

The elimination of the national conference and the restoration of the Superior Party Council, which proved its effectiveness throughout the history of the BSDP. The national conference should be retained as a provisional decisionmaking body to solidify party programs on particular matters of importance to society.

As the highest permanent party authority, the Superior Party Council combines national leadership with representation of the individual areas. By reducing the membership of the National Committee from 101 to 51 members and by meeting at least once monthly, it may become a more efficient body. This will strengthen control over the work of the Executive Bureau;

Eliminating the regional conference and replacing it with a regional council, which will be a standing consultative as well as the coordinating BSDP authority, will restore the two-step nature in the BSDP hierarchy, simplifying its structure and upgrading the efficiency of its activities;

Extending the interval between congresses from two to three years is consistent with the cycle of the Socialist International and offers the possibility of stabilizing the organizational structure of the party.

**Correlation Between BSDP Chairman and BSDP Chief Secretary**

The current statute does not stipulate the obligations of the chief secretary of the party, who is elected by the Congress. The submitted drafts determine the division of labor between the chairman and the chief secretary, stipulating their official obligations and maintaining the balance between the two.

The chairman oversees the political process of the party in making decisions, while the chief secretary organizes their execution. Naturally, both of them participate in both phases of the political process. However, they must supplement and not duplicate each other. Discipline is applied in all party activities. Thus, the chief secretary is directly in charge of the party's finances. However, the chairman must sign all financial accounting documents.

**Correlation Between the BSDP and the Organs of the State Authority and Local Self-Government**

The draft sets forth the rules governing relations between the party and its representatives in the state bodies and local self-government. It calls for increased political responsibility by the social democrats participating in the government. It also defines the procedure for resolving arguments, and so on.

The draft of the BSDP statute contains some less important suggestions for changes, new and clearer drafts of some older texts, and other changes whose expediency does not need substantiation.

The fifth anniversary of the resumption of BSDP political activities will be celebrated in 1994. Within this period that was short but rich in events, it experienced successes and incurred losses consistent with its political activities.

The main success achieved by the BSDP during this period is its new self-identification, its assertion as a conscious social democratic party during the transition from totalitarianism to a civilian society. The party suffered heavy blows but endured. Today it is gathering strength for new activities.

From a party enclosed within itself, the BSDP has become a party for others, and the extent to which its influence on the life of society will grow depends on all of us.

One of the important conditions for accomplishing this is the improvement of our organization.

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## Foreign Minister Views Diplomatic Activities

*AU0208062494 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 27 Jul 94 pp 1, 3*

["Letter" from Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan to the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY editor in chief, "providing information on the process of implementing the Slovak Government policy statement;" date not given: "Promising Starting Position"]

[Text] If we take into account that the first priority task, indicated as such also in the government policy statement of April 1994 of the Slovak Government in foreign policy, is, above all, consistent work toward the long-term strategic objective—the integration of the Slovak Republic into proved international political, economic, and security structures—we can consider its greatest success the fact that Slovakia managed, in the relatively short time of its existence, to significantly develop and intensify its dialogue with the institutions and member states of these groupings.

We exert the maximum effort by means of personal contacts and the diplomatic representation network to conclude, by the end of November 1994, the process of the ratification in the parliaments of the EU member countries of the European Agreement, which could go into effect on 1 January 1995. To date, the agreement has been ratified by seven EU countries. Within the framework of the endeavors to speed up the implementation of the European Agreement on Association of the Slovak Republic to the European Union, the Government of the Slovak Republic will, in the very near future, discuss the proposal on the establishment of a coordinating consultation body—the Slovak Government Council for the Implementation of the European Agreement. By means of the newly established institution of the "shadow European correspondent," the prospects of closer coordination should improve the operation and involvement of the Slovak Republic in the activities within the framework of the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. The technical assistance from the European Union, amounting to 40 million ECU's, provided to Slovakia in 1994 within the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program, can be described as another favorable moment in the relations between the Slovak Republic and the European Union.

A great advancement was made in the relations with NATO and the security pillar of the European Union—the Western European Union (WEU). Within the context of joining the Partnership for Peace plan, the Slovak Republic submitted in May, through Defense Minister Pavol Kanis, the Presentation Document, which is an expression of our unequivocal will to become a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Slovak Foreign Ministry is currently working, in cooperation with the Defense Ministry, on the individual plan of the liaison between NATO and the Slovak Republic, and a permanent mission of the Slovak Republic was recently established at the political and military structures of the Alliance in Brussels. The character of the relations with the WEU acquired a new dimension by the granting of the associate partner status, which is, after the European Agreement, another specific step toward the integration of the Slovak Republic into the European structures also in the security sphere. At the session of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in Paris on 16 June, the Slovak delegation presented specific Slovak ideas regarding the future security structure of the European Continent, the fundamental elements of which are to be NATO, the WEU, and the CSCE.

The results of the inaugural conference on the Pact of Stability in Europe (PSE) are certainly among the indisputable successes of our foreign policy. The at first narrowly perceived concept of the entire initiative that was to focus exclusively on the minority and border issues was modified, thanks also to the activities of Slovak diplomacy, to the current expanded form of the original idea of how to solve social, economic, and other problems. We can say that the conclusions reached at the inaugural conference on the PSE are flexible and, at the same time, compatible with the norms and principles of the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Council of Europe. It is definitely favorable that the fundamental document of the PSE confirms the results of last year's EU Copenhagen summit and links the entire project to the prospects of the participating Central and East European (CEE) countries joining the European Union.

One of the government promises included in the April policy statement was to implement the recommendation by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, which Slovakia took on as an obligation last year, when admitted to the Council of Europe as a member. At this time, one can observe with satisfaction that, in the meantime, the legislative conditions have been prepared, the absence of which in the past was one of the reasons for doubting the operation of the democratic institutions in the Slovak Republic. From the point of view of the government's planned objectives with respect to the Council of Europe, the participation of our experts is also important in the final stages of the Framework Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities, the adoption of which will establish the, for us, so important European standard for the interpretation of the rights of ethnic minorities.

The good reputation of Slovakia in the world has also been reinforced by the participation in the UN peace operations on the territory of former Yugoslavia within the framework of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], which is very favorably viewed also by the international community. The Slovak work within the framework of UNPROFOR may be considered a specific contribution of Slovakia, which feels coresponsible for the maintenance of the peaceful development on the global scale and not only on the regional scale. Moreover, the Slovak Republic offered the use of the exercise centers of the

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Slovak Army as needed for the training of units deployed within the framework of the UN peace operations. As a result of this offer, 900 Pakistani UNPROFOR troops trained on Slovak territory up to the end of June. Thus, the prerequisites were created for a favorable reception of another Slovak offer—namely, to establish a training center for international peace forces on Slovak territory, which was made on 10 June at the Istanbul meeting of foreign ministers of the countries associated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

The past months were also characterized by the development of bilateral cooperation that was expressed by the numerous trips abroad by Slovak representatives and the reception in Slovakia of important foreign political personalities. The purpose of these visits was, above all, to intensify the political dialogue and dynamize cooperation in the most diverse areas, with the economic sphere being the key one. We consider it a positive signal that our politicians abroad are welcomed as guests and partners in important talks. It is a sign that a certain barrier of mistrust in Slovakia has been broken and that we are slowly acquiring the reputation of a dependable partner with a transparent foreign policy orientation.

From this point of view, we realize the importance of maintaining good partnership relations with the neighboring countries. Therefore, one of the priorities of the present government was to overcome the tense atmosphere in the relationship with Hungary, which has often been a reason for questioning the credibility of Slovakia in the past. With a certain dose of optimism, we can state now that, thanks to the accommodating measures on both sides, the fundamental conditions have been created for solving all of the problems. The signing of the fundamental political treaty on good-neighborly relations, the preparation of which we are working on intensively, should be the beginning of a new stage of Slovak-Hungarian relations. In the relationship with Austria, there have been unofficial working meetings between ministers of most sectors and the prime ministers of the two governments, and the official visit to Austria by the president of the Slovak Republic was a genuine pivotal point. All the visits reflected favorably, particularly on cooperation in the economic sphere and a favorable change in the information provided on the Slovak Republic by the Austrian media. There were some unused reserves in the cooperation with Poland. In addition to the need to complement numerous, mostly economic, contractual documents that should significantly dynamize economic cooperation, we are beginning to implement specific projects to complete mutual infrastructure, border crossings, and the development of cross-border cooperation. A visit to Poland by the Slovak prime minister, during which an entire parcel of agreements is to be signed, will take place soon. In relations with the Czech Republic, we endeavor to maintain their specific character by creating a favorable political framework needed for settling all of the unsolved problems. The favorable aspects of mutual relations include the coordination of steps of both countries in the field of international organizations. The Slovak Republic recognizes the great importance of the general development of relations with Ukraine. We are interested in a democratic, prosperous, and stable Ukraine. The frequency of visits and receptions by Slovak representatives to the EU countries and vice versa testify to the significance Slovak foreign policy attaches to the question of eventual integration into the European Union. I am convinced that the meetings represent a great move in the perception of Slovakia by the West European countries, and, at the same time, confirm the country's unequivocal orientation toward the European integration structures. The most important events from this point of view were the visits by the president of the Republic to Spain and Portugal, the prime minister's visit to France, and the visits by the foreign minister to the FRG, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, as well as the reception in Bratislava of the foreign minister of Denmark, N.H. Petersen.

In relations with the Russian Federation, the process of adding the finishing touches of the contractual-legal basis that should become the point of departure for economic and trade cooperation continued, while the emphasis is on securing strategic raw materials—fuel-energy ones, in particular. In the political sphere, we continue with our efforts to maintain and develop a balanced dialogue.

The interest in reinforcing the transatlantic dimension of Slovak foreign policy, declared in the Slovak Government Policy Statement, found its specific form in the intensification of the political dialogue between the United States and the Slovak Republic and in the realization of the visits by the Slovak foreign minister to the United States and Canada. We consider, above all, the improvement of Slovak relations with the United States to be a success of our foreign policy, and that is an important prerequisite for the fulfillment of certain strategic goals of the policy.

Of course, in planning activities in the bilateral sphere, we are not forgetting the remote regions of the world, cooperation with which appears to be promising, particularly in the economic sphere. From the vantage point of the establishment of important economic contacts, the visits by the foreign minister to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and the prime minister's visit to India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, above all, attained their objectives.

I am aware of the fact that a full-fledged assertion of the interests of the Slovak Republic is possible only if a high-quality foreign service is built. The concept of Slovak representative offices abroad, recently approved by the government, should also contribute to this. It can also be considered a favorable development that certain important ambassadorial posts have been filled, while the unfilled posts certainly harmed the international political reputation of Slovakia in the past.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the above covers only the most significant activities of our foreign

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policy in the most recent period. Even that suffices, however, for the reader to get an idea of the complexity and range of the problems the young Slovak diplomacy faces. In many instances, specific results do not appear before some time passes, but that corresponds to the character of foreign policy per se. It is difficult, however, to be successful on the international political scene without solid foundations and good starting positions. I believe that, precisely from this point of view, despite the short time span at our disposal, we have done a lot of good work.

### Anti-Klepac KSU Faction, SNS To Form Bloc

*AU0108145594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Jul 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "A Future in Association With the Slovak National Party"]

[Text] Dr. Bartolomej Kunc, a participant in the assembly held by the national-Christian platform within the Christian Social Union [KSU] in Zilina on 23 July, which was attended by 43 delegates from 21 districts, has handed a statement to our editorial office. We have selected the following from it: Driven by the endeavor to commit our votes and effort to the spirit of the appeal from Anton Hlinka and Julius Binder to unite the nationalist forces, we have decided to support the formation of a preelection National Bloc led by the Slovak National Party [SNS]. We see our political future in association with the SNS, whose program corresponds fully to the fundamental principles of Christian democracy and the national and social platform.

We appeal to the KSU clubs and members who identify with this decision, made by the Pan-Slovak assembly of our platform's supporters, and who want to support the nationalist forces in the elections to make their decision known as soon as possible to the secretariats of the SNS District Councils and, on the basis of mutual agreement, to join the preelection campaign that is already under way with the participation of the platform's representatives.

### FR-SRS, SD Establish Unofficial Coalition

*AU0208085594 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Jul 94 p 2*

[TA SR report: "Social Democracy"]

[Text] Representatives from the Forum of Workers-Party of Workers of Slovakia [FR-SRS] have decided, in view of the similarity of their policy aims and, especially, their limited financial capacity, to take part in the parliamentary elections on the slate of Social Democracy [SD]. (This party was founded a few days ago by a group of dissidents from Volf's Social Democratic Party in Slovakia that disagreed with the election coalition with the Party of the Democratic Left). There is one stumbling block, however: The two partners have not yet gathered the 10,000 signatures needed to take part in the elections. Nevertheless, they believe that they will be able to do this before 1 August, when they announce their candidates. FR-SRS First Deputy Chairman Milan Klobusnik is listed on the Bratislava slate of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], however. Vladimir Trnkus, a member of the SD leadership, said that his party has negotiated with the HZDS, the Farmers' Party of Slovakia, and other parties, but not officially. He emphasized that in no way does it suffer from pathological anti-Meciarism. Representatives from Romany social democracy and some special-interest associations should also be on the SD's slate. As far as financing the election campaign is concerned, representatives of the new, unofficial coalition said that they will undoubtedly be one of the most modest political entities to compete for the voters' favor in September.

### KSU Sets Up Election Coalition Bloc

*LD0108131294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Excerpt] Representatives of the Christian Social Union [KSU] analysed election-related topics at the regular news conference today. In this connection, party chairman Jan Klepac told our editor Ivan Belko the following:

[Begin Klepac recording] Last weekend, we handed over the KSU's lists of candidates for all four of the election regions. I am pleased to say that the KSU succeeded in forming an election bloc with the National Union of the Handicapped [Narodna unia zdravotne postihnutych], the Slovak People's Party, the Slovak People's Bloc [Slovensky ludovy blok], and the Confederation of Political Prisoners. Furthermore, our list of candidates even includes a representative of the Trade Union Kovo.

The bloc was formed not by mere talking and propaganda but by the willingness to share deputies' mandates with others. In the process of forming this bloc, the KSU did not break up the structures of the participating parties but integrated them into a single common entity. I think that, after the elections, this integration will result in the forming of a joint people's bloc. [passage omitted]

### Kosice-Based Party Applies for Registration

*AU0108200794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Jul 94 p 4*

[TA SR report: "A Party of Truth"]

[Text] The Party of Truth [Strana pravdy], a new political entity based in Kosice, recently submitted a registration application to the Interior Ministry. The application was accompanied by a petition including 1,000 supporters' signatures, as well as the party's articles and program.

### KDH, SKOI Name Election Leaders in Regions

*AU0108164794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 29 Jul 94 p 2*

[Article by "(sue)": "The Electoral First Choices—Carnogursky, Pittner, Simko, and Dzurinda"]

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[Text] Representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] and the Permanent Conference of the Civic Institute [SKOI] signed an agreement yesterday morning on preelection cooperation. They presented their candidates for the electoral regions at a meeting with journalists. I. Simko will campaign in Bratislava as the KDH's electoral first choice. J. Carnogursky will be the electoral leader in West Slovakia, L. Pittner will represent Central Slovakia, and M. Dzurinda will represent East Slovakia. F. Sebej in second place in Bratislava, A. Vavro in sixth place in West Slovakia, and P. Zajac in sixth place in Central Slovakia are the best placed of the SKOI candidates. J. Langos will represent the SKOI in eighth place in East Slovakia.

## MOS Head Says Egyutteles Screening Candidates

*AU0208083794 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 29 Jul 94 p 2*

[Article by "(vg)": "Hungarian Civic Party Chairman Nagy: Egyutteles Is Conducting Screenings Again"]

[Text] The negotiations involving the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS), the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), and Egyutteles have not made any progress since the ceremonial signing of the coalition agreement. According to MOS Chairman Laszlo Nagy, the reason is the pressure game being played by Egyutteles, which has begun to screen MOS candidates again.

According to him, Duray's movement disagrees with the candidacy of the mayors of Tornala and Filakovo—Arpad Schwartz and Tibor Kasza—whom MOS has nominated as its leaders in Central Slovakia. Although they both campaigned for the Party of the Democratic Left in 1990, they later joined MOS. According to L. Nagy, Egyutteles Deputy Zs. Komlossy has spoken out most strongly against their candidacy, and the MOS chairman voiced his concern that this involves a personal dispute. "Moreover, the two mayors have created hundreds of job opportunities in towns where there is high unemployment," he added. The MOS leaders—the party gained 9.0 percent of the places on the joint slate—are K. Petocz and K. Toth in Bratislava, L. Nagy and L. Meszaros in west Slovakia, and L. Pirovits and P. Mariassy in east Slovakia.

L. Nagy also said that his party has not been briefed on the text of the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and Hungary, which has already been submitted to the Hungarian Embassy in Slovakia. "It is wrong to ignore the representatives of the minority concerned," he added and remarked that the Hungarian Government has shown an interest in the views of the representatives of the Hungarian political entities in Slovakia. "The quality of the treaty would definitely not be diminished by such consultation," he added.

## Poll: 7 Parties, Groupings To Enter Parliament

*AU0108195494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 29 Jul 94 p 3*

[Article by "(r)": "According to the Slovak Radio Poll, Seven Entities Would Get Into the National Council of the Slovak Republic"]

[Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Radio Methodological-Research Committee conducted a representative social survey of preelection preferences from 11 to 17 July. The survey involved a sample of 1,262 respondents. According to it, 72.5 percent of citizens intend (definitely or probably) to take part in the elections. At the moment, according to the poll, seven political entities would get into the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Of the respondents determined to take part in the elections, 23.6 percent would cast their ballot for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party of Slovakia [HZDS-RSS] coalition; 13.6 percent would support the coalition involving the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia, the Green Party in Slovakia, and the Farmers' Movement; 10.1 percent would vote for the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], 7.0 percent for the coalition involving the Hungarian parties, 6.6 percent for the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], 6.2 percent for the Democratic Party-Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen [DS-SPZ] joint slate, and 5.3 percent for the Democratic Union-National Democratic Party [DU-NDS] joint slate.

The survey has revealed that support for the coalition groupings is not made up of a mechanical sum total of support for their individual elements: There are groups of voters who support a specific coalition entity but for whom the coalition as a whole is unacceptable, and vice versa. The effect of coalition gravitation is also making itself felt—groupings are attracting votes from voters who would not vote for any of their individual entities. For example, without its partner, the HZDS would win 27.3 percent of the vote. Without its partners, the SDL would win 9.7 percent, while the KDH would win 9.6 percent, the ZRS 6.0 percent, the DU, 4.3 percent, the Slovak National Party [SNS] 4.2 percent, Egyutteles 3.3 percent, the DS 3.0 percent, and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement 2.5 percent.

| | (in percent) |
|---|---|
| DS-SPZ | 6.2 |
| DU-NDS | 5.3 |
| KDH | 10.1 |
| HZDS-RSS | 23.6 |
| SNS | 4.5 |
| Hungarian coalition | 7.0 |
| SDL-led coalition | 13.6 |
| ZRS | 6.6 |
| Do not know | 15.6 |

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## DU's Knazko Rejects HZDS Statement

*AU0108163694 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 29 Jul 94 p 2*

[Article by "(vg)": "They Have Signed an Agreement With the Freedom Party"]

[Text] Democratic Union [DU] First Deputy Chairman Milan Knazko has described the statement released by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Press and Information Department on 25 July, in which, among other things, it claims that leading DU representatives are leaving the back gate open for further attempts and talks with the HZDS, as another element of disinformation before the coming elections. The aim of this campaign is to disrupt DU's cooperation with the National Democratic Party [NDS].

Knazko and Freedom Party Chairman Silvester Minarovic signed an agreement yesterday on preelection and postelection cooperation. Knazko described the speculation about a possible post as premature because such a possibility has not yet been considered.

In connection with the attitude of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], which disagrees with the decision by the National Property Fund to privatize the Slovak Insurance Company, the Slovak Savings Bank, the Investment and Development Bank, and the VSZ [East Slovak Ironworks] by means of direct sales, DU Deputy Chairman Viliam Vaskovic said that all methods are the same and that he does not understand the KDH's nervousness.

Knazko expressed his conviction that the positive results achieved by the current government will be reflected in the election outcome. "We will do all we can to ensure that DU is a coalition partner worthy of the KDH and the Slovak left," Knazko emphasized. According to Interior Ministry State Secretary Roman Vavrik, DU has gathered the 10,000 signatures necessary for participation in parliamentary elections and has completed its list of candidates.

## Schmoegnerova on Current Economic Priorities

*LD0108163494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Unless it wishes to commit suicide, any government that emerges from the elections will have to follow, in principle, the current economic policy. This was stated by Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmoegnerova at a news conference held by the Party of the Democratic Left in Bratislava.

Schmoegnerova said that the basic features of the economic policy cannot be changed. What is at issue, however, is whether the government will be sufficiently competent to put it into effect.

She said that the priorities of the current government in the remaining two months before the elections will be the drafting of the blueprint for financial restructuring of the corporate and credit spheres. The objective is to free the money flow in the interest of expanding production and creating new job opportunities. Other priorities are releasing credit for the needs of small and medium-sized businesses, releasing export credits, and supporting the influx of foreign investors, Schmoegnerova said.

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## Official Discusses Minority, Foreign Policies

*AU0208063894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Jul 94 p 19*

[Interview with Political State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi by Tibor Kis; place and date not given: "We Are Moving in a Minefield—Interview With State Secretary Csaba Tabajdi on the Issue of the Hungarian Minorities and Relations With the Neighbors"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Kis] It seems that compared to the euphoria of the late 1980's, Hungarian society's relationship to the issue of the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries has changed. This relationship has become more ambivalent to say the least; more critical voices exist; views on the efforts of the Hungarians living beyond the border are not entirely positive. What do you think are the reasons for this change of mood?

[Tabajdi] Indeed, according to the signs, Hungarian society has significantly less solidarity than in 1989, in connction with the Romanian events, or at the time of the political change in Hungary. Obviously, a number of factors play a role in this. First of all, all that Hungarian society has gone through with the changeover to the market economy—I am thinking of the process of impoverishment, the appearance of many hundreds of thousands of unemployed, the decline of some of the middle classes—has naturally reduced solidarity. Today, we have an explicit lack of solidarity in the country and this also applies to the national minority issue. The second element in close connection with this is the fact that Hungarians over the border have been given such a prominent place in governmental policy—in preferences and usage of terms—in the past years, which made the public—to a certain extent justifiably—feel that this issue was more important for the Antall and the Boross governments than the well-being of the 10.5 million Hungarian citizens living here. As the problems of existence will not considerably ease in the near future, it will only be possible to lessen the current reserve or even aversion against the Hungarians beyond the border gradually and with a governmental policy that has the right approach. [passage omitted]

[Kis] However understandable the current situation is, the Hungarians over the border are visibly offended because of this. This is also natural. What is the current situation as regards their position, mentality, and chances of survival?

[Tabajdi] In my view, in this respect, very positive changes have taken place due to the fact that, after the years of state socialism, the Hungarians over the border have the freedoms of speech, of association, and of founding parties. They have set up significant interest-protection organizations and parties. It is true that, on the other hand, not much has changed in their financial situation.

[Kis] What is the situation regarding the various countries?

[Tabajdi] Let us see them in turn. In Croatia, due to the south Slav [Yugoslav] crisis, half of the Hungarians living there have physically disappeared from there. The Vojvodina Hungarians have also suffered very serious losses—at least 50,000 to 70,000 fewer of them are living there now than four years ago. As for Romania, in my view, the situation is stagnating, and the Hungarians living there suffer explicit disadvantages in market orientation and the bourgeois transformation. I believe that the Moravcik government takes the recommendations of the Council of Europe seriously and strives to make the initial steps of Hungarian-Slovak reconciliation. The situation in Subcarpathia is controversial. In theory, the results of the referendum on autonomy are in effect, but nothing has been done in order to implement these. Almost nothing has been implemented from the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty for the national minorities. At the same time, the Hungarian minority is free to use its symbols, they can display the Hungarian national flag, and they can sing the national anthem at official events. It is precisely the example of Subcarpathia which proves that even the use of national symbols and the more generous national minority policy are not enough to preserve the same position. When living conditions are worsening, when there is a big difference between the the living standards of Hungary and the given Hungarian national minority then migration away from these areas will remain high.

[Kis] To reword the question with a little more pathos, have the chances of survival for the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries improved or worsened in the past years?

[Tabajdi] These chances are basically better than they were before, even if the local political elite is not always a partner to this. A pluralist society, a state based on market economy is a much better guarantee for the national minorities to preserve their self-identity than the previous social system was. However, all this does not automatically result in improvements. This is a necessary but not satisfactory condition; to achieve it, the leadership of the neighboring countries would have to have politics that helps the Hungarians living there to utilize of the changed possibilities. However, it seems that a hard struggle of many years is still needed to accomplish this. [passage omitted]

[Kis] Hungary's goal is full European integration. It seems that not all our neighbors will be suitable for this within the foreseeable future, some nearby countries are slipping toward the Balkans. Hungarian groups are also living in these countries. Hungarian foreign policy might sooner or later come to face the dilemma whether it is going into Europe without the Hungarian minorities or, if it chooses the minorities, it will not get as far as Europe.

[Tabajdi] One of the biggest dilemmas of Hungarian foreign policy is whether it can reconcile the three basic

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directions: European integration, normalization of relations with the neighboring countries, and support for the Hungarians beyond the border. Naturally, these directions do not automatically coincide, sometimes it seems that relations with the neighbors and the problems in these relations hinder our approach to Europe and full membership. One fact is obvious: We will not be admitted to the European Union with an unmanageable Hungarian-Romanian or Hungarian-Slovak conflict. At the same time, it is also obvious that, for domestic political and moral reasons, Hungary cannot ignore the legal violations suffered by the Hungarians living beyond the border. Therefore, we need to perform a difficult balancing act to stop these seemingly parallel directions from crossing each other. [passage omitted]

[Kis] At the same time, Western analyses sometimes mention Hungary as an uncertain factor in their surveys of the region's security situation. How can we change this image?

[Tabajdi] The precise reason we have to make the basic treaties with our neighbors is to stop anyone from saying that Hungary speaks up in defense of the rights of Hungarians beyond the border because it has ulterior motives. We need the clause on borders to free at last the hands of Hungarian foreign policy and minority protection. The hands are tied just now. If these treaties are made, no one will be able to question that we really are acting only in the interest of the rights of national minorities and we do not have any thoughts that endanger the status quo.

[Kis] On the other hand, what does Budapest have to insist on in the clause on national minorities, what is it that it cannot give up? Which factors are necessary to achieve, otherwise Budapest will have to withdraw from the whole treaty?

[Tabajdi] I would like to mention some, but not all such elements. The affected states have to accept the fact that national minorities exist in their countries which have a community identity and wish to remain as a community. This passage is important because a homogeneous nation state is the starting point in the neighboring countries and they question the right and dignity of particularity. The second element: An education system is needed that facilitates general education in the mother tongue at the lower, middle, and higher levels. The third element: National minority local governments have to be set up. Further requirements are the use of mother tongue in public administration, courts, and other places; guaranteeing the right to found political associations and parties; the possibilities to maintain links with the mother nation. We also have to talk about guarantees. We have to base this on three international documents: the United Nations' statements on national minorities, the No. 1201 recommendation of the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly, and the CSCE Copenhagen Document.

[Kis] Do these documents include all the criteria you mentioned? I am asking this because Bratislava and Bucharest often argue that Budapest raises requirements that are not in accordance with the international norms.

[Tabajdi] It is not certain that we have to include the collective rights in the treaties and territorial autonomy is not acceptable to the neighbors, either. At the same time, we must not give up the idea that the special rights that are due to the national minorities also apply to the communities. In other words, if our partners receive a new Hungarian confirmation regarding the borders, then I do not see any reason for Bratislava for example not to take the demand of the Hungarians in Slovakia for public administration seriously. This is not a maximal demand on our side, this is still far from the autonomy of South Tyrol. This is not at all an exaggerated expectation: It is impossible to guarantee the situation of the national minorities without these rights. [passage omitted]

## Security Officer Cited on 'Skinhead' Movements

*AU2907172194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 pp 1, 8*

[Report by Zoltan J. Gal: "The Skinheads Will Be Voters"]

[Text] We were beginning to forget them as an unpleasant memory of the past; the skinheads have not made an appearance for a long time. However, it has recently been in the headlines that the skinheads are arming themselves. We again had to realize that the skinhead phenomenon is to be part of Hungarian public life for a long time. In several Western European countries, governments have had to devise special solutions to prevent the further spread of the extreme right and the neo-Nazi disease. How dangerous is this phenomenon in Hungary and what is the level of crime committed by the skinheads? We interviewed the deputy director in charge of the protection of the Constitution at the National Security Office [NBH] that is responsible for domestic security. For understandable professional reasons, our interviewee asked not to be named.

NEPSZABADSAG also reports that the police have recently found a number of illegally possessed firearms and gas rifles at Skinhead Youth in Budapest's 12th District. According to the deputy director, this news did not only indicate the efforts of a certain skinhead group to get weapons. The secret services also have some information on skinhead groups trying to acquire weapons. The expert also acknowledges that this can give rise to serious concerns, so the office handles the news on the acquisition of weapons with special attention.

The Hungarian secret service also has international obligations in connection with this issue because Hungary has turned into a transit country for weapons trade with the south Slav war. "This indicates a danger that will provide serious work for the National Security Office," the high-ranking secret service leader said.

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The NBH officer quoted the Welfare Ministry's public report. According to a survey on the youth situation in 1993, in a given situation, every fifth young person was in a violent movement. These thought-provoking data indicate that tensions and frustrations are hidden in the social situation of young people in vocational training, the unemployed, and partly young working people, which make them inclined to accept, and even carry out, violence.

According to the Welfare Ministry's survey, nearly 40,000 people between the ages of 14 and 17 identify wholly with the ideology of the skinheads, even if they do not actually participate in their movement; 160,000 partially agree with the skinheads. Some 480,000 young people condemn the skinheads for their aggressiveness and the racist nature of their ideology. However, it is not reassuring that at least 130,000-140,000 are indifferent to the movement and do not take a stand on it.

"Young people who partially or wholly accept violent extremism will be voters in five years' time. These young people have misconceptions, they want to make their views prevail through violence, and this is a danger for all of us. The NBH is aware of this," the officer said. He thought that it would be good if the legislators also realized the magnitude of the danger and they allowed "more definite possibilities" for those who enforce the law.

The NBH and the police estimate the number of those who could be called skinheads at 4,000 because these have already been seen by the police for some reason. Of course, even the definition of the term skinhead is debatable. The officer said that aggressiveness and militant inclinations characterize skinheads. The vast majority of these young people are poorly educated but some of them attend universities or high schools. However, openness, patience, and tolerance are absent from all of them.

The composition of the skinhead groups is constantly changing and foreign extreme organizations also affect their "development." It is known that foreign skinheads often receive invitations to Hungary, and the Hungarian skinheads usually return the visits. Many of them are in contact with German, Italian, and Austrian groups, from where they receive "intellectual support." The Foreign Reconstruction Group of the German National Socialist German Workers Party [NSDAP/AO, National Socialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/Aufbauorganisation] with its headquarters in Lincoln, United States, has the biggest influence. A few hundred young Hungarians correspond with this organization.

The NSDAP/AO sends out newspapers and leaflets to Hungary that create justifiable public outrage, the NBH officer said. Samples of the Hungarian language UJ REND [new order] "militant national socialist publication" regularly arrive from here. Arrow Cross stickers, Nazi relics, badges, and books can be ordered from this newspaper. The newspaper also publishes security guidelines in every issue, and offers conspiracy techniques to the Nazi activists.

The secret service officer drew attention to the fact that the extreme groups often try to become legal through already registered and operating organizations. He also referred to the already banned World National People's Rule Party that represents the heritage of the Arrow Cross movement. This organization submitted an application for registration to the courts, in which it formulated noble and constitutional goals. However, its operation and activities violated the Constitution, and this is why the NBH acted against them.

From the aspect of the skinhead movement gaining strength and becoming dangerous, it is a major question if there is or will be a leader who can keep the scattered groups together and who is accepted by the "hard core." According to media news, this leader might be Istvan Gyorkos, who has previously received a suspended prison sentence for incitement against the community. Recently, he appeared before the public as co-chairman of the Hungarist Movement—he was remanded in custody, again for incitement against the community, until 25 July. The NBH officer did not wish to talk specifically about Gyorkos, but he mentioned that the authorities know a certain group of people, including the leaders of the Hungarist Movement, very well. Other notional Nazi and Arrow Cross organizations also exist. The NBH officer mentioned the Szalasi Guard led by a young man known by the name Mengele. However, he did not mention how many groups the office knows about or is watching.

According to newspaper information, some Hungarian skinheads are fighting in the south Slav war as mercenaries. The NBH officer said that the office pays special attention to this phenomenon because there are serious dangers involved in the skinheads gaining military experience.

Intelligence, information gathering, and crime prevention in connection with criminal acts that contravene Paragraph 269 of the Penal Code on incitement against the community or Paragraph 156 on violence committed against a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group come under the jurisdiction of the the NBH's Directorate for the Protection of the Constitution. We can say that it is justified to review these legal provisions, the officer said. In his view, the deviations, which have become stronger in society, must be handled and legislation must be adjusted to the new circumstances.

According to the NBH officer, the office is working beyond its means. Protection of the Constitution is equivalent to the protection of the citizens. We do not carry out total prevention; we also rely on help from the citizens. We ask them to inform our office if they experience worrying incidents in their area, he added.

It is the NBH's task to establish the actual danger and act against it in all cases that arouse the suspicion of crimes

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within the office's jurisdiction. The secret service acquires reliable information on incidents that are dangerous to the constitutional order and on people who wish to change the power conditions in violent ways.

For four years, the NBH has been operating according to temporary rules of law, and its staff is only hoping that the draft national security bill can soon come before Parliament. In the course of its information gathering activities, the secret service, which enforces the law, also faces the inadequacies of the law and it can call the legislators' attention to follow social changes in their work.

According to the NBH officer, the current regulations do not correspond to society's current conditions and they do not deter those people attracted to extremisms. "We should also get closer to the Western European practice in the legislative handling of this issue," he finally said.

### ΩElection Defeat of Fidesz Viewed

*94P21033A*

[Text] Grave miscalculations by the party's leadership caused the resounding defeat of the liberal Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz) in the May parliamentary election. Fidesz parliamentary representative Tamas Wachsler charged in a speech at the party's extraordinary congress on 10 July. Introducing its report on the speech, which Wachsler made in an unsuccessful attempt to unseat Fidesz chairman Viktor Orban, the daily NEPSZABADSAG of 19 July noted that although the congress was held behind closed doors, "several participants" took notes that "served as the basis" for NEPSZABADSAG's reconstruction of Wachsler's speech.

According to Wachsler, the steep decline in the popularity of Fidesz—which won only 5.4 percent of the parliamentary seats although in 1993 it had scored 35 percent in popularity polls—was the party leadership's fault. Although Fidesz probably would not have won in any case, Wachsler said, with better leadership it could have made a respectable showing and could have prevented the overwhelming victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). One of the leadership's "biggest mistakes" was that while Fidesz opposed both the right-of-center government and the leftist MSZP, from 1993 on the party became more critical of the left than of the right. "By attacking most vehemently those who were the most adamant opponents of the hated government," Fidesz found itself "dangerously close to the government" and began to share in its "extraordinary unpopularity," Wachsler said. Moreover, Fidesz made the MSZP look good by relinquishing to it the "gratifying role" of "the most uncompromising opposition party." If Fidesz had been a "little more diplomatic, if it had shown a little less vehemence against the MSZP and a little more toward the government," the MSZP would not have gotten an absolute majority and the present governing coalition would not hold two-thirds of the parliamentary seats—a dangerous degree of dominance that even makes it possible for the coalition to change the constitution at will, Wachsler stressed.

The second major problem, according the Wachsler, was connected to Fidesz's financial affairs. Its leadership involved the party in some ill-considered financial dealings that tarnished the "image of purity" that had been the basis of Fidesz's popularity. One mistake it made was selling some Fidesz-owned property in a lucrative but purportedly irregular transaction that made the party vulnerable to widespread criticism in the media, Wachsler indicated. Another mistake, he charged, was that attempts to gain financial independence for the party through business dealings backfired as Fidesz became "completely dependent" on some entrepreneurial circles. Moreover, Wachsler asserted, the party's expensive campaign—Fidesz spent more than any other party on each seat that it won—was also counterproductive. The party's campaign was not only "childish" in tone but was also obviously costly, further fueling "ill-willed comments" about Fidesz's financial situation, Wachsler declared.

Although Wachsler did not mention any names, he blamed the party's failures on the leading "troika," by which he apparently meant Viktor Orban, former parliamentary group chief Laszlo Kover, and newly elected parliamentary group chief Jozsef Szajer. Charging that the trio tried to exercise its leadership "in secrecy," Wachsler alleged that a "haze obscured" the party's internal finances and that the leadership made open discussion of the party's financial dealings a "taboo" subject even in internal debates. Moreover, he declared, the leadership "did not even have the courage" to discuss with the party presidium the finding of an advisory group last year that Fidesz's future was in jeopardy unless it changed its political tactics.

Despite these harsh charges, however, Wachsler apparently was not successful in persuading most of the delegates that the Fidesz leadership was responsible for the party's plight. In the vote for chairmanship, which according to NEPSZABADSAG was held after Wachsler's speech, Orban decisively defeated Wachsler 250 to 92.

### Government Commissioner Views Privatization Plans

*AU3107185194 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Jul 94 p 11*

[Interview with Government Commissioner Ferenc Bartha by Agnes Peredi; place and date not given: "We Will Defend the Legal Privatization Decisions—Ferenc Bartha Is in Favor of Parliamentary Control"]

[Text] After the change of the government, great expectations preceded the decision on the future concept of privatization, whether the current leadership will remain in place or a new one will come, and by whom it will be run. It became public a few days ago that the two

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privatization organizations, namely the State Property Agency [AVU] and the State Property Management Corporation [AV RT], will be supervised by government commissioner Ference Bartha, and a new draft privatization bill will be prepared by the beginning of September. We interviewed Ferenc Bartha, who has been chairman of the Banque Indosuez Hungary Ltd. up to now, and was chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, on the expected changes in privatization.

[Peredi] The government program states that it wishes to place privatization under parliamentary control. The need for this has existed for a long time but it was always rejected by saying that technically it is difficult to implement without violating operational interests and business secrets. What solution have you found?

[Barath] It has to be stated in a law that Parliament exercises control over privatization. This can have two forms: Either a parliamentary supervisory committee is established whose members represent the six parties, or the privatization organization's supervisory committee would consist of parliamentary deputies. In the latter case, naturally, the question arises if a deputy can be member of a supervisory committee, and the rules of keeping the secrets also have to be drawn up.

[Peredi] Which version do you prefer?

[Barath] The parliamentary committee can have a broader scope for maneuver and the tasks of a company supervisory committee and those of political control would not become mixed up. Therefore, in my view, it is better if the supervisory committee consists of experts and a separate committee carries out the control. However, the experts are still to consider this issue.

[Peredi] From what you are saying it seems that the merger of the two organizations is more likely to be in a company form similar to the AV RT and you are not thinking in terms of governmental organization similar to the AVU....

[Barath] This has not yet been decided. We were given the task to use a broad range of sources and try to use all kinds of concepts. When the decision is being prepared, it has to be taken into consideration that some people believe that we need an organization that will operate as a special institution with special rights set up through the law on state administration, rather than in a company or proprietor form. There is a consensus that—except for the assets of the local governments— the assets that are divided up between the AVU, the AV RT, and the Treasury Property Management Organization should be overseen by one organization. I believe that a company form would better suit the goals we would like to meet, an organization that implements complex goals with complex means, in close cooperation with the governmental organs. Privatization can only be a means to the goals of the industry, agricultural, transport, and telecommunications policy.

[Peredi] What kind of personnel changes would the merger involve and how big would be the new organization?

[Barath] The merger would understandably result in a reduced staff, from the current 500 to 300. Many parallel activities can be ended, the professional requirements will be higher, and we will try to keep a good quality team.

[Peredi] To what extent do you intend to maintain long-term state ownership?

[Barath] The range of long-term state assets has gradually been narrowed compared to the beginning. At certain companies, we would like to keep certain rights in the long term, and the golden share is a good method for this. However, we would not maintain the proportion of long-term share ownership to the extent it was previously defined.

[Peredi] The government program indicates that privatization would be left to the managers of the company in the case of small and medium enterprises—this reminds of spontaneous privatization to a certain extent. What is the difference? And which way are you planning to involve advisers in the case of large enterprises?

[Barath] We do not want to bring back spontaneous privatizaton which was made spontaneous by the lack of control and regulations. It is still to be decided how to use the means of decentralized privatization. In the case of external asset management at large enterprises, it is very important to do this with more responsibility, more guarantees, and in such a way that it helps to increase the assets. It is possible that the asset manager will receive shares of the enterprise depending on his results.

[Peredi] Would you select the advisers and asset managers through open competition?

[Barath] Competitions have become an inalienable part of privatization. I consider the form and criteria of the bids important. We might invite bids in a way that is formally impeccable but which can nevertheless allow partial decisions. There are many methods that can be included in competitions with the help of which it is possible to replace the winner, for example canceling the competition or making the participants give higher bids. Certain methods exist which can be used subjectively even in a quasi objective competition. Therefore, the method, rather than the mere fact, is the essence of the competition.

[Peredi] Privatization had many storms, scandalous affairs came to light, and presumably more will come to light in the future. What are your intentions with the disputable decisions?

[Barath] We will consistently defend all cases where lawful decisions were made. However, it is our declared intention for an independent organization to reexamine certain past cases where it can be assumed that the purity

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of the competition was violated. We do not yet know whether this will affect one or two dozen cases.

[Peredi] The new government has inherited many obligations, including compensation. How do you wish to continue this?

[Barath] Asset management and asset transfer will both be the tasks of the new organization. This also applies to compensation and to the transfer of assets to the social insurance. The new law will define the framework and methods of this. The issue of the social insurance has been lasting a long time. We must draw up principles that can be accepted both by the social insurance and the asset manager. The question is whether someone who receives the asset is also suitable to manage it or whether it is more expedient to assign a different, expert organization with it. Compensation will have to be completed fairly. Extreme demands for the offer of the more valuable assets cannot be made but I would also consider it unfair if we offered the shares of the weakest companies. The middle way has to be found. We will propose to define a deadline by which time we will form the offer. However, it is an objective problem that there is a dreadfully large demand for handing over assets. Therefore, it is in our interest to satisfy this sensibly. In the case of compensation, fairness is more important, rather than the more astute people doing well and the less astute ones badly. Therefore, the methods will also have to be changed. For example, we can introduce a system of applications; the originally compensated people can request a prior applications and there will be quotas and limits.

[Peredi] What will happen to the preferential share purchase program [KRP]?

[Barath] The KRP is an existing and established solution which cannot be forgotten as two subscriptions have already taken place. However, it is not yet known with what offer and how it will continue to operate.

[Peredi] What are your views on the situation of bank privatization and its possibilities?

[Barath] The banks are an important part of the existing assets, therefore their future is a central issue. Some of them can be taken to the market in a relatively short time. In the case of some, mainly large, banks, we have to draw up an overall program to assess how they can be taken to the market. It is an important element whether this step should be made as a national state venture or whether we should try to find enterprise partners to this through privatization. Obviously, we have to carry out reorganization although many people might say that this has already been done. However, unfortunately, large sums of money have been used up without actually putting the large banks into order. I am in favor of finding partners to this who can receive some of the results of the improvements. This is the optimal solution. I am sorry that this was not successfully implemented in 1989 although, in this case, the banks would be in a much better position now.

## Consensus on Parliament's New Internal Procedures

*94CH0361B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Jul 94 p 4*

[Interview with Ibolya David, member of the legal affairs caucus, by Sara Szeli; place and date not given: "There Is Mutual Interest in Having Good House Rules"]

[Text] *The legal affairs caucus of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] group of parliamentary representatives held a news conference yesterday morning in parliament. A professional and political analysis of the government program was part of the agenda. Ibolya David, member of the legal affairs caucus, provided an assessment for our newspaper of the proposed house rules of the National Assembly.*

[Szeli] The very first draft of the house rules, the so-called professional plan, evoked great outrage in the ranks of the present opposition. To what extent do the agreed-upon amendments render the house rules acceptable to the four parties seated in parliament: Fidesz [Federation of Young Democrats], the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party], the FKgP [Independent Smallholders Party], and the MDF?

[David] I can speak only for the MDF group of representatives, of course. Based on our original concepts, we certainly had some reservations; we found many provisions with which we could not agree. But after the six-party reconciliation we were able to reach an agreement with the ruling coalition parties without infringing upon the rights of the opposition, as those have been recognized so far.

[Szeli] What rights does the opposition have based on the new house rules, as compared to the rules that prevailed during the previous four-year parliamentary cycle?

[David] I believe that a brand new situation has presented itself, because in the previous cycle the opposition was able to influence and formulate the two-thirds laws. This gave rise to, and provided opportunities for, much bargaining, and for searching for consensus, because the support of one of the major opposition parties had to be attained. At present, the number of ruling party representatives exceeds the number of two-thirds of the total number of representatives, and this means that we are not going to be able to exert substantive influence on the most fundamental laws. The manner in which parties opposed to the government must perform their classic opposition functions was resolved in a peculiar way. This includes the oversight of governmental work, for example. Our six-party proposal would provide an opportunity for the present opposition to enforce its rights in the field of oversight and by expressing its views. At the same time, however, the proposal would recognize the majority's responsibility with respect to legislative action. I am convinced that this house rule came about at the right time. I am very confident that parliament will vote to approve this rule.

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[Szeli] What do you regard as the most important result of negotiating amendments to the house rules?

[David] We achieved that the support of one-third of a committee's membership is not going to be needed for the minority view to be heard by parliament. As long as representatives are able to reach an agreement as to who is going to read the summary of the minority view, they will be able to state such views after the views of the majority are heard. Attaining the appointment of an investigative committee, and the designation of a day for the conduct of political debate, is subject to a request filed by one-fifth the number of representatives. The "hour set aside for the resolution of issues demanding immediate attention" is an entirely new institution introduced as part of the house rules; it permits a representative and a member of the government to ask questions, to argue for five or six minutes about issues he or she regards as important. The old system of raising questions remains intact, of course. Speaking under special order following the conclusion of the agenda will also be very interesting: Representatives will be able to talk about problems they regard as important, but in exchange for this opportunity party group leaders will be able to make their remarks during morning business, and only after the daily business of the House will other representatives be allowed to speak once again. This system works well in the British and Canadian legislatures, and I hope that this method will also prove to be appropriate in Hungary.

### Duray on MSZP, Ethnic Hungarian Parties

*94CH0341A Bratislava UJ SZO in Hungarian 13 Jun 94 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Miklos Duray, ethnic Hungarian leader and president of the Coexistence Political Movement in Slovakia, by Jozsef Szilvassy; place and date not given: "We Do the Same as They Do; Conversation with Miklos Duray, Chairman of the Coexistence Political Movement"]

[Text] [Szilvassy] Mr. Chairman, every assessment, every public opinion poll holds that even today, the Coexistence Political Movement has the largest base of support among Hungarians in Slovakia. This also demands responsible political discourse, among other things. In regard to this sense of responsibility, I want to ask you, whether you personally, and through you, the Coexistence itself has made a one-sided commitment to the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] during the past several months.

[Duray] Unfortunately, there exists in our public life, and mainly in journalism, a demagogic view of the political events of the past four years, a view I am unable to understand. We must realize that during this period the Hungarian government endeavored to establish universal Hungarian political thought. Clearly, credit is due for the way things happened to the politics pursued by Coexistence, and to the proper relationships we established with the Hungarian ruling party and with the parties seated in parliament. As a result of this, in contrast to the earlier decades, a 1992 government statement in Budapest elevated the politics of Hungarians beyond the borders to the level of partnership. In making this statement, the Hungarian Government subscribed to all endeavors for which legitimate organizations of Hungarians beyond the borders stood for, consistent with European policies and with European integration. Thus there evolved an organic relationship between the Hungarian ruling parties and the political forces of Hungarians beyond the borders. The choice of political party Coexistence regarded as its partner was a natural consequence of this, because that party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, defined the political profile of the government. This partnership should not be regarded as a commitment, however, it was much rather a political means applied in the interest of Hungarians in Slovakia.

[Szilvassy] But this party, and the political style it represented, has failed.

[Duray] Let us not rush to judgment. A significant number of voters cast their ballots for the Left based on nostalgic feelings about gulyas communism. History will decide whether they were correct.

[Szilvassy] I continue to harbor doubts, because every party seated in parliament, notably the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] as well as the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], have, in their policies and election programs, agreed to represent Hungarians beyond the borders, except that they did so with a different emphasis, based on the principles of historical reconciliation and mutual confidence.

[Duray] We tried to establish proper relationships with every party seated in parliament. Our relationships evolved the way these parties related to us. We cannot help the fact that ever since its establishment, the SZDSZ for example, wanted our movement to cease to exist. Specifically in February 1990, after a statement of intent to establish Coexistence appeared, they came to see me and suggested that we stop the whole thing. This negative attitude has been present almost to the end.

[Szilvassy] The chief concern may be that they pursued their politics based on a different value system, and wanted to develop partnerships with Hungarian political forces beyond the borders correspondingly. It is odd that you came into conflict with those whom you were together in the past system from the standpoint of morality and ideals, as a person of a different frame of mind.

[Duray] I always pursued political discourse based on my own value system, and that system remained the same as it was in the 1970's. I supported the Network of Free Initiatives, but I quit these processes when parties began to evolve in Hungary.

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[Szilvassy] Not entirely so, based on facts, and let me refer here to the election campaign, and within that the conflict that erupted with Gabor Kuncze and with the MSZP.

[Duray] I had no conflict whatsoever with Gabor Kuncze, this was conjured up by UJ SZO.

[Szilvassy] The Hungarian Television and other mass media made ample references to this.

[Duray] I repeat, I had no conflict whatsoever; this emerged from a writing by the mayor of Marcelhaza [Marcelova] in UJ SZO.

[Szilvassy] And the MSZP?

[Duray] I had no conflict with that party either. I expressed my view on Hungarian Television: I did not regard a party that endorsed Janos Hajdu's candidacy for parliamentary representative as an appropriate ruling party. Incidentally, this statement of mine also created a conflict within the MSZP, moreover, the central leadership recommended that Hajdu be recalled.

[Szilvassy] Based on the will of voters, that party is going to become the ruling party within a matter of days.

[Duray] My view has not changed at all: We will maintain relations with them the way they relate to us. I am waiting to see the government program and their platform with respect to Hungarians beyond the borders.

[Szilvassy] The fact that Coexistence representatives cast three kinds of votes with respect to the amended proposal of the so-called sign law, whipped up a huge storm in Hungary and evoked conflicting reactions. According to the Slovak television reporter, you did not provide a clear-cut answer at your press conference as to whom you agreed with.

[Duray] I agreed with those who voted against the law. They could not have designated Parkany [Sturovo], Guta [Kolarovo], and other settlements where 40,000 Hungarians reside, to use bilingual signs, and the bilingual signs could have been easily removed. One could not subscribe to this idea.

[Szilvassy] On the other hand, many believed that bilingual signs could have been placed in 480 settlements at last; this compromise would have made sense, because it would have enabled amendments to the law later.

[Duray] Never before have they changed from our standpoint unfavorable laws in Slovakia. Just take a look, see what happened to the language law; we are still suffering from its grave consequences.

[Szilvassy] One could choose between two alternatives in the strained atmosphere of those days. The other law was far worse, it was the so-called maticas legislative proposal, it endeavored to degrade our native tongue into rudimentary language.

[Duray] I do not think that it would have been approved. But this language law should also have been rejected.

[Szilvassy] Mr. Chairman, opportunities for sensible compromises repeatedly arise, and so does the question of whether the all or nothing principle is appropriate.

[Duray] I am an advocate of pursuing political discourse based on principles, and of reaching compromises that create or preserve values. But a limit beyond which one cannot retreat always exists. During interrogation in the 1970's, the secret police wanted to persuade me to reveal to them certain information, and if I did, they would not search my mother's house. However painful it was, my answer was a firm "no." The same way, I say a firm "no" to any unprincipled retreat today.

[Szilvassy] Politics in general, and in Central Europe in particular, always depend on sensible compromises, on alliances and partnerships that serve a purpose. What kind of ally is Coexistence able to find here, in Slovakia, to implement its program?

[Duray] Coexistence continues the Hungarian tradition of national liberalism and conservatism. At present, every Slovak party, including the Democratic Party, is alarmed by losing voters with a Slovak nationalist outlook. For this reason, at present, one can find long-term partners only if one surrenders himself. On the other hand, allies must be, and can be found to deal with important partial issues and measures. We have reached an agreement with the Moravcik government on a number of important issues, and this is why we pursue politics together. I hope that we will succeed in having parliament approve a sign law that is also acceptable to us, one that is the product of sensible compromises and of our principled politics based on alliances.

[Szilvassy] I believe that sensible compromises are greatly needed in the framework of cooperation between our Hungarian parties. From an outsider's point of view, coalition negotiations are progressing slowly, and have not even begun with the possible third partner. What is the present situation?

[Duray] Our national council reached an agreement in Losonc [Lucenec] about three possible alternatives. We regard a union as the most appropriate solution to accomplish Hungarian political unity in Slovakia. If this is not appropriate from our partners' point of view, we would recognize this, and recommend the formation of a close-knit triple coalition. In the event that this is not acceptable to the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDM] either, we would be willing to remain at the level of a dual coalition, by offering seats to representatives of the Hungarian Civic Party [MPP] and the Hungarian People's Party [MNP]. These are the issues we must resolve and agree upon.

[Szilvassy] Is it conceivable that the MKDM finds one of the Losonc resolutions to be unacceptable, the one that

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specifies the names of certain MPP representatives who may not run on the common slate?

[Duray] This is not the decisive issue. This can still be debated. The main issue is whether we want to develop a unified Hungarian policy. Each party should surrender some of its sovereignty if they do, and if they do not, they will have to enter parliament on someone else's back, and conduct separate political discourse there.

[Szilvassy] Which elements of their sovereignty would they have to surrender?

[Duray] This is a matter subject to agreement. If a triple coalition is established, we would find it indispensable for the coalition to have a joint club in parliament, we should have a common policy regarding local government, we should run mayoral candidates jointly, or, at least, we should not run different candidates opposing each other. A further element of sovereignty to be surrendered would be the mandate that we present uniform positions abroad regarding Hungarians in Slovakia; this would not apply to relationships between the various parties, of course.

[Szilvassy] Could it be that you would not demand that the MPP observe exclusionary conditions regarding certain persons?

[Duray] A fundamental expectation exists. The names of those who conducted political discourse against us for more than two years should not appear on the common slate. Conflicts become unavoidable if views regarding fundamental issues differ, and it would be impossible to reach an agreement on a triple coalition. Conflicts can be avoided or reduced only if the names of those who pursued political discourse against us do not appear on the common slate of candidates.

[Szilvassy] Is it not true that this condition condemns the entire membership of the MPP, because it was the membership that provided a mandate to its leaders to realize a certain trend in politics?

[Duray] This is not the case, I am afraid. The MPP program did not suggest that they must pursue politics against us, against our proposals; the membership was not asked about that. This is why we are talking about persons, and not the party. We may argue about certain persons, nevertheless the basic thesis cannot be changed.

[Szilvassy] Mr. Chairman, based on what you said, is there truth to the Budapest rumor, according to which you declared in the presence of Mr. Jeszenszky your opposition to a triple coalition, and that you would resign if one came about?

[Duray] Mr. Editor in Chief, as a Hungarian journalist in Slovakia, you should ask such questions from politicians in the homeland.

[Szilvassy] I will do so, Mr. Chairman.

[Duray] I would like to remind you that I recommended to Coexistence the establishment a close-knit triple coalition, if we fail in forming a union.

## Measures Against Corruption, Conflict of Interest

*94CH0366B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 21 Jul 94 pp 1-2*

[Article by Peter Szakonyi: "Crusade Against Corruption"]

[Text] *Last Tuesday's cabinet meeting gave an assignment to Gabor Kuncze, the new interior minister: He must develop anticorruption measures. According to some news reports, an investigative committee to deal with corruption will be established in either the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of the Interior.*

A special committee of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] composed of Peter Hack, Alajos Dornbach, and Matyas Eorsi has been investigating corrupt practices for the past three years. Lacking information and power to act, the committee was, understandably, unable to take forceful action against corruption. All they did was to periodically call the attention of the press to "peculiar" phenomena.

In response to a NEPSZAVA inquiry Peter Hack said that the fight against corruption is being pursued simultaneously along several lines at present. In his view the goal should not be to unveil specific instances of corruption—even though these should not be neglected—but to establish a societal milieu and regulations having the force of law which eliminate opportunities for corruption. Within this framework, the first action manifests itself in the form of a legislative proposal to control government procurement. Corruption may be eliminated simply by open, competitive bidding whenever orders can be filled that way. Improving the open review of privatization is no less important. It is difficult to judge whether a transaction involves abuse as long as the government keeps the information secret, according to Hack. He mentioned the allocation of local radio frequencies as an example, a field in which, in Hack's view, the decisionmakers were satisfied with brief, meaningless justifications when evaluating specific offers.

Incompatibility rules are also urgently needed. Hack regards this as an immediate need mainly with respect to representatives seated in parliament, as well as local government officials. The previous coalition has "boycotted" for three years a legislative proposal for incompatibility rules, as those would apply to parliamentary representatives. This and other laws previously mentioned will be enacted this year, according to Hack.

Corruption can be exposed in three ways, according to the leading politician of the SZDSZ. Traditional prosecutorial, police, and accountancy resources, as well as governmental controls, come first. These may be supplemented by political parties and independent groupings

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in society that possess information based on their respective expertise, and which could assist in the struggle.

The third available means is clearly the press, which, in Hack's view, increasingly tends to adopt a pragmatic style of journalism, and thus could become an effective means to combat corruption. At the same time Hack emphasized that only as a result of joint efforts could these three means produce results in fighting corruption. The SZDSZ anticorruption committee has recommended investigations by prosecutors in two instances during the past three months. These involved anomalies noted in the sale and purchase of the Nikex headquarters building, and in the way funds were used by the Trade Development Fund. Investigations of several other cases were completed a few days ago. Hack regards as one of the great successes of the committee the fact that it publicized and, in the end, prevented the secret privatization of TV3. The results produced thus far by the SZDSZ investigative committee suggest the likelihood of the presence of organized crime in privatization processes. Although no proof to substantiate this claim has been found thus far, Hack believes that organized crime enters fields in which extra profits can be made. In today's Hungary privatization is clearly such a field.

"Corruption is like AIDS, the only difference being that it destroys the immune system of society, and not of the body. Corruption suggests to people that anything can be done as long as those at the peak of power are corrupt," Hack summarized. Although fighting corruption seems to be futile, it is not hopeless. Although no permanent "cure" exists, exposed cases of corruption act as deterrents.

"The leadership of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] fully agrees with taking a firm stand against corruption and crime," according to Katalin Kutrucz, vice chairman of the National Assembly Committee on the Constitution, in response to our question. In her view, the previous government has already begun fighting corruption, as evidenced by the fact that it established a group dealing with organized crime within the Ministry of the Interior.

The establishment of this committee, as well as the reorganization of the police unit dealing with white collar crime, came about as a result of a study that stirred up a huge storm, written by her husband, Imre Konya. Representative Kutrucz believes that the legislative proposal governing the incompatibility of parliamentary representatives with certain functions was not acted on because of mistakes in the format of the proposed law, and due to lack of time. She believes that the legislative proposal should be expanded to include family members of representatives, in addition to persons recommended in the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] proposal.

"The emphasis should be on fighting organized crime, regardless of whether they call this corruption or anything else," Kutrucz believes. She found it necessary to stress that fighting corruption should not be used as a "code name" for show trials.

## Paper on Recent Constitutional Court Decisions

*94CH0338B Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 23 Jun 94 pp 1, 3*

[Article by Attila Schmidt: "Eorsi and Lengyel Criminal Cases to be Reviewed"]

[Text] **The Constitutional Court decided some extremely important issues at its Wednesday session. Among other things, the knowledgeable body decided that legal provisions concerning the protection of secrets were unconstitutional. Similarly, a provision of the criminal code of laws that declares offending an authority or an official a crime, and penalizes the same, also violates the Constitution.**

Certain politicians in state offices would probably never leave their velvet chairs, if confidence in the functioning of an authority or an official could be ordained by law. But fortunately, since the internal structure of democracy operates differently, the Constitutional Court accepted an argument advanced by the well-known public figure Dr. Istvan Nehez-Posony, and declared criminal law provisions concerning offending authorities or officials as unconstitutional. It also voided the same effective on the date of proclaiming its decision.

The Constitutional Court ordered a review of all criminal proceedings that had been conducted based on the voided law. The Court said that the voided provisions were contrary to international standards. Nevertheless, slandering persons exercising public authority should be punished the same way, as slandering other persons.

Two political suits of outstanding significance were filed while the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] was in power based on offending an authority or an official. In both cases, the late prime minister Jozsef Antall was the complaint.

On 11 January 1992, the head of government filed suit against SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] National Assembly Representative Matyas Eorsi, because a statement of his on the since discontinued "HOMERO" TV program offended former Interior Minister Balazs Horvath. Jozsef Antall also filed a complaint against Laszlo Lengyel for offending "the body of ministers."

The indictment of Laszlo Lengyel was completed on 13 August 1993. Although neither criminal case has come to a conclusion with final effect, in light of the Constitutional Court decision the final outcome of these cases, as well as the fact that the complaints were based on a major error, are beyond doubt....

[Question] "What considerations led you to challenge the constitutionality of the legal provisions mentioned above," we asked Dr. Istvan Nehez-Posony.

[Nehez-Posony] "When the obviously politically inspired law suits were well on their way—suits which

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had nothing to do with law—the elements of the crime of offending authorities or officials were made even more stringent as of 15 May 1993. The elements of the crime of offending authorities or officials conflict with basic rights granted by the Constitution. The free expression of opinion is a fundamental right, which may be restricted only if it conflicts with the fundamental constitutional rights of others. Only natural persons are entitled to the basic right to human dignity; this right cannot be extended to authorities or to office holders. If the legal policy consideration behind making statements offensive to authorities or officials a crime is based on the idea that shaking confidence in the functioning of these authorities or officials needs to be sanctioned under criminal law, the related legal provisions must also be unconstitutional."

The Court also decided that legal provisions protecting archival materials are unconstitutional, because they restrict the freedom of research in a manner contrary to the Constitution. Similarly, legal provisions to protect secrets are also unconstitutional, because they provide a broad latitude to the state in defining the scope of state secrets. The Constitutional Court annulled these legal provisions effective 30 June 1995.

Provisions of the land law objected to were not found to be unconstitutional. The president of the Republic asked the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of provisions that restrict the opportunity to acquire property. The Constitutional Court also rejected arguments which objected to the fact that the legislature belatedly classified pharmaceutical centers as assets temporarily remaining under state ownership.

### Soos: Forint Devaluation Expectations Unfounded

*94CH0366A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 18 Jul 94 p 12*

[Unattributed interview with Karoly Attila Soos, new political state secretary in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; place and date not given: "Money Market Expectations Mistaken; No Strong Forint Devaluation To Be Expected"]

[Text] In the future, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce [IKM] will extend over matters ranging from settling the situation of crisis zones, through European affairs, all the way to stimulating exports. We inquired from Karoly Attila Soos, the new political state secretary of the ministry, about the most urgent concerns to be put to rest.

By discontinuing the Ministry of International Economic Relations and merging it into the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the new organization will cover the total scope of the economy (except for agriculture and the infrastructure).

"Joint decisionmaking will characterize the ministry, as compared to decisions made at the governmental level, where the concurrence of the smaller coalition partners must be sought," Karoly Attila Soos said in response to an inquiry by MAGYAR NEMZET. "As of now, however, rules for reaching agreements have not been developed, and the division of work has not been clarified. Presumably, Laszlo Pal is going to pay greater attention to certain fields of activity, while I am going to have to pay greater attention to the work of others; nevertheless, we are going to hold joint responsibility.

"Relieving concerns in crisis regions is the greatest task faced by the IKM. The fact that the gravest situation has evolved in the northeastern region of Hungary and in Baranya is well known. Foundries and the mining industry have fallen into a deep crisis during the past years, causing employment problems that virtually cannot be resolved. The former level of production can obviously not be restored, and not even the present situation can be maintained. We must seek solutions that encourage the functioning of new, competitive enterprises. As a first step, however, we must act to put the old firms back on their feet, and this requires serious amounts of state support. But sustaining unprofitable enterprises cannot be a long-term goal.

"But the state also has some other functions, besides handing out money. Developing the infrastructure is indispensable; otherwise foreign and Hungarian capital is going to continue to stay far removed from crisis zones. In addition, there will be a need to make other luring offers. Large-scale tax benefits may be the best solution, but research and educational subsidies could also be useful. Offering lots for industrial firms free of charge seems to be a good idea. This way we could turn around the trend by which foreign capital prefers to settle on empty meadows, like the automobile manufacturing plants.

"Hungarian exports dropped drastically during the past year, and the trade balance shows a deficit. This deficit can be financed for the time being by taking out foreign loans, but this cannot be maintained in the long run," Soos stressed. "Stimulating exports is a primary function, but we must not think exclusively in these terms. It would be very important to take steps which stimulate supply, and which increase the quantity of exportable products and services. On the other hand, we must not be deterred from making decisions to reduce demand for imports either. The possibility of taking such actions is limited because Hungary's association with the European Union permits the application of a rather small variety of protectionist devices."

Soos believes that public debate over exchange rate policies pursued by members of the previous government was unfortunate. There is no precedent for such debates in civil countries; this could only happen in Hungary. The political state secretary is certain that future debates over this subject are not going to be conducted in public.

The coalition agreement is clear with respect to the forint exchange rate: It projects policies to maintain the worth

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of the forint and to stimulate exports. The fact is that the market is counting on policies that would result in a strong devaluation of the forint. The exchanges quote dollar rates three months in advance, at exchange rates 10-15 forints higher than at present. "But this means nothing," Karoly Attila Soos said. The expectation manifested by the money market—an expectation of strong devaluation policies—is not going to materialize.

## Fewer Subsidies, More Bankruptcies Expected

*94CH0338A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 23 Jun 94 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "Debtor Consolidation: The End of State Assistance"]

[Text] The position on debtor consolidation, taken by the parties negotiating a coalition agreement, can be summarized as follows: "Pouring good money instead of bad money into the bottomless pit is not the solution." After a week's work by the specialized economic committee the negotiating parties agreed: It would make no sense for the state to continue financing corporations that are not viable. Both the socialists [Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] and the free democrats [Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ] regard the consolidation of banks as complete, and further development could take place only in conjunction with privatization. They took a strict stance with respect to firms: settlement of debts will be entrusted to the creditor banks. The committee recommended to the new government that it provide state support to only three firms. (Persons familiar with this matter did not reveal the names of these firms when we went to press.)

Firms cannot count on additional state support after the new government is formed, Laszlo Bekesi [MSZP], co-chairman of the conciliation conference told FIGYELO. Some of the agreements signed by creditors and owners will be reviewed. But if no further state support is forthcoming—about 300 billion forints, according to professionals—a new wave of liquidation proceedings becomes unavoidable.

Nevertheless, stringency is justified by the fact that the close to two-year history of debtor consolidation has grown into an impressive problem cluster. (In this regard our readers should be reminded of a statement by a World Bank expert; see FIGYELO No. 22, 1994.)

SZDSZ officials also confirm that the new government must, by all means, change the practice pursued thus far. Marton Tardos asserts that the series of individual enterprise consolidations, as proposed by the government, must be brought to an end. Enterprise debtor consolidation must be left primarily to the banks, which, in the future, may exchange debts for stock, based on an appropriate grant of legal authority. The responsibility of accepting risks, held by bank managers—beyond changing other circumstances—should also be strengthened by stating that henceforth banks cannot count on state subsidies. Tardos believes that the managements of state banks should be held accountable as creditors, and the managements of state enterprises as debtors as to the manner in which they manage the means available to them, or placed at their disposal. Personal consequences must be drawn in instances in which irresponsible conduct or abuses on part of management are found.

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### Walesa Receives Vice President Gore

*LD0108152194 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1503 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Warsaw, 1 Aug—At approximately 1700 on Monday, President Lech Walesa received at the palace in Krakowskie Przedmiescie U.S. Vice President Al Gore, whom he warmly thanked for coming to Poland for the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising.

### Walesa Marks 50th Anniversary of Warsaw Uprising

*LD0208100794 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Speech by Polish President Lech Walesa at a ceremony in Warsaw to mark the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising—live]

[Excerpts] Soldiers of fighting Poland! Ladies and gentlemen! Fifty years ago, after five years of slavery and humiliation, terror and atrocity, poverty and suffering, Warsaw stood up to fight. [passage omitted]

The Warsaw Uprising was a great Polish drama. To this day, it has not become just an ordinary page in history. It continues to move hearts. It disturbs minds. It returns with a fundamental question. A question about the sense, the justification, the political rationality of the decisions made then. [passage omitted]

Ladies and gentlemen! On 1 August, Warsaw stood up to fight with its own strength. It stood up so as to once again confirm that we are a side in this war, an active member of the coalition. It stood up to prove that Poland maintained its continuity as a state not only in the sense of international law, but also that it exists truly in its own land as an organized underground state, capable of administering real power, possessing its own basic structures and armed forces, that it is sovereign in this land.

This was the reasoning of the Polish authorities. These were the political motives for Action "Burza" [Storm]. This was the political basis for the decision on the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, a decision made at a time when Poland had to choose, even though it did not have a choice. A decision that was risky but not suicidal.

It transpired to be suicidal only later, when Stalin responded to the reasoning of the insurgents by agreeing to the city's destruction. He spoke with the language of an emperor. He cynically replied to the allies: In Warsaw there are only disturbances. He spoke in such a way when he consistently refused permission for American Flying Fortresses to land and when the tone of the Soviet frontline radio stations changed, that had recently been encouraging the fight. Then, indeed, Warsaw became a redoubt of the forlorn.

The situation of September 1939 was repeated, however, with a significant difference. That lonely fight was given a deep sense by subsequent events. The sacrifice of September was not in vain. After the Warsaw Uprising, no one out of the great of this world recalled the cause for which Warsaw died. He did not call out, "I am a Varsovian." He was not capable of a moment of reflection. He did not ask out loud the question: Where are you going, Europe? Really toward freedom?

In full harmony, a rape was perpetrated on the sovereignty of Poland, a sovereignty in defense of which World War II commenced. In the name of peace, in the name of a better future, in the name of a falsely conceived accord, spheres of influence were allotted.

Two years later, the specter of the Iron Curtain appeared over Europe. Six years later, the specter of war.

Ladies and geltlemen! Representatives of the great coalition. The year 1944 does not hide from us the earlier years. We remember how much you did for us. How much you then did for Europe. For the world. Warsaw also remembers the superhuman effort of the allied airmen. Their generous offering in blood.

For all of this we today sincerely thank you. The British, who proved then that Britain is truly great. The noble and high-minded Americans. The French, ever close to us. I thank the airmen from distant Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa for their sacrifice made for Warsaw. For their deeply human solidarity.

Ladies and gentlemen! The Russian president is not among us. That's a pity. I want to address a few words to that country's representative. And through him to the Russian people. I am aware that history has thrown the burden of guilt, the wrongs and the crimes of the Soviet empire on Russia. This includes the wrong of the Warsaw Uprising. This burden chafes and mutually repels us. Both our nations are aware of this. This is why we are tunneling our way through the ashes of history. Toward the truth. Toward each other. There is a great deal of good material in those ashes. There is something to build bridges from.

We remember about Katyn. We remember about the graves of the Poles murdered by the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs]. We remember the soldiers of the Polish underground. But we also remember about the hundreds of thousands of graves of Russian soldiers who fell on Polish land. Straightforward soldiers at the front. Fighting in the best faith for a freedom without qualification. We keep this memory as a seed of friendship. On the soil of truth and democracy it will grow without difficulty. Real, and therby strong. I deeply believe this.

Mr. German President! Our nations have been divided by a sea of blood. This has in it also the blood of insurgent Warsaw. The road toward each other across this sea is a long one. Glory to those who first had boldness enough to say the words: "We forgive and ask for forgiveness." Glory to those who knelt down in

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Warsaw. This was an important and significant gesture on the road toward the reconciliation of our states and nations.

It is not permissable that hatred be cultivated. That it be carried over into sucessive generations. Warsaw and Oswiecim [Auschwitz] are on Polish soil. But there too is Krzyzowa. Otto Schimek also rests in this land.

We do not give absolution to the murderers of Warsaw. But we do not carry these feelings over to the German nation. We wish to and can live with you in friendship as good neighbors. It has been so more than once in history. I believe it will happen thus. It must happen thus. [passage omitted]

Hatred is the child of enslavement. Freedom is the best medicine for it. A Europe of free nations may cure itself of it. Poland wants to take an active part in this. It is our obligation to liberate the young generation from the burden that has fallen to us. Blood and hatred are the curses of the 20th century; let it pass into the past with them.

I believe the experience of Warsaw will not be repeated. I believe that at the threshold of the third millennium there will not again be such an awful betrayal. Poland, born out of the sacrifice of Warsaw, looks with hope into the future.

Soldiers of Warsaw! You did not fight in vain! Free Poland pays homage to you.

The president of the Republic bows his head before you!

Hail to the memory of the fallen and murdered inhabitants of insurgent Warsaw!

Hail to the memory of those bearing Warsaw aid. Hail to the Polish and allied airmen.

Warsaw! You were nonetheless victorious!

### Filatov Speaks at Ceremony

*LD0108212694 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1947 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Speech by Sergey Filatov, head of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's administration, at the ceremony in Warsaw marking the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising in Warsaw; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network—live; in Russian with passage by passage translation into Polish]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President, esteemed and dear people of Warsaw, esteemed guests and friends: On behalf of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, president of Russia, and on behalf of all democratic forces of the Russian Federation, I hereby express gratitude to President Lech Walesa and to the leadership of Poland for their invitation to participate in the ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the start of the uprising in Warsaw.

Now the inhabitants of the heroic and beautiful Warsaw and, along with them the whole of Poland and all those who hold dear the ideals of freedom and independence, peace and progress, hark back to the tragic events of 50 years ago, paying tribute to the heroic feat of those who took part in the Warsaw Uprising.

Our people, whose losses in the struggle against Hitler's fascism were serious and whose losses in the course of Stalin's totalitarianism were just as great, have a deep understanding for the tender feelings Poles have toward this dramatic episode of World War II. It will forever be a glorious and dramatic page in Polish, European, and world history.

We bow our heads to the heroism of the participants in the uprising and to the heroism of all those who contributed toward the rout of fascism, the 50th anniversary of which will be marked throughout the world next year.

We want the history of the Warsaw uprising and of Soviet-Polish relations of that time to be fully opened up and studied. The views of historians concerning this period frequently fail to coincide, but what the present times dictate and what politicians' wisdom consists of is that a glance back to our past should not become a barrier between us, but, on the contrary, should protect us alike from repeating the mistakes of the past.

We are convinced that it is only the path of historical truth that leads to friendly relations between our peoples, who suffered under Hitler's fascism and Stalin's totalitarianism.

Russia is currently experiencing a complex period of transition, from totalitarianism to democracy. However, it has enough strength and resolve to put right the shameful mistakes of the past and to ensure that they are not repeated.

The legacy of the past should not influence the construction of new relations between democratic Poland and democratic Russia.

Currently, the level of trust and mutual understanding that have been reached makes it possible for us to resolve numerous problems that emerge and to hope for the closest possible cooperation in the future. We are for an all-around expansion of business ties at all levels—state, regional,and human.

At this moment, allow me to read aloud a message from President of Russia Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin:

Esteemed Mr. President: I turn to you and, in your person, toward the entire friendly people of Poland on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, conveying to you my sincerest feelings of esteem in which I hold the feat of the uprising participants and of the civilians of the Polish capital who rose up to fight the fascist tyranny.

Together with you, the people of Russia bow their heads to the fallen Polish patriots.

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Russia, as no other country, remembers what war is and knows that Poland and Russia suffered the heaviest human casualties in the course of the war.

Now that the people of Poland and Russia have embarked on the path of democratic development, it is particularly important not to forget that our countries made a joint contribution toward the victory over the forces of fascism and totalitarianism. This inspires us with the hope that our peoples will continue to march together along the path of democratic transformation and that they will build their relations on the basis of equality, esteem, and genuine good-neighborliness and mutual advantage.

Mr. President, I warmly recall the meetings and conversations I had with you. They always stood out for their openness, constructiveness, and full mutual understanding.

I wish the uprising participants who have survived and the members of their families and all Poles good health and personal happiness.

[Signed] President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.

### Forgiveness Asked by Germans

*LD0108165294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1517 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Warsaw, 1 Aug—"I bow my head before the fighters of the Warsaw Uprising, as well as before all of the Polish victims of the war. I ask forgiveness for what was done to all of them by the Germans." With those words, German President Roman Herzog ended his speech on 1 August during the ceremony at the Warsaw Uprising Monument.

Expressing his thanks to Polish Republic President Lech Walesa for the invitation to participate in the ceremonies commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the German president also said: "At the same time, I understand the feelings of those who take a critical view of my participation in this ceremony, and I extend my respect to them as well."

Herzog recalled that 1 August recalls the memory of the immeasurable wrongs done to the Poles by the Germans: "As if under a magnifying glass, we see before our eyes the terror and the destruction, the extermination and the humiliation. In a final burst of rabid anger, saturated with hate, the Nazi machine of destruction exceeded even itself after the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, in whipping up unrestrained actions of revenge and in carrying out the systematic annihilation of the city and its inhabitants."

"We Germans are filled with shame at the fact that the name of our country and nation will be associated with the pain and suffering that were imposed upon millions of Poles. We grieve at the fate of the Polish nation, which, after the Warsaw Uprising, once more had to bear the sufferings of defeat and then for four whole decades struggled for its freedom and dignity," he said.

The German president recalled that the martyrdom of the Polish nation began on 1 September 1939. "No other country bore such losses as did Poland in the course of World War II. Millions of its inhabitants lost their lives in trenches, under the fire of bombs, in the gas chambers, and here on the streets of Warsaw. We take their deaths as an admonition and, at the same time, as an indication of our duty for the future," President Herzog said.

In the Europe of today, the German president stressed, no one has to forsake his national identity, culture, and history. "We must forsake only hostility, hatred, and a part of our national egoism. Today's road to a united Europe also stands open before the Polish nation. Germans will strongly and with the best motives support the efforts of Poland for acceptance into the European Union and NATO. There is nothing better that we can do for our children and grandchildren."

"We need reconciliation, accord, trust, and good-neighborliness. They can develop further and mature if our nations look with complete openness and without preconceptions at their most recent history. With the boldness to tell the whole truth. With consciousness of the need to obtain forgiveness, and also with the readiness to grant forgiveness," Herzog said.

### Daily on Uprising, Reconciliation

*WS0208082494 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 2 Aug 94 p 1*

[Commentary by Dariusz Szymczycha under the "100 Words" rubric]

[Text] History is of special significance to Poles. It comforts us, reminds us of duties toward the country and for society. It also shows to what degree the fate of Poles is determined by geopolitical concerns.

By inviting foreign guests to the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, the president thought about Polish-German and Polish-Russian reconciliation. Not everyone is able to accept this intention. History awakes and stirs emotions in them. The new Europe, however, the one that has begun to emerge after the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, is supposed to be a Europe of cooperation, a continent without borders, a state of states. History should be remembered in this Europe; however, it is not possible to live with history. What counts are prospects, economic potential, level of civilization, and diligence. Stereotypes, phobias, and aversions are no longer a market commodity in this Europe.

Of course, it is easier to reconcile with a democratic state that has forced itself to critically evaluate its own history. Comparing liberation by the Red Army to a new occupation, however, does not serve the cause of reconciliation. If we want justice, we should be fair ourselves.

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## President Views Relations With FRG, Russia

*AU0108163894 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 1 Aug 94 pp 120-122*

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Andreas Lorenz and Hans Werner Kilz at Walesa's summer palace in Otwock, Poland; date not given: "Poland Is at the Top"]

[Text] [SPIEGEL] Mr. President, you decided to hold this interview at an unusual location.

[Walesa] Yes. I spent several months in internment here during martial law in 1981 and 1982. I sat in an outbuilding with two small rooms. The situation was rather tough.

[SPIEGEL] But now you are president, and the palace is yours. Do you feel triumphant?

[Walesa] Even at that time, I said to myself that this palace would belong to me one day. But that is history.

[SPIEGEL] You have invited German President Roman Herzog to attend the 50th anniversary commemorations of the Warsaw Uprising. By doing so, you have invited internal political trouble upon yourself. Some 200,000 Poles died in that uprising, and the occupiers reduced Warsaw to rubble. Of all people, why do you want the Germans to be present?

[Walesa] After 50 years, a message should go out to Germany, Europe, and the world. Hostilities are a thing of the past.

[SPIEGEL] You also invited Russian President Boris Yeltsin, but he refused. Are you angry about that?

[Walesa] I would not say I am angry. I think that, for domestic political reasons, this is a difficult matter for him. For many Russians, the time is not yet ripe for the message that should go out from Warsaw to all the world.

[SPIEGEL] Perhaps you are putting too much of a strain on your countrymen by inviting former enemies to come here?

[Walesa] My father was a victim of this war. That is to say, he died very young, in 1945, after he returned from a German labor camp. Therefore, I feel directly affected by this war. The future is important, but we also learn from the past.

[SPIEGEL] The French population agreed to the participation of German soldiers in the French national day celebrations. Can you ever imagine German tanks parading down the streets of Warsaw?

[Walesa] Of course. But by then we will have built a new Europe, a Europe without confrontation. All these military parades represent an era of confrontation and partition, and we still live in this era. But I want to work for the future.

[SPIEGEL] A future without NATO seems unthinkable to you. Poland is trying so hard to join the Western defense alliance.

[Walesa] We want to be in a security zone, where events like those in Yugoslavia cannot happen. The events in Yugoslavia could also happen in other places, but admission to NATO rules out the use of force between partners. If anyone violates this basic principle, he must be brought back into line by the others.

[SPIEGEL] Do you see any danger to Poland on the eastern border?

[Walesa] Yes, but not in the form of a war involving an invasion of Poland. But imagine the following situation: Domestic unrest breaks out in Russia, the Army intervenes, and, for tactical reasons, the troops return to their former bases in the former Warsaw Pact. The best solution is to become part of a zone governed by collective security regulations.

[SPIEGEL] But Moscow now belongs to the Partnership for Peace.

[Walesa] Partnership means that everyone acts according to the same rules, just like when traveling along the road. A Cinquecento, a Mercedes, and a Russian truck might be traveling on the same stretch of road. Each driver has a driver's license. There cannot be a situation where one driver drives on the left, the second drives too fast, and the third drives in a drunken stupor.

[SPIEGEL] How does this apply to Russia?

[Walesa] This is what we understand by partnership. Partnership means the same conditions for everyone, or there is no partnership. To me, it is clear that Russia must join NATO. But that means that its entire defense potential must come under NATO control, and Moscow must give up its nuclear potential; otherwise, there is a danger that Russia will chase the United States out of Europe. The result of that would be a United States of Russia. But I would rather have a United States of Europe.

[SPIEGEL] We have the impression that the process of Poland's admission to NATO is taking too long for your liking.

[Walesa] Yes, it should be faster. The dangers exist.

[SPIEGEL] But President Clinton reassured you once again on this subject during his latest visit to Warsaw. The only thing is that he left the question of when and how to join NATO unanswered. Were your unable to convince him?

[Walesa] Clinton is responsible for the whole world. He listens to our arguments, but he also listens to the other side's arguments. He is a great democrat, who was unable to say or do anything more in Warsaw.

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[SPIEGEL] That sounds very nonchalant. Were you not disappointed that no commitments were expressed yet again?

[Walesa] No, I was not disappointed because I understand Western rules. That is the high school of democracy, and, at the top of this school, stands Clinton. Of course, I would like to have heard more from him, something more definite.

[SPIEGEL] But do you not have the impression that the Americans are unduly concerned about the sensitivity of the Russians?

[Walesa] The Americans fear anarchy in Russia. They fear dangerous movements and streams. They fear a revolt in Russia. That is why I voice no accusations against the United States. I think Clinton is pursuing very intelligent politics.

[SPIEGEL] Now you are wrapping the U.S. President in cotton wool.

[Walesa] Not at all, but I realize how difficult it is to be number one in this world that is so full of tragedy. The whole world is looking to the United States. The U.S. role is difficult enough.

[SPIGEL] Chancellor Kohl has displayed great friendship with Boris Yeltsin. Is this not giving rise to fears of a new Bonn-Moscow axis that would once again bypass Poland?

[Walesa] That would have been dangerous earlier but not today. There will not be a second Yalta. Poland's geographical situation is exceptionally good; we lie in the center of Europe.

[SPIEGEL] Nevertheless, many Poles are viewing the Kohl-Yeltsin courtship with great concern.

[Walesa] We are not afraid. An axis between Russia and Germany will always pass through Poland. For instance, one can transport bricks or steel by air, but it is cheaper to do so by road or rail. And the shortest distance between Russia and Germany lies via Poland.

[SPIEGEL] What is going to happen in Russia? Is there a chance that nationalists like Zhirinovskiy will seize their opportunity after Yeltsin?

[Walesa] The economic problems in Russia are producing people like Zhirinovskiy. There is still not enough economic reform in Russia. That is why the situation there could become dangerous. Everyone wants freedom, but one must also be able to afford it. A man is not free if his wallet is empty.

[SPIEGEL] You keep saying that the West does not understand the Russians correctly, whereas you say you do understand them. According to you, the West is naive. What is the West doing wrong?

[Walesa] The West should adopt straightforward principles of action, not just in politics but also in the economy. The farther east the reform countries are situated, the more money they need. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia do not really need any money. What they need is cooperation and partnership. The Baltic countries need a little money. Russia needs a lot of it.

[SPIEGEL] Poland does not need any money? That is new.

[Walesa] What we need is generals—General Motors, General Electric, and General Mercedes [as published]. We are happy that the Germans want to make overtures toward Russia via Poland. In five years' time, Germany will be a machine that pulls and drives many things.

[SPIEGEL] What can the Germans do in particular?

[Walesa] Build bridges. Think of the large freeways with service stations and hotels, from Berlin to Moscow. But, before that, we need a north-south highway, from Gdansk to Turkey. That will create jobs in Germany and Poland.

[SPIEGEL] Do you consider Russia reformable at all?

[Walesa] That is Russia's great problem. I can explain this by means of the Lego bricks my children play with. Any brick, whatever its size, is taken away if it does not fit or if it is damaged. There is no other choice. Either the brick is the right size or it is disqualified.

[SPIEGEL] It can take some time before the Russian brick fits the European house.

[Walesa] Some of the bricks already fit—for example, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

[SPIEGEL] Is the election of the postcommunists in Poland not an obstacle to Poland's admission to European institutions?

[Walesa] I do not see it as an obstacle. I can tell you one thing: The former communists are going to struggle much harder for capitalism than any one else because they have become owners under this capitalism. That is immoral and dishonest. But the comrades are active. They have no scruples.

[SPIEGEL] That is a bitter observation by a former leader of the workers.

[Walesa] We were honest, we followed the straight and narrow path, we did the dirty work—privatizing, for instance, unprofitable enterprises and building up capitalism. One person in 10 will be rich, and the remaining nine will be jealous and dissatisfied. But in 50 or 100 years' time, we will be praised, and monuments will be erected to us.

[SPIEGEL] Mr. President, according to the opinion polls, you have lost much of your popularity, but you still want to run for a second presidential term. Can Poland not live without you, or can you not live without the office of president.

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[Walesa] You are right. The latest surveys suggest that the situation does not look good. But the things that speak out against me today will speak in my favor tomorrow.

[SPIEGEL] How are we to understand that?

[Walesa] No one has done more for Poland than I have. We do not really need any election campaign. It is enough to make a list of the things I have done and the things I have failed to do.

[SPIEGEL] Well, you are certainly not short of self-confidence.

[Walesa] Poland is at the top of the reforming countries. No one stands a chance against me. I am going to run for president not because I want to be present everywhere but because I want to perform a service. I have so many ideas for the future, enough to occupy the entire parliament and government. I am afraid that I might achieve too much. That would not he good for democracy.

[SPIEGEL] Mr. President, thank you for the interview.

## Church Official on State Rapport, Constitution

*WS0108121594 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1 Aug 94 pp 14-15*

[Article by Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary of the Polish Episcopate, under the "Opinions" rubric: "What Kind of Constitution Does the Church Want?"]

[Text] One must state very strongly at the very beginning that the Catholic Church is not in favor of Poland as a religious state and does not want the Constitution of the Polish Republic to grant the Church or Catholics living here any privileges while putting other religions or those who do not believe in God in a worse legal situation.

All citizens should enjoy full religious freedom, and they should be free from any kind of coercion in that regard, both when it comes to beliefs and views, and to practicing them.

It does not, however, follow from this that the Catholic Church is willing to accept the kind of constitution that would make it difficult to practice religious faith or that would eliminate sacred items from public life. The danger of such solutions can be easily seen in various attempts to make Poland a secular state—not in the sense of religious neutrality but in the sense that "secular state" came to mean in the previous era, which is about supporting atheism, with a constant reduction in religious freedoms. "We are convinced," wrote Polish bishops in a statement issued in "The Conference of the Polish Episcopate's Stand Regarding the New Constitution's Axiological Principles" of June 1990, that the time has come to reject the erroneous and harmful simplification that unfortunately has taken deep root in the social mentality, according to which a state's secular nature is portrayed as the basic and almost only guarantee of freedom and equal rights granted to citizens. It is our view that a state's description is fully exhausted by saying it is a legal structure that serves its citizens and their communities, as a result of which there is no need to describe the state's features in detail."

If the state can be neither religious nor secular, it should be impartial, and it should base its constitution on principles that would be acceptable to all.

### The Inviolability of God's Law

Those who believe in God, including Catholics, of course, are convinced that the Lord God is the ultimate source of world order and of laws that govern mankind, and that some laws stemming from that source are not subject to change, which means man cannot violate them. In his lawmaking activities, a legislator therefore, regardless of whether it is a basic or an ordinary law, must take that existing and unchangeable law into account and must use it as the foundation of the state's order.

Those who do not believe in God reject the existence of such a source of law, but they generally agree that the entire world order and that which governs man is not up to him to decide, and, consequently, they accept the existence of a certain inherent order or a more or less unchangeable natural law.

Consequently, following the example of the United Nations, which declared in the preamble to the Popular Declaration of Human Rights that "the recognition of an inborn dignity and of equal and undisposable rights of all members of the human family is the basis of freedom, justice, and peace around the world," it can be said that the inherent law is a joint area of which everybody is able to approve as the basis of a constitution. Not everybody will agree on the ultimate sources of such a law or on its nature and scope, but that does not prevent the law from becoming the real basis of the state arrangement, on the one hand, and allowing everybody to grasp such an understanding of the law that would be in accordance with one's own religion or views, on the other.

"The fundamental task of the legislator," wrote the Polish bishops in the aforementioned document, should be a confirmation in constitutional norms of the inherent and inalienable rights of man, human communities, and the community of the state's citizens. That is because the church's teachings do not perceive man as a selfish individual free of social ties. The teachings recognize that man can only develop correctly when he is in a human community that would create the right conditions for such development; man also has commitments vis-a-vis the community that pertain to those interactions."

### The Securing of Religious Freedoms

The church's view is that the link between God and man is the source of human dignity. However, the dignity demonstrates itself primarily through ties among humans. The constitution, if it is to be for man and not

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against him, should not only guarantee ties between God and man but should also promote them and provide protection for them, through the proper securing of religious freedoms. It should also provide support for various types of human relations. In cases where the worshipping of God is not protected for those who want to worship Him, we simply have a lack of freedom. All natural human relations, beginning with family and marriage ties, social ties (associations, organizations, trade unions), all the way to economic, political, and cultural ties, as well as supporting human relations in international life, should be constitutionally guaranteed and protected.

The constitution should also explicitly prohibit everything that is an obstacle to or destroys man's links to God, as well as man's links to other men, particularly in the natural form of interactions. From this perspective, one should not only view the ban on killing the unborn, which should be included in the constitution, but also the ban on measures aimed at destroying familial, social, and other types of ties.

In cases where a constitution does not take values resulting from human community into account, there is a danger of lack of freedom through wantonness. Freedom must be guaranteed and protected in the constitution, while wantonness should be banned.

The right to religious freedom "has its roots not in the subjective approach by someone, but in the very human nature. That is why the right to religious freedom should also be permanently granted to those who do not fulfill the obligation of seeking the truth and being faithful to it, while using the right to religious freedom cannot face obstacles if public order is maintained" (From the declaration on religious freedom entitled "Dignitatis Humanae" p 2).

It follows that religious freedom—and also any other type of freedom—is an inherent right of every human being, regardless of what religion he or she professes or does not profess or the views that somebody might have or their lack thereof. From that perspective, the Catholic Church is not looking for an easy way out. All it demands is that it be granted the same type of freedom as is enjoyed by others.

One must pay attention to the view, however, which is popular and which continues to be imposed on society, that says that religious affairs are one's private business and are not included in the realm of public life. That view is completely false and constitutes one of the classic Marxist arguments regarding religion. It is in conflict not only with the nature of religion itself, but also with internationally recognized agreements ratified by Poland.

Aside from the need to respect human conscience in the area of religious beliefs, "another element that is equally fundamental," wrote Pope John Paul II on 1 September 1980, addressing the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, "is a consequence of the fact that religious freedom demonstrates itself through acts that are not just internal but are also exclusively attributed to one's own personality, which results from the fact that human beings act and think in agreement with other human beings. The "confessing" and "practicing" of religious beliefs takes place through a variety of visible acts—both personal and collective acts, both private and public—that are at the source of the community of people of the same faith and that constitute a link tying a man who believes in God to some type of organic religious community."

This position was confirmed particularly in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, Article 18, Item 1, which reads: "Everybody has a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The right encompasses freedom to acquire or profess a religion or faith in accordance with one's own choice, as well as freedom to make one's religion or faith known to the outside world individually, collectively, publicly, or privately, through the taking part in religious ceremonies, the practicing of religion, and teaching."

**The Recognition of the Polish Christian Tradition**

Everybody is familiar with attacks against the presence of religion classes in public schools. The Sejm of the Polish Republic, in its respect for the rights of parents and children to religious teaching and moral education in accordance with their own beliefs, reinstated religion teaching in schools and, in doing so, assured a better execution of Article 18, Item 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which says: "Countries-parties to this Covenant commit themselves to respect parental freedoms and that of guardians, in appropriate legal cases, in securing religious and moral education for their children in accordance with their own views."

The recognition of the Polish Christian tradition as one of the sources of national identity is not a sign of tolerance at all but is, instead, the recognition of a historical fact. On this issue, Polish bishops spoke out in the aforementioned document: "We also think it is necessary for the constitution to include the most precious values of the Polish nation, which constitute its history and fate and which are closely linked to society's evangelization. Values such as love of freedom, readiness to make sacrifices in the name of the maintenance and protection of freedom, honor, tolerance, social and national solidarity are not only a part of our national tradition and a cementing factor for the unity's identity but also constitute a value in the legacy of European culture. That is why this legislative obligation, aside from legal aspects, also has a moral dimension."

**Autonomy of Church and State**

The Polish Episcopate has already spoken out several times concerning the need to amend the current Constitution, which states in Article 82, Item 2 that "the church is separated from the state. Principles of church-state

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relations, as well as the legal and property situation of religious associations, are defined by legal acts of ordinary rank."

The issue requires elaborate treatment, but I think that just a few remarks should be sufficient at this point. First, the Catholic Church need not be separated from the state because these are different entities by definition, which means they are also separate from each other. Against this backdrop, one cannot protest against the real situation, but what one could do, at the most, is protest against the lack of logic. I am saying this because, given that the Constitution states that the church and state are not the same thing, the Constitution is simply reaffirming an obvious fact. If, however, the Constitution "separates" church from state, the impression is that the church used to be part of the state. Regarding the church as part of the state is understandable only within the Marxist approach or in the approach of some other philosophy that regards the church as a religious association that exists thanks to the state, that is ruled in line with the state's rules, and that could be dissolved because of the state's will.

A proposal regarding a different constitutional description of state-church relations is dictated by the church's new set of principles, which are expressed in the documents issued at the Second Vatican Council, especially in the pastoral "Gaudium et Spes" Constitution, which is about the church in the contemporary world and which states under Item 76: "It is a vital issue, especially in pluralistic societies, that the appropriate relationship between the political community and the church be appreciated, and to clearly separate things that are done by the faithful, either as individuals or those associated on their own behalf as citizens who are guided by the voice of Christian conscience, from what those faithful do along with their shepherds in the name of the church.

The church, which by virtue of its mission and powers does not identify itself with the political community in any way nor tie itself to any kind of political system, is at the same time a sign and a protection of the transcendental nature of man.

The political community and the church are separate and autonomous from each other in their respective areas, even though both communities serve the individual and social calls of the same people, despite the fact they do it by virtue of different rationales. The efficiency of the service of both of them for the sake of everybody will increase along with the improved and healthy cooperation between them, while, at the same time, taking into account the circumstances of place and time."

Both communities—that is to say, the state and the church—have been established to care for the good of man. The state's prerogative is to care for material prosperity, while the church has been charged with caring for the spiritual good of the same citizens. These two interests are complementary and not contradictory. (Catholic Information Agency, 26 July 1994).

## Drug Addiction Prevention Law Explained

*94EP0076A Warsaw NOWA EUROPA (KONIEC TYGODNIA supplement) in Polish 8-10 Jul 94 p X*

[Article by DAP: "According to Polish Law"]

[Text] The Polish Law on the Prevention of Drug Addiction of 31 January 1985 is based on the concept of preventive medicine, meaning that the possession of narcotic and psychotropic drugs is not punishable, and treatment is voluntary.

Under that law, only drug production and trafficking are punishable: Drug production carries a fine of imprisonment for up to three years or, if intended for personal gain (production in considerable quantities for commercial purposes), up to five years plus a fine. Similarly, illegal exportation, importation, and transit of drugs carries a fine of imprisonment for up to five yeas and a fine. If, on the other hand, a person is a trafficker in the milky juice of the poppy, raw opium, or marijuana, thus creating a market for these substances, he is liable for imprisonment for up to eight years. Also punishable is the cultivation of the poppy without the required permit. The penalty in this case is imprisonment for up to two years, restriction of liberties, or a fine. Sanctions also are applied to people who harvest the milky juice of the poppy, raw opium, and marijuana.

The currently mandatory law on the prevention of drug addiction regulates poppy cultivation in a special manner. Only so-called low-morphine poppy can be cultivated. This, however, according to Drug Addition Commissioner Grazyna Miros at the Ministry of Health, prompts addicts to seek out other narcotics, most recently amphetamine, a drug that is particularly dangerous to the organism but very popular in Poland.

After 10 years of operation of the existing laws against drug abuse, it can be seen that they are not accomplishing their purpose. That is because, in the meantime, the rise in drug addiction has been promoted by such factors as the opening of our country's boundaries, the rise of clandestine enterprises manufacturing narcotic substances, and the growing activities of foreign mafias on Polish territory; they utilize our country for trafficking in and transiting drugs.

Last April, Poland ratified the United Nations Convention on Combatting Illegal Trafficking in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances. This necessitates modifying our laws to conform to world trends, including the international coordination of exports and imports of narcotics handled by our government; controls on so-called precursors—that is, on the manufacturers of substances that are potential raw materials for drug production; and the introduction of laws making drug possession punishable. The new law being drafted at the Ministry of Health reflects two conflicting trends, one in

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favor of punishing all people in possession of drugs, including drug addicts, and the other in favor of exempting addicts from penalties and, instead, encouraging or requiring them to seek treatment.

MONAR [Young People's Movement To Combat Drug Addiction], which is the largest Polish organization dealing with drug abuse, has at present been assigned 600 hospital beds and is treating 800 patients. It operates 22 centers and 22 prevention clinics. Of late, its employees have been feeling particularly disturbed by the growing number of cases of drug abuse due to the consumption of amphetamine, whose effect is initially less tangible but, in the long run, more deleterious than many other drugs. Attached to MONAR are therapeutic clubs of a preventive nature, designed chiefly for youth threatened by drug addiction. Also associated with MONAR are confidential telephone numbers and the distribution of syringes and needles for drug addicts with AIDS.

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### Government Statement on New Moldovan Constitution

*AU0108203494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Statement issued by the Romanian Government in Bucharest; date not given]

[Text] The Romanian Government has carefully followed the debates in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on the new constitution and took note of its adoption by parliament and its promulgation by decree, by the country's president, Mr. Mircea Snegur, on 29 July 1994.

The Romanian Government proceeds from the recognition and respect of the right of the Republic of Moldova to adopt its own constitution and considers this fact as an important step along the road of democracy, reform, and the consolidation of the rule-of-law state, since it has many positive provisions in this respect. At the same time, in view of the fact that Romania was the first state that recognized the independence of the Republic of Moldova, the government cannot but take note with regret of a significant departure from the spirit and principles of the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova adopted on 27 August 1991, particularly with regard to the definition of the nature of the state and its language. Against all proof to the contrary and of (?ethnic) and scientific truth, the Constitution of the Republic of Romania promulgates a second name for the same language, which is none other but the Romanian language. The problem can have a broader significance than the mere definition of the language, since the actual goal of the move is to negate the character of the Republic of Moldova as a Romanian state and, implicitly, to move away from the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.

Unfortunately, a formula preferred by the old system [words indistinct], invented a new nation, while actually striving to achieve the forced denationalization of millions of Moldovan Romanians on the left bank of the Prut River. The discussions of the Chisinau Parliament also brought to the fore other anti-Romanian theses, which started out from the false premise that Romania is a danger to the independence of the Republic of Moldova, something that flagrantly contradicts the entire official policy of our government and country toward the second independent Romanian state, born in the wake of the former Soviet Union's dismemberment, of the collapse of communism, and of the radical changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years. If there is a danger to the Republic of Moldova's independence and sovereignty, it does not come from Romania. The provisions regarding the declaration of other languages as official languages, too, play into the hand of the separatist policies and of the attempts to preserve zones of interest and influence. The erosion of the character of national language and the declaration of certain areas as having a special status, instead of implementing internationally valid practices or ensuring a broad administrative-territorial decentralization, basically create the premises for the state's atomization and possible federalization, with serious consequences for the independence of the Republic of Moldova and for ensuring the observation of the rights of the majority population, the Moldovan Romanians, in accordance with existing international standards. The adopted formulas encourage separatism and can eventually damage the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.

The spontaneous reactions of protests among the population, as well as the immediate involvement of the opposition political forces in collecting the necessary signatures required for the procedure of revising the barely adopted Constitution, prove the vulnerability of this basic text.

The Romanian Government reiterates, on this occasion too, its political will to lend consistent support for the real independence of the Republic of Moldova and its full assertion on the international level, for the withdrawal of foreign troops from its national territory, and for the consolidation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Romanian Government is further interested in promoting close relations with the Government of the Republic of Moldova, in order to achieve the strategic common goal of deepening economic integration and consolidating the common cultural and spiritual space, and will further act along these lines, particularly at this difficult time for the Republic of Moldova, when it is faced with great difficulties in the process of transition, difficulties that are compounded by this summer's drought and by the hardships the Republic of Moldova is meeting on its traditional markets in the CIS space.

Observing and supporting the Republic of Moldova's desire for independent international assertion, the Romanian Government intends to further cooperate with all political forces in the Republic of Moldova that share this goal, that act for special relations with Romania, and that speak out in favor of national emancipation, in the spirit and letter of the Declaration of Independence of 27 August 1991, which calls for democracy and reform and for linking the Republic of Moldova to the values of European democracy.

### Foreign Minister on European Structures, NATO

*AU0108191294 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 29 Jul 94 pp 1,7*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by Romulus Caplescu; place and date not given: "In Our Race Toward Europe, the Criterion of Performance Remains Decisive"]

[Text] [Caplescu] Of late, Romanian diplomacy has been present at the Paris conference on stability and security

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in Europe, at the Istanbul meeting of the North Atlantic Consultative Council, at the Warsaw talks of the foreign ministries from Eastern and Central European countries associated to the European Union with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and with President Clinton, and finally at the Trieste Meeting of the Central European Initiative. Drawing a balance sheet of these activities, to what extent, Mr. Minister, can one say that we have made progress on the road to integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures?

[Melescanu] At first glance, the various international meetings organized at the European and Euro-Atlantic level may appear slightly dispersed and even contradictory. A first conclusion is that we have now entered the second stage of the integration. In the first stage, we were particularly concerned with the legal and procedural aspects, hence with the idea of being admitted to these organizations. Now, we realize that the most important stage is that of the real integration, with particular emphasis on economic integration. We are now entering the stage when integration is a practical process of adjustment to common European standards. This is a less spectacular, but more difficult process. From a legal viewpoint, we are at the same level as the other Central European countries. However, from a practical viewpoint, it is obvious that our efforts should be very great and particularly very fast, in order to recover a gap of more than two years, if we were to refer to the signing of the association agreement with the European Union alone. There has also been a delay in our admittance to the Council of Europe. Compared to other countries in our region, I can say that we have recovered part of the handicap. If everything goes well, our association accord with the European Union will take effect less than a year after the implementation of the Hungary's and Poland's association agreements. Hence, this amounts to another reduction of the handicap, without mentioning the Partnership for Peace (PFP), a program we were the first to adhere to.

[Caplescu] During their recent visit to Warsaw, the defense ministers of Germany and France said that Poland has good chances of being the first country to be received in NATO, at the end of the nineties. During his meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl intimated that the road toward the European Union might be cut short for Hungary as well as for Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. What about the assurances given to Romania? Are we witnessing to a return to the concept of two-speed integration?

[Melescanu] First of all, we consider that we have an equal status with that of the other Eastern European countries, regarding the way in which we are being treated by the aforementioned institutions. However, this does not necessarily and automatically mean that the broadening or expansion of these institutions will be nondiscriminatory and concomitant. For us, the important thing is to be granted equal opportunities and to ensure that these institutions will practice a nondifferentiated treatment and nondiscriminatory approach. By that, I mean that the admittance decision in each particular case should be taken on the basis of the respective country's performance. This is because the integration in these institutions is not a purely formal act, but rather an act arising from the fact that the respective countries are increasingly drawing closer—from an economic, political, and social viewpoint—to the overall standards practiced by the aforementioned institutions. I cannot exclude in advance the possibility that some countries will be admitted first and the others will follow suit. However, I do not think it is good for all of us to jostle at once at a half-open or barely open door (sometimes it is not even open at all) and thus hamper each other in crossing its threshold. The important thing is that admittance should be equally accessible to all of us and that we should be judged by our performance.

Of course, as far as Hungary and Poland are concerned, these countries have a better start than we do, since they began the transition long before us and have enjoyed spectacular successes in this transition, while also meeting with very great hardships in the process, something which is still the case today. Therefore, I do not think that we can now pass final judgments on the priority of joining those institutions. The important thing is that we should have equal chances and we were given assurances in this respect. The Western attitude toward the relationship of the Central European countries with the European Union and the Partnership for Peace is equally open and nondiscriminatory for all six of them.

[Caplescu] The proceedings of the recent international seminar in Sinaia [on regional security and cooperation, organized by Romania's parliament and the North Atlantic Assembly on 14-16 July] and the statements of certain Russian politicians have again revealed Moscow's opposition to NATO's expansion eastward and also emphasized its demands that Russia should be given a preferential treatment within the Partnership for Peace. Moscow's demands in these two directions are explainable. However, do you think that they will have the desired effect?

[Melescanu] It is obvious that Russia is currently working out its own concept on European security, a concept which does not fully tally with NATO's model or an extended NATO's model. On the contrary, it seems to me that this concept aims at ensuring the European security on the basis of two poles: NATO and the Russian Federation, or better said the CIS. These two poles could be harmonized, either under the aegis of the CSCE or under the aegis of a very broad body, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC]; hence, Russia's desire to have its particular role, tasks, and responsibilities recognized. Russia has signed the PFP, as any country wishing to enjoy the possibilities offered by this scheme. The difference is that Russia's individual cooperation program will look slightly different, to the

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extent that it will reflect Russia's particular share, role, and concerns in matters of security. It seems to me that the West's position vis-a-vis Russia is characterized by its readiness to recognize its role of great power, but a democratic great power, in the Western meaning of the word. I believe that we are now moving toward a reasonable compromise, that will blend Russia's desire to have its particular role in the CIS, in the world, and in ensuring stability in Europe recognized with a legal treatment that is absolutely equal to the one granted to the other countries participating in the PFP.

### President Iliescu Released From Hospital

*AU0108182794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] We received the following communique from the minister of health:

Developments in the state of health of Romanian President Mr. Ion Iliescu have remained normal. Consequently, he was released from the hospital this afternoon, 1 August 1994; following that he will go on vacation in the near future.

The communique is signed by Minister of Health Iulian Mincu, Dr. Alexandru Leu, Dr. Mihai Carstea, Dr. Stefan Dumitrescu, Dr. Gheorghe Dinescu, and University Prof. Dr. Dan Sevlacec.

### Doctor Denies Iliescu Cancer

*AU0108143994 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 29 Jul 94 p 4*

[Article by Maria Timuc: "MEDIAFAX Advances the Hypothesis that President Iliescu Might Also Have Had Cancer of the Pancreas Head"]

[Text] The MEDIAFAX News Agency is in a position to give additional details on President Ion Iliescu's health. Reliable medical sources have reconstructed for MEDIAFAX the evolution of this case. Thus, at the time of his admission to hospital, the president had symptoms of jaundice, but further investigations led to no sure diagnosis. In that situation, the medical team suggested to the patient that he should undergo surgery, which might clarify the situation to a large extent. The president accepted the suggestion. The operation lasted for over an hour (not an hour as announced in the press) and was filmed in its entirety. From a strictly medical viewpoint, there is the theoretical possibility of establishing another diagnosis: cancer of the pancreas head. The surgery officially confirmed the initial diagnosis: severe obstructive cholecystitis by lithiasis. A final clarification of President Iliescu's medical condition will be made after the laboratory test of the excited gallbladder, a result usually obtained within 15 days of the surgery.

#### Dr. Alexandru Leu, Director of the Elias Hospital Categorically Denies the MEDIAFAX Rumor

Contacted by EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, Dr. Alexandru Leu, director of the Elias Hospital in Bucharest, said: "I cannot believe that MEDIAFAX could issue such information. Mr. Ion Iliescu's post-operative condition is normal. Regarding the alleged diagnosis of pancreas head cancer, the problem did not even arise. As a matter or fact, the tests conducted during the president's hospitalization excluded such a diagnosis. Regarding the other information released by MEDIAFAX (the presence of jaundice before the operation, the duration of the operation, and its filming), it cannot be accepted even as a conceivable idea."

### Rovinari Miners Expand Strike; Deva Protest

*AU0108180294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Today, the number of strikers attending the sit-in on the platform in front of the Autonomous Pitcoal Corporation headquarters in the center of Targu Jiu Municipality increased to over 5,000 miners coming from the Rovinari and Motru mining basins, as well as from other units.

Our correspondent, Cornel Sorescu, has learned from Marin Condeescu, the chairman of the National Confederative Center of the Miners Trade Unions of Romania, that the number of the persons on general strike currently exceeds 64,000, as the labor action now also includes the Concordia League in Ploiesti.

The situation of the persons on hunger strike turned dramatic. Gheorghe (?Mihai), a repairman at the Mehedinti mining operation, has been transported to the hospital for emergency medical treatment. Matei Mircea, a repairman at the Tismana-1 mine, is also in critical condition.

Regarding the contacts taking place for the settlement of the labor conflict, after talks conducted at the headquarters of the Industry Ministry, Radu Mironovici, the general director of the Targu Jiu Autonomous Pitcoal Corporation, as well as the other members of the delegation, among whom Nicolae Oros, deputy chairman of the National Confederative Center of the Mining Trade Unions, were scheduled to meet with the prime minister our correspondent reports.

This morning, the Gorj County Court proceeded to try the case of the Targu Jiu Autonomous Pitcoal Corporation versus the Rovinari Mining Trade Union Federation, intended to declare the general strike that began on 28 July illegal. The court adjourned until 4 August, owing to lack of evidence.

As a result of the radio-broadcast appeal by the trade union leaders of the Autonomous Pitcoal Corporation to Romania's National Red Cross Society, this morning the latter distributed mineral water and multivitamin substances among the hunger strikers. According to the same communique signed by Professor Nicolae Nicoara, the chairman of the Romanian National Red Cross Society, the representatives of that society are in permanent contact with the hunger strikers.

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Today, in front of the Autonomous Copper Corporation in Deva Municipality, representatives of the miners of the Poiana Rusca, Deva, Zarand, Moldova Noua, and Balan [copper] mining units have also begun protests, our correspondent, Dorin Corpade, reports. The dialogue and the negotiations of the union representatives with the corporation administration have failed, said Nicolae Ciocan, the leader of the Solidarity '92 trade union organization, who added that, under such circumstances, 7,000 union members have decided to go on hunger strike as of today in front of the corporation headquarters.

Besides such protest actions, starting tomorrow, they will also initiate other forms of labor action in the various sectors of the extraction units, however, without interrupting production activity. The actions will continue until all wage claims are solved favorably, our correspondent reports.

### General Strike Threatened

*AU0208082594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Text] The Rovinari miners' strike has entered its sixth day. Today a commission led by the head of the Mining Department will go to Targu Jiu to re-examine the possibilities of the Autonomous Pitcoal Corporation negotiating new salary increases.

The labor action has meanwhile grown to comprise over 64,000 employees and strikes have also been reported at the Autonomous Copper Corporation in the town of Deva.

In connection with the worsening health condition of some of the hunger strikers, the St. Barbara Christian-Democratic Convention of Miners warned that if any of the hunger strikers die, a general strike will be triggered throughout the country's mining industry and a march will be organized in the capital city involving 200,000 miners.

### Police Warn Against Violence Over Cluj Dig

*AU0208083694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Text] As announced, this morning archaeological probing works are to begin in the central area of the Cluj-Napoca municipality to establish the various layers of the several material cultural remains deposited here over a number of periods of history. Uncontestable elements of the Roman period have already been unearthed during preliminary archaeological research work carried out in the same area.

In connection with this issue our correspondent Teodor Mateescu last night contacted Gheorghe Lazarovici, the director of the National History Museum of Transylvania, who confirmed that the works were to start, with specialized teams from the museum and the local building trust in the area designated by the government commission specially set up for the purpose, which two weeks ago carried out investigations on the spot, after which it stated that the security of the buildings and other objects in Cluj's Union Square would not be affected.

As is known, the local branch of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] has organized protests against this research program by the History Museum of Transylvania, and they have also pursued these in court, believing that symbols of the identity of ethnic Hungarians will be affected by the works. The court case and the issuing of the judgment have been set for 8 September.

Our correspondent also contacted Grigore Zanc, the Cluj County prefect, who pointed out that the UDMR's call for civil disobedience, as well as the negative reactions with regard to these routine archaeological works, are unfounded, and that the law-enforcement agencies will firmly carry out their duty to defend constitutional decisions.

The Cluj Municipality Police have issued a communique urging citizens tempted to commit violent acts to abstain from hostile demonstrations, as the law-enforcement agencies will not tolerate any further violations of public order, our correspondent reports.

### Rector Presents Data on Police Academy

*94BA0343A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 3 Jun 94 p 5*

[Interview with Gen. Vasile Dobrinoiu, rector of the Al. I. Cuza Police Academy, by Luiza Cristina; place and date not given: "We Are Among the Best in Europe"]

[Text] [Cristina] Please introduce this institution to us.

[Dobrinoiu] The Al. I. Cuza Police Academy is a military institution of higher learning. It came into being in 1990 and has five departments: the Police School, organized around legal studies; the Gendarmes School, organized around legal studies; the Border Guards School (headquartered in the city of Iasi); the Firefighter-Engineers School; and the Archival Studies School. The Police School comes under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Education. The Academy is led by a rector and a senate, and each school has its own council and a dean. Secret general elections were held for all of the leadership positions: dean, assistant dean, and rector. Both the teaching staff and the students took part in the elections. This is the first time in our military institutions when the leadership positions have been submitted to a general vote and confirmed through an order of the ministry.

[Cristina] What is the admissions procedure of the Police Academy?

[Dobrinoiu] All Romanian young people, regardless of nationality, religion, political convictions, or sex, can

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compete for admission so long as they meet the following conditions: They are up to 22 years old, they are secondary-school graduates, and they have no criminal convictions.

The competition for admission is organized into two phases. First of all there is the phase of eliminatory tests, of which there are three: psychological testing, physical training, and a complete medical examination. Everyone who passes these tests, any one of which can eliminate a candidate, goes on to the next stage of the examination: the written tests. For the Police School, one must take written examinations in the Romanian language—grammar, the history of Romania, and, in contradistinction to the Law School, also a foreign language: French, English, German, and Russian—languages of international circulation.

[Cristina] What fields are the students trained for?

[Dobrinoiu] For example, within the Police School the students train for all fields pertinent to the Romanian Police, including criminal investigations, economics, transportation data and record-keeping, population data and record-keeping, organized crime, drugs, traffic, and so forth. In the first or second year, the students cover some common disciplines. In the third and fourth years, they specialize in various fields. The Police School fulfills a double role: both law school and police officers' school. After the second year of studies, the students are given the rank of lieutenant, and after the fourth year they are awarded the diploma of bachelor's degree in law. So graduates are given double credentials.

The course load is heavy. While a student in civilian life carries 22-24 hours per week, the students in the Academy carry 30-32 hours per week.

[Cristina] Introduce the faculty of the Police Academy to us in a few words.

[Dobrinoiu] For the most part, the members of the teaching staff belong to the Police Academy. They teach specialized disciplines: police tactics, police law, criminology, criminal law, criminal trial law, and so forth. For certain subjects, we have well-known professors from the Law School in Bucharest, judges from the Constitutional Court, and specialists from the government of Romania, from the Institute of Legal Studies and Research. In our opinion, our faculty measures up to the tasks of this institution.

[Cristina] Where and how do the students get their practical experience?

[Dobrinoiu] We have to say that, tied to the practical nature of the profession for which our students are training, a great number of the practical activities are carried on at local police units, at penitentiaries, and at state archives.

[Cristina] How many hours of military training do the students have?

[Dobrinoiu] Military and physical training makes up a significant percentage—seven percent—but, compared to the period preceding this one, it is much reduced. Hours of military training were eliminated because they had to do not with the specific nature of a policeman's work, but rather with the specific work of a Ministry of National Defense cadre.

[Cristina] Is there any thought being given to changing the admissions system?

[Dobrinoiu] At the level of the University and the Ministry of Education, discussions have been carried on about modifying some of the tests in the competition for admission. For the time being, we have expressed our opinion that the established tests are the ones that should exist at any law school or at any officers' school. For the time being, we are not going with the multiple-choice system, which, among its advantages, also has the disadvantage that some answers can be given at random.

[Cristina] What is the status of the people studying here: Are they students or soldiers?

[Dobrinoiu] Student-soldiers. It should be mentioned that the Academy provides free to all its students housing, board, uniforms, transportation, medications, and tuition. In exchange, the students pledge in writing that they will work for at least 10 years in the M.I. [Ministry of Internal Affairs] after they have completed their studies. If they no longer wish to work in the M.I., they have to pay the cost of their schooling.

[Cristina] Is the regimen of being confined to barracks compulsory?

[Dobrinoiu] No. At the present time, it operates according to the following rules: fourth year—after school hours (which are compulsory), the students are free. So they can leave the barracks. But the great majority of them stay. The first-, second-, and third-year students are confined to barracks, but they have the opportunity to go into town every week: one day during the first year, two days during the second year, and three days during the third year.

[Cristina] What would the most important accomplishment of the Police Academy be?

[Dobrinoiu] It has begun to be known in this country and abroad as an institution of prestige. In support of this, I give you as an example the words of the secretary general of INTERPOL, Mr. Kendel, who said that it is one of the best institutions of police education in Europe and even in the world.

## Bishop Tokes' 'Opposition' to New Government

*94P20925A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 1 Jun 94 p 2*

[Article by Silviu Achim: "Bishop Tokes in Opposition to the New Leadership of Hungary"]

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[Text] Before the elections in Hungary, Laszlo Tokes, the Reformed Church bishop of Oradea, addressed an open letter to the parties participating in the election campaign. The epistle had a partisan character which was not at all concealed, since, after it referred to the discrimination to which the Hungarian minority in Romania is subjected, the letter repudiated the meeting between Gyula Horn, the chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and Oliviu Gherman, the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] leader. The same treatment was applied to other Budapest political leaders—in the MSZP and the Union of Free Democrats—which, in their statements, had said that there should be an improvement (if not an historic reconciliation) in Hungary's relations with some of its neighbors.

The mysteries of the move of the Oradea prelate did not elude Hungarian public opinion but the impact was not what was expected; indeed, judging by the results, it left most people indifferent, since they are more concerned about everyday problems than about inventions regarding the "bitter fate" of their blood brothers abroad. Gyula Horn gave an elegant, but firm, response to the honorary president of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], characterizing him as person who spoke about the socialists without knowing anything about them. He reaffirmed that the situation of Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary can be improved only if there are normal relations, without any tensions, with the political forces in the neighboring countries.

A downright sarcastic commentary appeared in the influential Budapest daily NEPSZABADSAG, a commentary which opened with the question: "To whom is Laszlo Tokes addressing himself and in whose name is he speaking?" Responding to the question, the author Tibor Kiss, sees the situation as follows: "Obviously, the bishop is motivated by the intention to treat the matter from the point of view of the nation as a whole: in his view, the elections in Hungary represent the cause of all the 15 million Hungarians. But, is this the way things really are? Can Tokes be considered today to be a personality whose opinions cannot be contradicted? Personally, after his strongly pro-government statements and manifestations (ADEVARUL note: he is referring to the Budapest government), I cannot consider him to be such a personality. As for the elections in Hungary, in accordance with the Constitution in force, it is the right of citizens who have the right to vote in Hungary to decide who will lead the country during the next four years. Therefore, this letter represents, from the legal point of view, interference in the internal affairs of another country, even if Tokes does not think so."

The commentator also notes that, as the election campaign advanced, openly progovernment manifestations of leaders and of Hungarians outside Hungary increased and the issue of the Hungarian minorities became, inevitably, part of the competition to win voters. In the opinion of the author, this demonstrates the crisis of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the governing party, in regard to the Hungarian communities abroad. "This policy of the MDF created, on the one hand, its own clients and, on the other hand, persons who were out of favor in the ranks of the Hungarian minorities, because the MDF divided up the public funds in Hungary which were earmarked for the assistance of Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary, in accordance with the interests of the party."

Failing to take into account the echo of his letter to the political parties in Hungary, Bishop Laszlo Tokes resumed his attacks on Gyula Horn, especially after Horn said that the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Border should be abolished and that, in December 1989, elite Hungarian troops were prepared to intervene in Romania. The bishop believes that, by ending the activity of the office, Horn would do an injustice to Hungarians abroad and that, by his statements about the Romanian revolution, the MSZP leader "provides ammunition for Romanian national communist, anti-Hungarian subversion", in other words, those who believe that the events in Timisoara in December 1989 erupted because of the interference of Hungary and the KGB. "These statements are absolutely indescribable", Laszlo Tokes added.

The letter which the Oradea bishop recently addressed to the UDMR Council of Representatives, which met in Tirgu Mures, by chance or not by chance, a week before the second ballot of the elections in Hungary, also had anti-Horn accents. Resuming the attack, L. T., most certainly wanted to give another helping hand to the MDF. The reason, perhaps, was his fear that any change in the leadership team in Budapest might be followed by the directing of the preferences of this team toward other leaders of the UDMR.

## PDSR, PDAR Alba County Branches Merge

*AU3007145594 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 30 Jul 94*

[Text] Yesterday, in Alba Iulia, the Alba County council of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the coordinating council of the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania [PDAR] decided upon the merger of those parties' county organizations, reads a communique sent to us from the Alba County PDSR press bureau.

They concluded a protocol, the text of which has also been faxed to us, which attests that the merger of the two party branches relies on the compatibility of the political programs of the two parties, as well as on the joint efforts they made in Alba County intended to implement the reform program of the current government.

The PDAR members, who thus become members of the PDSR, are to be admitted, in an adequate and equitable proportion, in the village, town, municipality, and county structures of the PDSR, stipulates the protocol.

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## Editorial on Reconciliation With Hungary

*AU3107203394 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 27 Jul 94 p 1*

[First of two installments of Ion Cristoiu editorial: "The Historical Chance of Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation"]

[Text] On Monday, 25 July, in Washington, a joint declaration was signed in which Israel and Jordan pledged to put an end to their state of hostility that has existed for over 46 years between the two countries. Thus, a new and important step forward was taken in the Middle East peace process. Considering that the Israeli-Syrian negotiations, despite certain hurdles, are also proceeding implacably, one could say that peace and quiet is about to be installed in one of the most explosive regions of the world. The progress reached in that process is one of the most amazing things that happened after the conclusion of the Cold War. For almost half a century there has been a conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, as well as between the Jordanians and the Israelis. It has been a half-century of war, bloodshed, and atttacks and counterattacks. A half-century of suspicion and mutually waiting in ambush. Both in the case of the Arabs and in that of the Israelis, several generations were brought up in the spirit of the cult of hatred. One's amazement caused by the advance of this peace process is even amplified by the fact that there do exist important forces which oppose peace in the Middle East. Those forces have been trying and are still trying with all their might to block the process from achieving peace. Rabid declarations, absurd bomb attacks, and triggering disorder—a whole arsenal, professionally orchestrated, has been put in motion with the intent to fully restore the cause which over decades has fuelled the Middle East conflict, namely: suspicion. Despite all this, the peace process continues to advance unperturbed. Yasir 'Arafat has set up headquarters in Gaza. Jordan, another former foe of Israel, is about to conclude peace with the Jewish state. Syria has also sat down at the negotiating table.

The conflict between Romania and Hungary has been going on for over 70 years. Even if there has not been as long a violent period as in the Middle East, that conflict has left and is still leaving its mark on the relations between the two countries, as well as on the relations between the Romanian majority and the ethnic Hungarian minority. As in the Middle East, the factor that is maintaining the conflict is mutual suspicion. Hungary presumes that Romania wants to liquidate the ethnic Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Romania suspects that Hungary wants to seize its territory lying across the Carpathian Mountains.

It is wholly unimportant whether those suspicions have or lack a real basis. Anyway, both parties have given off a sufficient number of signals intended to maintain the suspicions of the other side. Currently, the really important thing is the fact that the preconditions, even if still feeble ones, have been created for a historical Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation. The new government in Budapest has begun to implement its foreign policy program, which includes its program on its policy regarding Romania. [Hungarian Prime Minister] Gyula Horn declared in Parliament that he considers himself only the leader of 10.5 million Hungarians. The previous prime minister had stated that he was the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians. Thus they also included among the people they were responsible for the Hungarians living outside the country's borders, as well. Which actually meant that the former Hungarian government had turned its concern over the fate of the ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romania into one of the major goals of its domestic and international policy. By declaring that he is the leader of merely 10.5 million Hungarians, Gyula Horn actually announced that the current government has ceased to regard its preoccupation for the protection of the rights of Hungarians living in neighboring countries as an absolute priority. Similarly, at the Trieste [Central European Initiative summit] meeting, during his talks with Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, the Hungarian prime minister expressed his wish to conclude the Romanian-Hungarian treaty as soon as possible, and accepted that the document also ought to include an exigency formulated by Romania: The acknowledgment [by Hungary] of the post-war borders. However, the most clear expression of the fundamental changes undergone by Hungary's foreign policy is to be seen in the statements recently made by Laszlo Kovacs, the foreign minister of the new Hungarian cabinet. In an interview published by the Polish journal GAZETA WYBORCZA, as well as in an interview granted to the BBC correspondent in Budapest, the head of the Budapest diplomacy asserted that a "very urgent" task of the new government is to achieve reconciliation with Slovakia and Romania. Under the sign of that objective, Mr. Kovacs severely criticized the policy of the former government with respect to Slovakia and Romania, and the ethnic Hungarian minorities living in those countries.

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### Krajisnik: Contact Group Rejects Proposals

*LD0108213994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2035 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Sarajevo, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—The Contact Group has not so far accepted a single Serb proposal or suggestion and has produced a proposal completely unacceptable for the Serb side, Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the Serb republic's [RS] People's Assembly, this evening told Bosnian Serb television, SRNA reports.

"It is true that without the help and support of the people and leadership of Serbia and Montenegro we would never had succeeded in our struggle for freedom of our state, but we cannot now lose our state and again accept a joint one with the Muslims and Croats, who declared war on us," Krajisnik said.

According to him "there is no Serb state" with the proposed maps which cut the RS into three parts.

According to SRNA, Krajisnik reiterated that the Serb side will in future continue to acknowledge suggestions by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic "up to the point where interests of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are threatened" and stressed that "the RS will not give the West the satisfaction of watching divisions and a break-up among the Serbs."

"If objections are raised again or an ultimatum is set, if nothing is done to amend the maps and we do not receive any guarantees for our independence, we will most probably be forced to call a referendum for the Serb people to make a decision," Krajisnik said.

### Serbs Walk Out of Prisoner Exchange Talks

*LD0108204994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2026 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—The talks between the state commissions [as received] for prisoner and civilian exchange of the Bosnian Serb republic and the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo, which were held at Sarajevo airport today, broke down due to Muslim offensive operations within the Sarajevo 20-kilometer exclusion zone, SRNA reports.

The Serb delegation walked out of the talks because the Muslims began offensive operations from the direction of Visoko, Breza, and Vares while the talks were still going on.

"We could not consent to continuing the talks. We ended the talks and will resume them when the conditions are created for it, and when the reasons that caused the break down are eliminated," Maksim Stanisic, the head of the Serb delegation and the mayor of Serb Sarajevo said.

A SRNA reporter at Sarajevo airport says progress has been made on the issue of ending the sniping in Sarajevo, and that an agreement was drafted that could be signed at a higher level.

According to the head of the Serb delegation, no agreement on prisoner exchange was reached, even after several hours of discussion.

### UN Mediators: Chances of New Talks 'Very Thin'

*AU0208085894 Paris AFP in English 0824 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Text] Sarajevo, Aug 2 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs cut short planned talks with the Bosnian Government aimed at reducing tension in and around Sarajevo, UN mediators said here Tuesday [2 August].

The chances of holding a high-level meeting planned for Tuesday were "very thin," UN Protection Force spokesman Major Dacre Holloway said.

The Serbs have accused the Bosnian Government army of opening hostilities in the area around Visoko, 40 kilometres (25 miles) northwest of Sarajevo.

They refused to hold talks while the fighting continued, Holloway said.

A first meeting was held between Bosnian Government and Serb commanders at Sarajevo airport. Sarajevo Radio reported progress at the meeting, held to discuss a prisoner exchange and the fate of missing soldiers on both sides.

The meeting had also discussed possible re-opening of access roads into Sarajevo and the stopping of sniper fire.

### President Zubak on Croat-Muslim Dispute in Usora

*LD0108174294 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] [Unidentified announcer] After his visit to northern and central Bosnia, and talks with both Croat and Muslim authorities there, in particular in locations where certain problems have recently surfaced and smaller incidents taken place—like in Usora, Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, held a news conference today. Ankica Posavljak reports.

[Posavljak] A general conclusion after the visit—Kresimir Zubak said today—is that significant progress has been achieved in bringing closer the views of the Croat and Muslim-Bosniak side in the course of implementing the Washington Agreement on the level of cantons and municipalities. But the situation is complicated by the fact that there is a difference between the legal regulations and the situation on the ground, and that several legal systems coexist in the same territory, Zubak said. This even causes some incidents, such as the

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recent developments in Usora, a town, which before the agreement was signed, was an example of good coexistence.

The whole problem emerged after the policemen from Usora were denied the right to carry out their duties by Tesanj, with the explanation that the Usora municipality had not yet been set up. Some local Croat officials were brought for questioning and maltreated. But after the joint visit by the president and vice president of the federation, as Mr. Zubak told journalists today, a temporary solution was found and the final solution should be reached by representatives of the Usora Municipal Council and the municipalities of Tesanj and Doboj—a solution that should enable the functioning of the Usora Municipal Council.

If the interested parties cannot reach an agreement, Zubak stressed, a compromise solution will be offered at the federal level. What has to be noted, as regards this case and any similar cases, is that no disagreement can be resolved by force and that all methods of resolving them must be in keeping with the Washington Agreement. This agreement is based on the fact that the two nations have equal rights and that none of them is more equal than the other in any part of the federation.

Speaking about the visit to Tuzla and the problem of mobilizing Croats into the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, Zubak informed reporters today that an agreement was reached on enabling all Croats from the Soli community to be militarily engaged in HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units, that is, the 101st HVO Brigade, and on organizing military training for those who had not had any prior combat experience; the Croat side will supply all those who decide to do their military service in this way from its logistical reserves.

Referring to the situation in Zenica, Kresimir Zubak said today that he had acquired a positive impression, and that the majority of representatives of the authorities in that city with whom talks were held sincerely wished that their city no longer be mistakenly taken for a center of Islamic Jamahiriism.

However, Zubak pointed out today, a particular problem in this municipality is the fact that a Mojahedin unit is stationed in the Croat village of Podbrezje—one of the few villages that the Croat population had not fled. The Bosniak authorities have promised that the problem will be solved.

Asked to comment on the latest Serb rejection of the Contact Group's peace plan, Zubak said that the Contact Group had shown it was not capable of implementing what it had tried to convince the Croat-Muslim side into believing, trying to elicit a positive response from that side.

According to Zubak, the Contact Group has shown greater heterogeneity than expected. However, the important thing is that the initiated peace process was going on and the initiative was not a failure.

Zubak described Slobodan Milosevic's latest statement as differentiation within the Serbian corps and as slight progress, with a manifested dose of skepticism in the sense of this being just another one of Milosevic's public statements with a completely different political background.

### Croats Reported Terrorizing Muslims in Mostar

*LD0108192094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Belgrade, Aug 1 (TANJUG)—Moslem-controlled Radio Mostar [as received] charged Monday that the Bosnian Croats are continuing to kill, terrorise and persecute Moslems in the Croat- held western part of Mostar.

The acts are said to be continuing despite the recently inaugurated European Union [EU] administration.

The body of Moslem Malik Alajbegovic from western Mostar was found last week at the bank of the Neretva river that divides the city into Croat- and Moslem-held parts, the radio said.

Violent fighting between Moslems and Croats began in Mostar in May 1993 and stopped after they signed a federation agreement in Washington in March 1994.

Much of the city was left in ruins in fighting that saw Croat forces target and destroy the old Mostar bridge, which had been listed by UNESCO as a world heritage monument.

As allies against the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the war, the Moslems and Croats ethnically cleansed about 45,000 Serbs from the Mostar region, destroying Serb Orthodox churches, monasteries and historical monuments.

There has been no change since Germany's Hans Koschnick became the EU administrator of Mostar nine days ago, because the city is still divided, the radio said.

Due to complicated procedures, barely 200 people a day can pass through checkpoints to cross from one side of the city to the other, the Radio Mostar said.

Moslem and Croat forces in Mostar have withdrawn to parts of the city that are not under the E.U. administration, but their police have remained to control the vacated parts of the city.

It was expected that the demilitarisation of Mostar would result in the free passage of citizens and that their safety woutd be guaranteed by EU, Moslem and Croat police, the radio said.

Radio Mostar said moslems were disappointed to learn that the EU police would only arrive on September 1,

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because the Moslems would have to wait for their arrival before they could safely return to homes in Croat-held territory.

### Plavsic Suggests Milosevic Guilty of 'Treason'

*AU0208124194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Aug 94 p 4*

[Report by G.K.: "Milosevic's Naivete or Strengthening of Power"]

[Text] "Radovan Karadzic has been elected by the Serb republic assembly and his task is to create a Serbian state. Slobodan Milosevic has so far supported that. Why has he made such a U-turn now? If it is a question of power, then it is horrible, it amounts to national treason. Listen, I am not saying anything, I am only saying 'if'."

This is what we were told yesterday in a telephone conversation with Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb republic, in Banja Luka. She also announced that the Serbian people would give their definite 'yes' (or 'no') [to the contact group plan] in a referendum.

"Who has the right to condemn 2 million people (I include the republic of Serbian Krajina here) to life under the rule of a fundamentalist regime? What union, it has nothing to do with a union? It is not even a confederation. We are supposed to live in a classic example of a federation—one president, one ministry of foreign affairs.... The people are bitter and desperate with what we hear coming from Serbia," Mrs. Plavsic said.

"I do not know what President Milosevic was guided by, but the arguments for the signing of the peace plan cannot be defended from the point of view of the survival of the nation. Milosevic has either decided that now is the time for him to strengthen his power, or he is naive, and that cannot be tolerated," Biljana Plavsic said.

### Serbs Fire on British Troops in Gorazde

*AU0208105794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Report by Fahrudin Becic from Gorazde]

[Text] The Chetnik attacks are of a somewhat lesser intensity in the Gorazde suburbs, but their skirmishes with the members of the peacekeepers are becoming increasingly frequent. Over the last 24 hours, [Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko] Mladic's warriors have several times fired on British troops, who are trying to secure peace here.

They have also continued to fire at civilian targets in the areas of (Djindjici) and (Vranici), and the defense lines on Vranovina, and in (Bradulice).

Over the last few days the Chetniks have redeployed most of the artillery they removed after the NATO ultimatum to their initial positions.

### UN Confirms Weapons Explosions in Sarajevo

*AU0208100894 Paris AFP in English 0949 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Aug 2 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs have cut short planned talks with the Bosnian government aimed at reducing tension in and around Sarajevo, UN mediators said here Tuesday.

UN coordinator Sergio Viera de Mello was to have chaired talks Tuesday between the mainly Moslem Bosnian government minister responsible for UN relations, Hasan Muratovic, and the president of the self-declared Bosnian Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik.

But UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Major Dacre Holloway said in the morning that the chances of holding the high- level meeting were "very thin."

The coordinator "is trying to get it back in line," he added. [passage omitted]

Commander Gregoire Verdon, a spokesman for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, Tuesday confirmed the presence of heavy arms and mortars in the area, which lies outside the Sarajevo heavy arms exclusion zone set up by the United Nations in February.

He said it was not known who had started the hostilities: "We do not know where the firing is coming from."

Holloway said "serious exchanges" were also taking place between the two sides in the western suburbs of Sarajevo including "twelve explosions of unknown origin" in the Stup neighbourhood, UN jargon for banned heavy arms. [passage omitted]

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## Martic Cited on UNPROFOR Mandate, Blockade

*LD0208092394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0718 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Text] Knin, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—The goal of the one-month blockade of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] by the Croatian side is to change the mandate of the peacekeeping troops in UN-protected areas, republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] President Milan Martic told TANJUG.

The blockade of UNPROFOR, allegedly by Croatian refugees, has been staged by the Croatian authorities, and it clearly reveals Croatia's efforts to abuse UNPROFOR for its own goals," Martic said.

"The Zagreb authorities are using pressure and blackmail to try to force UNPROFOR to do certain things outside its mandate, that is, they want to change UNPROFOR's mandate", Martic explained. "They think that UNPROFOR's task is to help them to reintegrate the RSK into the state of Croatia. The Croatian authorities believe that UNPROFOR will enable them to deploy their forces on, as they say, internationally recognized borders, implying the border between the RSK and the Serb republic (in Bosnia)."

Stressing that "this is not UNPROFOR's task and it cannot do this," President Martic recalled that according to the Vance plan, UNPROFOR's mandate was to protect the peace until a political agreement was achieved. According to Martic "A change in UNPROFOR's mandate would annul the Vance plan and its main principle that a political solution cannot be prejudiced."

Asked if the UN Security Council could vote for a change to UNPROFOR's mandate under the pressure of certain states which have acted as Croatia's sponsors and allies so far, and what this would mean for the final resolution of the crisis, Martic said that a unilateral change to the mandate is unacceptable and that such a decision would harm the peace process.

"UNPROFOR arrived with the consent of the warring sides, and a decision on extending or possibly changing its mandate must be reached in the same manner," Martic said. "However, if a resolution on a change to its mandate is adopted, placing UNPROFOR directly against the RSK and siding with the Republic of Croatia, we would treat UNPROFOR as an enemy—the term occupying forces would not be out of place," Martic explained.

He pointed out that Croatia's demands to the United Nations in asking for help to reintegrate the Serb territory (Krajina), has no basis in the UN Charter or in the UN Security Council's resolutions which Croatia had been citing. Croatia had been accepted into the United Nations despite the UN Charter, and three months after the Vance plan was adopted, Martic said, adding that the UN resolutions used to exert pressure and push the RSK into Croatia contravened the adopted (Vance) peace plan.

"As far as we are concerned, UN Security Council resolutions and decisions by certain states are not above the UN Charter, which recognizes a nation's right to self-determination," Martic said. "This right, established by the international community, is valid for all, including the Serb nation, and a political solution has to be sought on this basis."

The RSK president denied claims that a political solution, according to which the RSK would stay in Croatia with the widest possible autonomy, had been reached in the Russian embassy in Zagreb in March of this year. "The thought of accepting something like that has never crossed my mind," President Martic said.

## Deputy Minister Urges Recognition of Belgrade

*LD0208093194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0803 GMT 2 Aug 94*

[Text] The Croatian deputy foreign minister, Ivo Sanader, took part in Croatian television's political program "Croatia and the World" last night, and said, among other things, that Zagreb believes that the recognition of Croatia by Belgrade is inevitable. Sanader added that this issue will be topping the agenda at the future talks, not only with the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but will also be the crucial topic during the talks with the local Serbs. Answering the question of whether Zagreb is ready to resume talks with the Serbs from the occupied sections of Croatia, Sanader said tht Croatia was prepared to continue the talks, but this time on a wider base, namely, it would like not only to discuss economic issues, but the overall reintegration of the occupied areas. The deputy foreign minister added that now it was absolutely clear that the time had come for Zagreb and Belgrade to recognize each other and for the issue of the occupied areas of Croatia to be tackled to everyone's satisfaction.

## Simac Protests Italian Invitation of Serbs

*LD2907164094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jul 94*

[Text] Smiljan Simac, deputy minister for foreign affairs, today received an Italian parliamentary delegation, headed by Marco Pezoni. They talked about relations between Italy and Croatia, the status of the Italian minority, and the situation in the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia and neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Smiljan Simac conveyed to his guests the indignation of the Croatian public at the invitation sent to representatives of the rebel Serbs from the occupied territories by members of one of the coalition parties in the Italian Government.

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## Commander of 4th Guard Brigade Interviewed

*94BA0363A Zagreb HRVATSKI VOJNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 94 pp 13-15*

[Interview with Brigadier Damir Krsticevic, commander of 4th Guard Motorized Brigade, by Gordan Lausic; place and date not given: "In War, One Can Lead Only by Example"]

[Text] *"If you ask someone to risk his life, and every combat operation is a type of risk, then you must demonstrate at least an equivalent dose of willingness to risk your own life. But talking about risk does not mean asking people to engage in risky operations. Another foundation of trust is a good and measured command, based on all the factors that can influence the outcome. As far as organization is concerned, I must say that I value first of all fighters of the type I have known since the beginning of the war; however, we must recognize that fighters must slowly develop into soldiers, so that they remain ready and effective in the long run," Brigadier Damir Krsticevic, the commander of the 4th Guard Motorized Brigade, emphasized in an interview with HRVATSKI VOJNIK. On 28 April, the brigade celebrated its third birthday, and in the opinion of Corps General Janko Bobetko it has become the most exemplary unit of the Croatian Armed Forces.*

[Lausic] Brig. Krsticevic, you are certainly one of the youngest brigadiers in the Croatian Armed Forces, even in the world. Your career is a chronicle of nothing but success. You entered the homeland war as a volunteer, all of 20 years old. How have you managed to combine in yourself youth but also know-how, a skill at commanding?

[Krsticevic] Conditions were such that it was necessary to cope just as quickly as circumstances demanded. The burden of responsibility forced me, like everyone else, to learn and mature quickly. None of us had the right to make mistakes, and it is a good thing that we were all aware of the price of such mistakes. I am proud that I can say that from the present-day perspective I am not aware of any mistakes on my part of which I would have to be ashamed. I have had the good fortune of having assessed situations well, and that has brought about the current results. Along the way, the course of development, although rapid, passed through regular phases, beginning with the role of commander of a reconnaissance squad, and then leader of the 4th Battalion of the Guard Brigade, the 115th Imotski and 113d Sibenik Brigade, which reflects the inevitability of accepting maximum responsibility and moreover many refusals. In fact, a young person can achieve optimal results simply by investing maximum energy and love for the work that he does.

[Lausic] After performing a number of command functions, what did it feel like to return to your own unit, it seems to me with only one goal, to make it a top-notch professional unit of the Croatian Armed Forces, which will apply all its abilities toward one goal—a free Croatia?

[Krsticevic] The feeling was exceptional, given the respect and awe toward the unit that I had left only a short time before, in the position of battalion commander. All the more so since I was taking over the unit that had just carried out Operation "Maslenica" with exceptional success. In short, it was a mixed sense of pride, fear, and challenge. However, what kept me going was the conviction that the brigade is still largely made up of people whose human and combat value I had previously had the opportunity to experience. They were the foundation on which I decided to further develop myself and the brigade. An additional motivation was my decision upon previously leaving the brigade that I would return and continue my way here in my family, the 4th Guard Motorized Brigade. When Corps Gen. Janko Bobetko notified me on 13 July 1992 that I had to leave the brigade and accept a command, the transfer was extremely hard for me because even then I felt that the brigade was part of me.

I was part of those people and was trained there; ultimately one must not forget that I was only 20 years old when I arrived at the 4th Brigade. That reflects on what I emphasized earlier. That is the best indication of my feelings at the time. Perhaps this will ring hollow, but I contend that returning to the ranks of the 4th Brigade was my rebirth, regardless of the burden that it imposed.

[Lausic] Brig. Krsticevic, in terms of its organization and combat performance at the front, the 4th Guard Motorized Brigade is one of the most elite and competent units of the Croatian Armed Forces. You—or rather your way of working and the organization of the 4th Guard Motorized Brigade—deserve a great deal of credit for that. How did you manage in such a short period of time to organize and strengthen the combat readiness of an exceptionally complex unit like the guard brigade?

[Krsticevic] In the context of what I said earlier, one way of looking at it is that the 4th Brigade had a potential that only had to be selected and aimed. Based on experience from previous work, I knew that I would succeed to the extent that I succeeded in creating and gathering a good team around me. That team had to be shown the goals and general plans of one interval of time, and then be given maximum initiative and creativity in all the activities that it undertook. Everything else was routine. All that remained was continuous supervision and specific adjustments if the need arose.

This team, on the average composed of very young people who cropped up from the homeland war, in the very units of the 4th Guard Brigade, had the moral and empirical credibility to redraw the entire structure, which was crying for a breath of fresh air. I must also emphasize the people from 1991, who are still present in the brigade in appreciable numbers, and who are the real mainstay on which one can rely when carrying out every

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proper initiative. They are actually the backbone of every project, and the 4th Brigade must never renounce them, naturally on the condition that they continue to accept the inevitable process of advancement. I say that because I know all of them personally and they know me and my associates. All of this engenders absolute trust, which is later transformed into a feeling of belonging. That feeling is a recurrent motif that impels maximum devotion and giving regardless of the compensation. Love for one's job that is engendered in this way is priceless. I will stress, however, that our obligation is to at least attempt to compensate for it in order to avoid burnout.

[Lausic] As far as I can tell from the time that I have spent with members of the 4th Guard Brigade, you are a commander who is an outstanding example for your men. You are with your soldiers day and night, and work and organization are your motto. You have also launched a number of projects for the purpose of strengthening the brigade. What is next?

[Krsticevic] Commanding in wartime is possible only through personal example. Otherwise, you have authority for a short time, but the branch on which you are sitting will break very quickly because there will be no trump cards for you to play. If you ask someone to risk his life, and every combat operation is a type of risk, then you must demonstrate at least an equivalent dose of willingness to risk your own life. But talking about risk does not mean asking people to engage in risky operations.

Another foundation of trust is a good and measured command, based on all the factors that can influence the outcome. Soldiers will recognize very quickly that a command is well-thought-out and that a maximum of attention has been devoted to their protection and safety in choosing the manner of carrying out a mission, or that—on the other hand—there was no deliberate decision behind it. In only a few missions, you will be valued to the extent that you command consciously.

As far as organization is concerned, I must say that I value first of all fighters of the type I have known since the beginning of the war; however, we must recognize that fighters must slowly develop into soldiers, so that they remain ready and effective in the long run. I must admit that that has not been easy, but every situation in the field has been conducive to it. Good analysis made it possible to show where the mistakes were and what the price of them was. That has clearly yielded results and the process of advancement that is visible today. Such results retroactively leave an impression of the rightness of what was accepted and drive us on further.

Thus, the organization and advancement of the 4th Guard Brigade will grow permanently because at its root it is conditioned by awareness of the real need for these processes. As far as work is concerned, it is the prime mover of everything. We can have countless ideas, but if we do not endure in implementing them they will remain useless. By creating a working atmosphere, all potential side influences are neutralized and the psychology of a builder is achieved with each individual. As long as I am commander of the 4th Guard Brigade, or any other unit of the Croatian Armed Forces, there will be no place for people who do not work. In the context of the projects that follow, there is nothing especially new. It is primarily a continuation of the process of organizing, selecting, and training personnel, introducing more effective methods of warfare, more modern ordnance....

[Lausic] Besides maintaining psycho-physical readiness, the members of the 4th Guard Motorized Brigade are devoting special attention to caring for the families of their fellow soldiers who have died. You too always emphasize that this is the greatest concern for all of us, right?

[Krsticevic] That is a special duty not only of the 4th Brigade, but also of the entire Croatian state. I am certain that no one will fall short in fulfilling their obligations. It is possible that there are irregularities and indifference today, but tomorrow everything must be as it should. We can never stop repaying the debt to those people and their families. In this regard, however, I would speak not of duties, but rather of the moral obligation to us, who have had the good fortune to stay alive, to enjoy the achievements of our common struggle, to remain their eternal friends. We must not forget that we knew them, and I knew the majority of them, those people who brought with them their honor but not good fortune in battle, and that we are the ones who will always light a candle for them. That is the reason that we have initiated, within the realm of the possible, some projects to provide for their families, and with the help of decent people from this region of Croatia we have constructed a stately monument, a memorial chapel to the fallen knights of the 4th Brigade. It is in the center of our St. Cross Barracks and is there to remind us, to bring their families to our midst, i.e., to join us into one big family.

[Lausic] The members of the 4th Brigade are visually recognizable today. How was it that you chose the red beret?

[Krsticevic] The visual identity of the 4th Brigade is not coincidental. It is linked to its distinctive features and state of momentary organization. The red beret, besides being based on the traditional Croatian color, also signifies the aspiration to the role of an assault-landing unit. As far as this latter aspect is concerned, some of our members have already begun training for airborne landing activities, which will be obligatory for the rest of the unit as well. In short, the identity also promotes the goal of maturing into a modern, versatile unit.

[Lausic] It seems to me that while you have answered my questions, you have continually directed your eyes toward the motto of the 4th Guard Brigade—In hoc signo vinces—a motto that combines the brigade's past,

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present, and future. Have we witnessed the past and are we witnessing the present, while the 4th Brigade is the future?

[Krsticevic]-Translated, the slogan in our symbol means "With this sign you will emerge victorious," and it is completely justified. Indeed, a victory mentality has been created in this unit, and I can say with no qualms that on occasion it is hard to stop these people from expressing their own possibilities. I agree with you that that is the primary basis for our history. I similarly agree that this must be the basis for the brigade's present and future. Nevertheless, we will not build the future on that exclusively. There are many things that our members must learn yet, beyond simply emerging victorious. For me, there is never any question about that. Thus, they must learn to pay as little as possible for that victory, because Croatia is not Knin. Here, people must be the last alternative. In the future, the 4th Brigade will emerge victorious through its level of training, its shrewdness, and its quality of equipment. And we will return from the mission happy, because we will not find new names in the St. Cross chapel.

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## Russian Diplomat Views Relations, Issues

*AU0108195894 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 29 Jul 94 pp 7-9*

[Interview with Yuriy Petrovich Trushin, first Russian official representative in FYROM, by Maja Miskovska; place and date not given: "The Very Old Closeness of the Slavs"]

[Text] [Miskovska] What is your opinion of the cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM]?

[Trushin] The development of our relations with Macedonia is unique in many ways. The reason is that there is a range of historic, ethnic, political, and economic elements for that: The Macedonian and the Russian people have the same roots. Moreover, we are close because of common cultural values and religious roots, and we must remember that, after the invasion of the Tartars in Russia, and after losing independence, the south Slavs played a major role in the spiritual development of the Russian people. We must underline the importance and the character of the Macedonian-Russian contacts in the 10-11th centuries when Russia became Christian and when Slavic literacy was introduced. A great Russian scientist, the academic M. H. Tihomirov noted that probably "there cannot be found a better example of identical sources for cultural development and brotherly exchange of cultural wealth than the cultural links of Russia with the south Slavic peoples."

Those cultural links "were the basis for the very old closeness between the southern and eastern Slavs, who represented the best example of a brotherly exchange of cultural achievements among the peoples, an exchange that is not based on invasions and violence, but on the same origin, historic destiny, and cultural interests."

Unfortunately, for some reasons, the Russian-Macedonian links later remained as "adopted children" of history for many decades. The democratic changes in our country that made us give up a policy that was subordinated to ideological determinations and the mutual practice of recognizing the rights of the Balkan nations for independent development created a different basis for relations between Russia and Macedonia.

Russia was one of the first countries to recognized the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name and it is helping it in its efforts to gain admission to the United Nations, the CSCE, and to other international organizations.

Here are the Macedonian-Russian contacts that took place in 1992: Russian Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev visited Macedonia in May, [Vitaliy] Churkin in August, while the Macedonian deputy foreign minister visited Moscow in September. During the 47th UN General Assembly session in New York, Kozyrev had meetings with Macedonian leaders. In August 1993, our countries established official interstate relations and diplomatic offices were opened in Skopje and Moscow.

On 30 January this year, a very important event took place: Full diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. This procedure was accomplished by a diplomatic exchange between the foreign ministries of the two countries, parallel with all norms and regulations of the current diplomatic and international legal practice. Since January this year, there have been established normal diplomatic and legal relations between Macedonia and Russia. I have deliberately spoken about this issue, because this is the question about which there are many criticisms and polemics in our country, particularly from some very emotional parliamentarians and journalists who are obviously not qualified in diplomacy.

[Miskovska] Why is there not an ambassador in Skopje if there is already an embassy of the Russian Federation?

[Trushin] The fact that there is not yet a Russian ambassador in Skopje does not mean that diplomatic relations have not been established between our countries. We have not had an ambassador in the United States for almost a whole year, for six months in Spain, Colombia, Turkey, and a number of other countries, but nobody there criticizes its government for not establishing diplomatic relations. For instance, there was not a Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow for a longer period, but diplomatic relations were and still are being developed normally. This is a normal practice in the mutual relations between two states, which is not always caused by political reasons, but often the reason is that there are no political personnel, or perhaps the reasons are of a bureaucratic nature, which is characteristical for these countries. Mainly, these are the reasons for postponing the nomination of a Russian ambassador to Macedonia and the opening of an embassy, although the building has already been constructed. I have mentioned this several times in my statements and discussions, but obviously there are some who wish to obstruct a process that is leading to an intensification of Russian-Macedonian relations, presenting a false thesis to the public that diplomatic relations between Macedonia and Russia have not yet been established. Regarding this, we are surprised by the silence of your specialists in diplomatic protocol who are the most competent to "cool down" the criticisms.

[Miskovska] Considering that the Russian Federation was among the first to recognize us in a very difficult situation, is it true that Russia did this in coordination with the United States?

[Trushin] As far as the United States is concerned, it is out of the question that there is any coordination between us in relation to the recognition of Macedonia, because the Americans are in a different situation, and I am sure that Mr. Comras [name as published], the head of the U.S. diplomatic office in Skopje, can tell you more about that.

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[Miskovska] What do you think about your work here and what are your future plans?

[Trushin] I would like to mention our relations in the political sphere in 1994, and I think that a great progress has been made in the development of our relations. I should like to mention the visit of Churkin and his discussions with your leaders, the ministerial and consular advisers of Viktor Gaber [deputy foreign minister]. We are soon expecting a visit by Interior Minister [Ljubomir] Frckovski to Moscow. We are also making preparations for a visit by the Macedonian foreign minister [Stevo Crvenkovski] to Moscow. A visit by [Russian] Deputy Prime Minister Soskowetz to Macedonia is also possible.

There are important contacts among historians, archive services, scientific and technical workers, sportsmen, and so on. As far as the commercial contacts are concerned, we are interested in a broad exchange and fruitful cooperation. We signed a Russian-Macedonian agreement on commercial and economic cooperation in May 1993. There is also a direct air traffic between Moscow and Skopje.

In our opinion, the most important areas for a commercial and economic cooperation could be: Metallurgy, the electric power industry, transport, textiles, lumber, and the machine industry. The Russian side could participate in the construction of the railroad between Beljakoce and Guesevo, which will connect Macedonia and Bulgaria, as well as in the program on the development of the electric power industry in Macedonia.

In our opinion, there are also some Russian organizations that might be interested in participating in the "State Investment Program in Macedonia," particularly in building tunnels, electric power plants, irrigation systems, and oil plants. As you can see, there are good opportunities that should be utilized.

Unfortunately, the present various and intensive relations are very unequal. We are not delivering the necessary quantity of raw materials and other products, and in return we are receiving smaller quantities of the products we need compared to last year. I am thinking here about fruit, vegetables, wine, medicines, and other goods. We must involve mutual efforts to improve this situation, because if the obstacles in the economic cooperation remain, they can easily be politicized.

[Miskovska] You are saying that some economic matters can easily be politicized. Do you here refer to the construction of the gas line in Macedonia?

[Trushin] The construction of the gas line, exclusively meant for industry in Macedonia, will contribute to the stability of the energy supply in the country. The ecologic situation will be greatly improved in the towns, and it will be of a long lasting economic effect. That is of great importance for Macedonia. According to present assessments, the gas line construction that started two years ago should be completed in April 1995.

[Miskovska] Does the political turmoil in the Russian Federation, particularly the appearance of [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir] Zhirinovsky, have a greater effect on the Russian foreign policy?

[Trushin] The sooner Russia overcomes the deep social and economic crisis, the sooner Zhirinovsky's influence will fall. If the fall of the standard of living of a great number of Russian citizens is not stopped, all sorts of extremists will gather more strength.

This is nothing new, it used to happen even before.

[Miskovska] It was noted in the media that the Russian Federation has greatly decreased its sale of arms. What is the effect of this on the division of the cake among the superpowers?

[Trushin] The present world, particularly the world's economy with its strong and commanding threats, is far from being ideal and altruistic. We must accept it the way it is. We must not add to it, but we must not omit anything of importance.

The same goes for the trade of arms. Sometimes, when we speak about general human values, it does not coincide with the practical protection of national interests. After the USSR left the Near Eastern arms market, the United States became the greatest exporter of modern military technology, primarily to Arab countries hostile to Israel, where 75 percent of the weaponry is of U.S. origin. In general, in 1989-92, the United States increased its participation in world's arms supply from 17 to 38 percent. As a proverb says: The sacred place is never deserted.

[Miskovska] Do you think that the events that took place in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe are an attempt for a new Yalta?

[Trushin] Of course not. In moving toward Europe there is the danger of going back to the pre-war period, and, as you know, it was filled with inter-ethnic hatred and economic unbalance on the "Balkanized" continent.

As a result of a conflict between West and East, Europe can be divided again, but this time it will be between North and South.

The collapse of the system of confrontation and the provision of a global security created a certain unbalance in international relations. Although the world has been now liberated of the nuclear missile threat, it has been also deprived of its former stability. We must be worried by the intensified political, territorial, religious, ethnic, and other controversies in the Balkans, which may turn into armed conflicts and local wars, causing the danger of a conflict on a larger scale.

[Miskovska] What is the political future of the Balkans from the aspect of the collapse of former Yugoslavia, taking into consideration some talk about its reintegration?

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[Trushin] I cannot believe that any serious politician can forecast the future of the Balkans from the aspect of the collapse of former Yugoslavia. The ethnic map is extremely complicated and the interests of the big states in the territories inhabited by the south Slavs are intermingled. There are great hopes that this situation will soon be resolved.

However, I can make two different prognoses. First, if the problem of former Yugoslavia is not solved, then the next century for southeast Europe will mean a long lasting political instability in this region, which can also cause numerous international crises, as was the case at the beginning of this century. Secondly, the "Europeanization" of the Balkans and not the "Balkanization" of Europe is the only hope, that is the integration of the Balkan territories into Europe.

[Miskovska] What is your opinion about the spread of Islam in the Balkans and at large?

[Trushin] As far as Islam and its influence are concerned, I will be frank: I do not know enough about this issue, but I shall commit myself to studying it and then, after that, I will be able to give an answer.

[Miskovska] Regarding the Republic of Macedonia, do you think that the interests of the superpowers, including the Russian Federation and the United States, will affect the current and the future situation in the Republic of Macedonia?

[Trushin] In my opinion, the world community, especially the superpowers, are interested to see Macedonia as a stable democratic state that will implement a peaceful policy in the region and the whole world. Russia, like the other big states, will help it achieve this goal, within the framework of its possibilities.

[Miskovska] Are there any disagreements among the Russian Federation, the United States, and the European Union relating to the independent Macedonia and its position in the Balkans?

[Trushin] Well, each state has still got some national interests in this or that region. Traditionally, Russia has great interests and influence in the Balkans. However, the great changes in this region place the Russian policy in the most dangerous hot- bed of crisis in Europe, in new circumstances that create serious problems to us.

[Miskovska] What is your opinion about the fact that Serbia and Greece do not recognize Macedonia?

[Trushin] We made a decision to recognize all former Yugoslav republics. As far as Macedonia's neighbors are concerned, there is a new possibility for establishing good relations with the new state, which, according to its geographic and political position, its economic links, and its natural communication axes, is oriented to close ties with the FRY and Greece.

That is exactly what gives me hopes that the three neighboring republics will soon overcome the temporary difficulties in their relations and thus contribute to the development of partnership in conditions of peace and mutual understanding.

[Miskovska] What is your opinion about some claims that the creation of the two Yugoslavias, after World War I and World War II, was a mistake that lasted too long?

[Trushin] Neither I, nor anybody else, can give an answer to that. History will prove whether it was a mistake or not.

[Miskovska] How much is the public in Russia told about the situation in the Republic of Macedonia?

[Trushin] My main mission is to provoke good sentiments for Russia in Macedonia. Unfortunately, there is very little knowledge of Macedonia in Russia. That is why I am having enormous difficulties. I think that it is very difficult to inform the Russian nation about the actual events here. False information is frequently planted, for instance that a war is going to break out in Macedonia tomorrow. This false information has negative effects on tourism, and businessmen are reluctant to invest in this region.

[Miskovska] When the process of the transformation of all Eastern Europe started in 1989, Russia was often accused of being the most responsible for the collapse of the socialist bloc. How were the relations between Macedonia and Russia in that period?

[Trushin] Macedonia was and still is the only country in Eastern Europe where there was no Russian phobia. I mean there was neither hatred nor bad manners against the Russian people from the Macedonian people, and I was pleasantly surprised to see that.

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## Federal

### Foreign Trade Minister Reports on Ukraine Talks

*LD3007163794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1537 GMT 30 Jul 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, July 30 (TANJUG)—Potentials for economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Ukraine are practically unlimited, Yugoslav Foreign Economic Relations Minister Milorad Unkovic has stated.

The two countries' trade could be valued at 1.5 billion dollars once sanctions against Yugoslavia have been lifted, Unkovic told reporters in Belgrade. Unkovic was accompanying Prime Minister Radoje Kontic who headed a Yugoslav delegation on a three-day visit to Ukraine.

Ukraine has the potential to become one of Yugoslavia's four leading trade partners, Unkovic said. He also said that several business cooperation deals drafted during the visit should come into force once the anti-Yugoslav sanctions had been lifted or eased. Unkovic said that key areas of future cooperation were the automobile industry, where two-way exchanges could amount to 500,000 dollars a year, and the power, chemical and iron and steel industries. Agriculture, consumer goods sector, the electronic equipment, pharmaceutical and construction industry should not be ruled out either, he said.

Unkovic said he and his Ukrainian counterpart Oleg Slepich had also defined ways of cooperation in the exchange of food and medicines until the sanctions had been lifted. Both sides agreed that the sanctions had been detrimental for their economies, said Unkovic. Ukraine has lost about four billion dollars through the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

### New Program To Increase Energy Efficiency

*94BA0344B Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 94 pp 13-14*

[Article by D. Nedeljkovic: "Energy: Wasting What Belongs to Someone Else"]

[Text] The Federal Ministry for the Economy has prepared a program of incentives for substitution and efficient use of energy containing 14 specific measures and activities essential to at least getting things moving in this field, which has been under a spell. For two decades, that is, the specialists have been indicating and writing programs and proposing measures to improve efficiency in production and energy consumption, but the situation has gotten worse and worse. The well-known figure that Yugoslavia (both past and present) consumes three times more energy per unit of the social product than the countries of the European Union [EU] seems never to have disturbed anyone in the government—hardly anything has been done. It is perhaps more accurate to observe that the measures of economic policy and energy policy have contributed to the deterioration of energy efficiency, negligence, and wastefulness.

Since back in the time of the "energy crisis," the world took efficiency in energy use seriously as an opportunity to increase the social product, and it has accomplished an authentic miracle in various campaigns—from standards and regulations, then new technologies, control systems, and equipment, to incentives and tax credits. The countries of the EU have in 10 years (1980-90) achieved a 20-percent growth of the social product with a zero growth rate of energy consumption. At the same time, at a zero growth rate of the social product, Yugoslavia has recorded a growth of energy consumption exceeding 30 percent! After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and creation of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], and especially since introduction of the sanctions and the considerable energy shortages, the situation has continued to deteriorate: Efficiency has by professional assessment dropped another 22 percent, measured by the same yardstick. One can only guess what all this means, but the direct damage done to society as a whole, and to individuals in particular, is drastically evident from a few specific examples. If there were no blockade, or, better put, if it were removed, all domestic products would be more expensive on foreign markets by the excess energy consumed, which means that they would not be competitive. Without getting into quality, design, and marketing, energy inputs alone are a barrier to foreign markets. So there is no point boasting about inexpensive manpower, which in any case is more an embarrassment than a comparative advantage.

It is an illusion that anything is achieved by prescribing low energy prices, electric power rates, for example. Someone has to pay the economic price of domestic power (which is above the price in the advanced countries); if it is not paid by the consumer through the rate system, it is paid by the state through hampered development, a lower social product, and a lower standard of living. Or through the plundering of energy resources which nature created over millennia in this region, which comes to the same thing. We should not lose sight of the fact that back in 1991 the FRY was importing more than half of its total energy needs, at world prices of course, and that it was wasting that energy. A few years ago, when the Finns studied the situation in the Serbian Glass Factory in Paracin and concluded that $20 million a year could be saved, no one believed them. The factory's total annual revenues amounted to $50 million, so that the figure on that kind of savings sounded improbable. However, the Finns observed at the same time that with the same capacity and the same size of the labor force, they could realize a revenue of $100 million and a saving of $20 million. Something similar, using another model of energy (but also general) efficiency, was also ascertained at Crvena Zastava in Kragujevac, the Cement Factory in Kosjeric, the Balkan Factory in Suva Reka, the Aluminum Combine in Podgorica, the heat and power plant in Novi Sad, and several other enterprises.

All of those studies were done with the help of the EU and a special program of the United Nations, the purpose being

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for the advanced countries to market on a commercial basis the technologies and experiences gained in efficient energy consumption in past decades. The rapid economic growth and growth of the national income in the countries of the former socialist world with the same amount or considerably greater energy consumption also implies many other things besides an evident commercial interest. Extending the life of conventional energy resources, the environmental aspect of the planet, and probably certain political objectives as well. A few years ago, Yugoslavia was the closest candidate and was abundantly assisted to join in the global energy efficiency program, but when the country fell apart and the sanctions were applied, everything came to a halt.

Sticking to the energy aspect of the problem, the essential question is what is driving the government to behave differently from the rest of the world, to conduct a "policy" and adopt measures which directly detract from the efficiency of energy use. Is there some concealed interest here, is it a question of interrepublic disagreements (which certainly had an effect in the former state), or is this simply a continuation of the "socialist" way of thinking (it is important to build new things, to consume as many tons, kilowatts, and liters as possible)? The answer is not simple, although it is difficult to escape the impression that ignorance is still dominant. The way in which one becomes a minister, a director, the way in which one gets an important post and position, the way one gets into power and stays there, obviously has a decisive impact on behavior with respect to fuel and energy, but that goes outside this topic. It is easy to waste what belongs to someone else out of ignorance and irresponsibility, especially when no accounts are rendered to anyone. That is why the new program of the Federal Ministry of Industry has little chance, although it was drafted by a special team "on assignment" and as a segment of the federal government's economic policy for this year. Half a year has passed for that matter, and the program still has not been taken up; procedure, establishment of jurisdiction, and various administrative snags (should matters be dealt with at the federal level or the republic level) are preventing it from getting on the "agenda." But it is clear that two of the proposed measures are crucial: establishing economic prices of all forms of energy and their mutual parity (otherwise there is no point in any of the other measures proposed) and forming an agency that will keep track of energy in a professional way.

**[Box, p 14]**

**Incentives for Substitution and Conservation of Energy**

1) Energy price policy

2) Rate systems for the sale of electric power and natural gas

3) Reduction of energy costs of users of budget funds

4) Bringing production standards and environmental standards to the projected level in the energy sector

5) Achievement of the projected standards of energy consumption and pollution of the environment in transportation and municipal utilities

6) Utilization of waste and secondary raw materials

7) Technical regulations in the area of efficient energy use

8) Tax credits on equipment and materials

9) Exemption from customs duties and special import charges

10) Tax credits on corporation profits

11) Tax deductions for construction contractors and equipment suppliers on capital investment projects for substitution of imported energy by domestic energy

12) Furnishing financial funds to support the incentives

13) Promotional campaigns

14) Agency for energy efficiency

## Kozyrev Discusses Peace Plan With Serbian TV

*LD0108141194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1238 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Aug (TANJUG)—Russia is impatiently waiting for the moment when the sanctions against the FRY are lifted and when it will launch and increase its cooperation with Yugoslavia in all spheres, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told Zoran Jevdjovic, an editor at Serbian Television, immediately after last night's talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

"This is why there is a permanent invitation for the Serbian prime minister to visit Moscow, and I hope that he will come soon to sign a general agreement on economic cooperation," Kozyrev said.

"Because of our long-standing friendship and because we are interested in close relations [with Yugoslavia], we support the peace plan for solving the Bosnian crisis," the Russian foreign minister stressed.

Commenting on the Contact Group's plan, Kozyrev said that there were pressures to alter the maps to the other side's advantage, and there are also attempts to put the Bosnian Serbs in a disadvantageous position in relation to the other side.

"All this was rejected, so the plan remains valid. The plan offers equal rights to the Bosnian Serbs. Of course, we are speaking about Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan gives guarantees for the border. It will not be a new front line, but an internationally recognized border guaranteed by the international community, and it will even be physically protected by peacekeepers. If necessary and where it is needed, Russian peacekeepers will be deployed. We are ready to send Russian troops to protect the areas of greatest importance for the Serbs," Kozyrev said.

Explaining some unknown facts about the constitutional agreements, Kozyrev said: "If the other side wants to

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enter into confederal relations with Croatia—and it seems that it does—the Bosnian Serbs will have the right to do the same with Serbia, that is, with the FRY, if the two sides reach an agreement on this. It is not up to us to decide that. But, that right is absolutely clear. Therefore, if both sides—Belgrade and Pale—opt for confederal relations, they are free to do so. I believe that this is an equal, balanced, and very favorable plan for the whole of the Serbian nation."

In support of this statement, Kozyrev said that the Contact Group's plan grants the Serb Republic half of the [Bosnian] territory.

"According to any criteria, the plan is useful for the Bosnian Serbs. However, it is especially useful for Serbia itself and for Yugoslavia because, from the moment the plan is accepted, the easing and lifting of the sanctions will begin. When the plan is implemented, all sanctions will be completely lifted and we will have boundless opportunity for cooperation. Yugoslavia will regain its rightful place in the international community and will have Russia's full support. Therefore, the only choice is to say 'yes', because 'yes' means peace, no sanctions, and the return to its rightful place in the international community."

"If the reply is 'no', I think there is a danger of the escalation of violence, and this is against the Serb tradition. We cannot support it. Russia cannot take part in it. If the war escalates, if a big confrontation happens, there is the danger of a war in the air waged by NATO. We shall not take part in that war. We are taking part only in peace. Therefore, we would withdraw the Russian peacekeepers, and that would be a very bad choice. I do not wish to discuss it. That would mean slipping into a state of war for which the Serb people would be blamed. That would cause huge economic, military, political, and cultural damage. The Serb people would suffer for that reason, and therefore President Yeltsin clearly said that we are in favor of the plan. I hope that the reply is going to be 'yes'. There is still time."

Asked what Russia's stand on President Milosevic's statement and on his attitude toward the Yugoslav crisis would be, Kozyrev said:

"I consider this a very clear and correct understanding of the plan which offers full guarantees in the interest of the Serb nation, and I deem it to be a completely correct statement. This is a real statement of a leader of the Serbs and Serbia."

Will the Western countries also accept that stand?

"This stand was correctly conveyed. There is no doubt that everything President Milosevic said is what the international community said. I mean, it was not something that the president made up; he just understood the plan correctly. But I wonder whether others, primarily the people in Pale, really understand the plan. They do not seem to understand it."

"The president presented simple facts, all that is true. If the answer is 'yes' all that President Milosevic said will be realized—guarantees, the lifting of the sanctions, the return of Yugoslavia and Serbia to the international community. This is the correct meaning of the plan and therefore Russia supports it," Andrey Kozyrev said at the end of his interview to Belgrade TV.

## Serbia

### Djindjic Warns Against Belgrade-Pale 'Dispute'

*AU0108155094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 1 Aug 94*

[Telephone interview with Democratic Party President Zoran Djindjic by Svetlana Zivkovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Zivkovic] Mr. Djindjic, how do you see the resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis after the statements by [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic and [Russian Foreign Minister] Andrey Kozyrev.

[Djindjic] I believe that guarantees pose the fundamental problem for the Serbian side; namely, guarantees that, by making the territorial concessions to which it has essentially already agreed, the Serbian side would receive adequate political concessions to safeguard its status as an international state, for it not be forced to live in a close community with the enemy side, and for it to enjoy a political status that will allow it to enter a sort of state link with its neighboring countries, that is, with the FRY.

According to the statements by Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Kozyrev, these guarantees do exist, however, only in words. As I understood it, the reserve of the Bosnian Serbs refers to the firmness of these guarantees and, because of bad experiences in the past, they demand that these guarantees be put in writing. I believe that for them only two points are controversial: That the state sovereignty of the Serbian Republic be guaranteed at the moment of signing the agreement on maps and that the status of Sarajevo be defined immediately, because Sarajevo represents a part of the territory where some territorial exchanges could be carried out in the bilateral contacts with the adversary side by which the currently rather unfavorable corridor would be widened a little.

I believe that these are truly acceptable conditions and only a little effort on behalf of the contact group is needed to meet these conditions; to transform the given oral promises into a written agreement and for all the warring sides in Geneva to sign two written agreements: One referring to the territorial division and the second referring to the political status of this future state.

[Zivkovic] How do you think the Serbian Republic, that is to say, the leadership and the Assembly of the Serbian Republic, will react?

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[Djindjic] I believe that they will not step down from their demands, because they have had numerous opportunities so far had they wanted to accept oral guarantees. The fact that they did not accept them is sufficient proof that they will continue to insist on the finalization of the rudimentary segments of the peace plan. The worst thing in my opinion would be if a dispute or a polemic broke out between Belgrade and Pale and if this dispute is carried out through the media. All controversial points should be resolved independently of the media. If there is a dispute, it should not see the light of day and the people should not be divided and polarized by the positions of these two sides. I believe that this would harm all of us. I hope that our politicians who are making decisions will demonstrate sufficient maturity and wisdom to refrain from public reactions—regardless of how much they believe they might be right, on either side, to reduce tensions a little—so that, in this critical moment, we can present a more-or-less unanimous front to the international community.

[Zivkovic] Mr. Djindjic, thank you.

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